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ABSTRACT 
 
STATES AND GROUP RIGHTS: LEGAL PLURALISM AND THE  
DECENTRALIZATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 
 
Emma Hayward 
 
When do states decentralize judicial power to ethnic and religious minority groups? This dissertation 
presents a theory to explain why states are willing to undertake significant transfers of power by lending 
their support to ascriptive, group-based law. It begins with a literature review of scholarship in comparative 
politics and public law, both of which argue, for different reasons, that because the judiciary is vital to the 
state’s coercive apparatus, property rights regime, and governing functions, we should not expect states to 
decentralize judicial power. Yet over half of the world’s states choose to officially engage with legal 
pluralism by delegating power to group-based law; so the remainder of this work builds a theory to explain 
under what conditions states devolve or share judicial power with ethnic or religious minority groups, and 
what accounts for the variation in state approaches to judicial decentralization. To do this, it uses process 
tracing methods and an institutional choice approach. It offers a test of this theory through three full case 
studies and three shadow cases: Lebanon, Egypt, and Tanzania (full cases); and the United Kingdom, 
France, and Malawi (shadow cases). The data that it draws upon consists of 21 months of fieldwork in all 6 
countries in which the author conducted approximately 450 interviews, as well as local newspapers, 
archives, and secondary source materials. Using this data, the dissertation creates a typology that maps the 
concept of judicial decentralization according to two characteristics: the unity or plurality of the national 
court structure and the state’s legal doctrine, with a resulting six types of judicial decentralization. Through 
a study of one case of each type, it finds that judicial decentralization is in significant measure the outcome 
of bargaining between state leaders and minority group elites, in which the capacities of the state’s leaders 
and the capacities of group elites, both shaped by multiple factors, are decisive in determining the degree of 
decentralization. It concludes with a summary of findings, sample court cases from each case study 
country, and suggestions as to possible avenues for further research.  
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Chapter One: Methodology, Theory, and Causal Argument 
 
 
Introduction 
 
When do states decentralize judicial power, creating a particular form of legal 
pluralism? Why do they sometimes permit ethnic and religious groups to live under their 
own laws in their own communities? In many states, people belonging to different 
groups—usually divided along ethnic or religious lines—live under separate sets of laws. 
In Malaysia, for example, the state maintains two sets of official courts: one for Muslims 
and one for non-Muslims.1 While the state operates parallel judicial systems in Malaysia, 
in many other places, it instead allows minority groups to manage their own courts or 
legal procedures. Religious groups in Lebanon are given complete autonomy over 
personal status law, which governs marriage, divorce, custody, guardianship, and 
inheritance. For a long time, Lebanon’s 19 official religions had exclusive jurisdiction; 
only in 2013 did the Lebanese government pass a law creating an option for civil 
marriage offered by the state. In many other places, the relationship between minority 
group law and the state is more fluid and less official. In Malawi, for instance, tribal 
customary courts were abolished with the introduction of multi-party democracy, but in 
practice they continue to adjudicate the majority of the country’s disputes with the tacit 
acknowledgement of most politicians.2 
                                                
1 Yvonne Tew, “The Malaysian Court System: A Tale of Two Courts.” 19 Commonwealth Jud. J. 3-7 
2 Franz von Benda Beckmann, F., Legal Pluralism in Malawi: History from 1858-1970 and Emerging 
Issues, Kachere Series 2007. 
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In most states, judicial diversity is the norm. The end of colonialism forced newly 
independent governments to navigate a judicial terrain characterized by strong legal 
pluralism. Immigration sometimes has the effect of creating enclaves of like-minded 
citizens who find that they prefer not to fully abandon the legal edicts of their place of 
origin (England’s sharia councils are one such example). In the last half-century, treaties 
and global conventions such as International Labor Organization no. 169, which 
recognizes group rights explicitly, have legitimized the demands of minority groups that 
want state recognition for their norms and legal practices.3 Accordingly, most states find 
themselves having to decide how much judicial autonomy they both can and want to 
afford those minority groups that demand it. That governments seriously entertain 
thoughts of sharing judicial power, and that many of them choose to do so, flies in the 
face of traditional narratives of the state possessing a legitimate monopoly on the use of 
coercion. Existing theories of the state lead us to expect that states should seek to 
monopolize their coercive power and oppose devolutions of authority where state 
functions are delegated to sometimes-oppositional minority groups.  
How, then, can we explain the fact that states delegate judicial power to minority 
groups? Is it that the states that do so are experimenting with new ways to manage ethnic 
conflict, or have the civil societies in these states gained sufficient strength to 
successfully make such demands? Or is this trend the by-product of democratization and 
the recognition of group rights? Neither regime type nor level of economic development, 
or even prior history of decentralization is able to fully explain this phenomenon. Yet the 
answers to these questions are crucial for developing a better understanding of how states 
                                                
3 International Labour Organization (ILO), Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, C169, 27 June 
1989, C169, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ddb6d514.html [accessed 19 March 2018]. 
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are renegotiating their ties to ethnic and religious communities, whether immigrant or 
indigenous, and to extending our theoretical knowledge of comparative law beyond 
formal constitutionalism. This study thus aims to answer two separate questions: what 
causes states to devolve or share judicial power in the first place? And among those who 
devolve judicial authority, what accounts for the variation in state approaches to judicial 
decentralization? 
Few political scientists have addressed the more general topic of legal pluralism, 
much less judicial decentralization, directly, although it sits at the intersection of a 
number of fields that have been of longstanding interest to the discipline. Research on 
legal pluralism has implications for ethnic conflict studies because, like 
consociationalism or federalism, each of which can be associated with legal pluralism, it 
offers minority groups a possible compromise between the preservation of identity and 
inclusion in the larger state. It is also of interest to scholars of state-society relations 
because the assumption of judicial functions by societal groups suggests a possible 
rethinking of the boundaries between the state and society.4 Perhaps more importantly, 
legal pluralism offers rich material to the field of democratization (and particularly de-
democratization) because it has become popular in recent democracies such as South 
Africa and Bolivia as a way of recognizing group rights. Current research raises 
concerns, however, that the traditional authorities who are entrusted with adjudication 
responsibilities via judicial decentralization use their position to entrench their power and 
                                                
4 Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third 
World, Princeton University Press (1988); Timothy Mitchell, “The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist 
Approaches and Their Critics.” The American Political Science Review 85, no. 1 (1991): 77. 
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create authoritarian enclaves in otherwise constitutionally democratic states.5 
Additionally, the study of legal pluralism has implications for the rule of law literature 
because judicial decentralization creates tensions between the often-cited need for 
equality under the law (for example, Dicey 1915) and the practical reality that forcibly 
eliminating minority group adjudication forums often creates waves of violence and 
crime.6  
I propose that judicial decentralization can best be seen as the outcome of a 
process of bargaining and contestation in which the relative capacities of minority group 
elites in comparison to state leaders’ capacities determines the resulting institutional 
configuration. Capacity is further defined and discussed below. Six distinct patterns result 
from this process, ranging from the full devolution of judicial authority in a particular 
domain to incorporation of group law into state courts to a ban on anything other than 
state law. This study explores one case of each type. By uncovering the prevalence of 
judicial decentralization, this project challenges the norm of unified central judiciaries. It 
articulates the circumstances under which states give up a portion of their judicial power 
in contested processes that, in unmaking part of the state, often permit it to extend its 
power in other ways. 
 
Literature Review 
 
                                                
5 Aninka Claassens and Ben Cousins, Land, Power, and Custom: Controversies Generated by South 
Africa’s Communal Land Rights Act, 1st ed. Ohio University Press (2009). 
6 See, for example, Tanzania in the mid 1980s in Leila Chirayath, Caroline Sage, C, and Michael 
Woolcock, “Customary Law and Policy Reform: Engaging with the Plurality of Justice Systems,” World 
Bank: Washington, DC (2005). 
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The study of judicially diverse states has long been the focus of the literature on 
legal pluralism. Legal pluralism was of particular interest to the academic community at 
the height of the critical legal studies movement in the 1970s and early 1980s, when legal 
sociologists and anthropologists determined, primarily through the study of individual 
cases, that beyond the domain of state law exists a vast and rich world of secondary, 
group-based legal systems that are as much or more binding on their constituents than 
state law. Most early studies of legal pluralism focused on places such as South Africa, 
Ghana, Indonesia, and other developing (and often post-colonial) states.7 The majority of 
data collected on legal pluralism at the time came from groups such as the Third World 
Legal Studies Association and the Commission on Folk Law and Legal Pluralism, whose 
names reflect their underlying and long-unchallenged assumption that legal pluralism was 
a cultural phenomenon that belonged distinctly to developing countries.8 It was studied 
primarily in places where customary law was predominant—typically, scholars found 
legal pluralism in the contrast between “unofficial” customary law systems and the 
“official” civil or common law legal systems that were established by and left over from 
colonial regimes.9 Moving away from tribal or customary law and toward a single, state-
administered judicial system was often seen as not only desirable, but as a necessary 
condition in the process of modernization and state development. 
 Early correctives to this somewhat stark conception of legal pluralism came with 
a shift in focus to industrialized and “modernized” states. Chiba published an account of 
legal pluralism in Japan during and after the Meiji restoration, which he argues resulted 
                                                
7 Sally Engle Merry, “Legal Pluralism,” Law & Society Review 22 (1988): 869.   
8 Masaji Chiba, Legal Pluralism: Toward a General Theory through Japanese Legal Culture, Tokai 
University Press (1989), see first chapter. 
9 John Griffiths, “What is Legal Pluralism?” Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 24 (1986): 1-
55.   
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from a process of clash and accommodation between old and new legal systems.10 Until 
recently, then, the legal pluralism literature focused on states where an old and a new, or 
an “indigenous” and an “imposed” system coexisted—in essence, states where two 
separate sources or types of law were brought together, and where legal pluralism has 
been the unintentional result of an inability to merge the two systems or for one system to 
completely replace the other. There has been much less research on states where legal 
diversity exists in an intentional framework, such as federal states or states that grant 
subgroups judicial autonomy in certain areas of the law. Accordingly, the outcome of 
interest for this study is judicial decentralization, a form of legal pluralism involving the 
transfer of judicial power to particularistic legal communities, usually ethnic or religious 
minority groups. Legal pluralism in many of its forms can exist with or without state 
recognition or interference; judicial decentralization is the result of institutional choice. 
Most political science literature emphasizes the importance of state sovereignty, 
indicating that even small amounts of judicial decentralization should be a rare 
phenomenon. Even in the scholarship on state building, where one might expect to find 
more contingent assessments of the state’s capacity for full sovereignty, variations of 
Weber’s claim that a state possesses a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
within a given territory” are standard.11 In the introduction to Rule and Revenue, Levi 
notes “The object of state regulations changes with time and place. However, all states 
attempt to monopolize the concentrated means of violence within a given territory. All 
implement and enforce property rights and other formal rules.”12 This definition, 
according to her, makes it possible to discern whether or not a state exists in a given 
                                                
10 Chiba, 71. 
11 Max Weber, Politics As a Vocation, Indianapolis: Hackett Pub Co, 2004. 
12 Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue, University of California Press, 1989, 1. 
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territorial space. Tilly, who dispenses with the idea that the state’s coercive force must be 
legitimate, defines states as “Relatively centralized, differentiated organizations, the 
officials of which more or less successfully claim control over the chief concentrated 
means of violence within a population inhabiting a large, contiguous territory.”13 Because 
judiciaries are an integral part of the state’s coercive apparatus, giving that power away 
or sharing it would imply a partial unmaking of the state. Although the state-society 
literature engages with the mutually constitutive relationship between the state and its 
constituent societal groups, it has only preliminarily considered judicial power. 
Two bodies of literature in public law and comparative politics present a strong 
theoretical and empirical explanation of why we expect that states avoid devolving 
judicial power. In the public law literature, Shapiro, Becker, and Ginsburg and Moustafa 
argue that states make use of courts to bolster the central authority and legitimacy of the 
regime.14 The three studies separately contend that alongside their dispute resolution 
function, courts also have social control and regime strengthening functions. Becker 
notes, “There seems little doubt that…governments can use the establishment of a court 
procedure and system to excellent advantage in fulfilling their desires for centralization 
or merely amalgamation of local power.”15 He argues that courts derive this ability to 
“induce political loyalty” from their “actual practice of impartiality and objectivity” as 
dispute resolvers.16 Shapiro agrees that courts can produce loyalty through impartiality, 
                                                
13 Tilly in Peter Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, & T. Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985, 170. 
14 Martin M Shapiro, Courts, a Comparative and Political Analysis, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
(1981); Theodore L Becker, Comparative Judicial Politics, University Press of America (1987); Tom 
Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa, Rule By Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, 1 ed., 
Cambridge (2008). 
15 Becker, 371. 
16 Ibid. 
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but contends that wider power is derived from the norm-shaping role that state courts 
exercise when they use state laws to resolve private and public disputes.17  
Both Becker and Shapiro use the example of medieval English courts shortly after 
the Norman invasion to illustrate the part that courts play in regime centralization. 
According to Becker, the crown, concerned about the wide-ranging powers of the barons 
and unable to establish authority via military conquest, opted to establish a court system, 
which, in order to “compete successfully with the lords’ private courts…had to offer 
benefits their competitors did not, and even better, could not offer.”18 The royal courts 
gained popularity for their perceived neutrality and logical procedures (at least in 
comparison with the local lords’ courts). The barons came to understand that they, too, 
could benefit from using these courts.19 Thus for Becker, centralization occurred via the 
individual choice, market-based mechanism of forum shopping. Shapiro tells much the 
same story but credits the success of courts as centralizers to additional factors. He 
contends that the structure of the royal courts was specifically designed to augment 
central authority. Rather than designate local deputies to judge disputes for the king, the 
Norman court set up the “eyre” system, under which the king sent an administrative 
official to hold court in the towns on brief tours through the countryside, after which he 
would report back to the royal court.20 Thus, judicial officials never had the opportunity 
to build local loyalty, and in addition, they served as a reporting mechanism to inform the 
king about local infringements of the law.  
                                                
17 Shapiro 1981, 18-26. 
18 Becker, 366. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Shapiro notes “They were not local subordinates of a central judicial authority tied to it by lines of 
hierarchical control, that is, appeals procedures. Instead, they were literally pieces of a central judiciary on 
temporary trips through the countryside” 72-73. 
 9 
Winning litigants away from local lords’ courts built direct ties between 
individual citizens and the regime. These ties gave the royal court the ability to provide a 
much-needed service (adjudication) directly to the people, cutting out the barons 
altogether. In addition, every time the king’s circulating official judged a dispute, he used 
the same set of norms and laws to do so. This law, for the first time, “developed as a 
uniform, national law, partially written and partly resident in the minds of a few hundred 
easily consulted lawyers in the capital, and directly backed by the authority of the 
crown.”21 Replacing local norms and practices with royal law meant that every instance 
of adjudication served to reinforce royal law and to further educate locals about its 
provisions. Shapiro generalizes this point beyond the English example: “a scattered 
population living largely by customary and local law may be governed more efficiently 
by central authorities if a unified body of law is introduced.”22 Indeed, in all states “a 
major function of courts…is to assist in holding the countryside” because “judging, like 
administering, may be principally designed to hold and exploit the countryside for the 
central regime.”23 
For these reasons, we should expect state authorities to avoid judicial 
decentralization. If courts are effective in centralizing power, then used in a similar way 
by local officials, they could also effectively decentralize or fragment political authority. 
If sub-state entities have the potential to develop dispute resolution mechanisms with all 
of the requisite criteria, then, as Shapiro argues, “for roughly the same reasons, courts 
may appeal to those who wish to resist, revolt against or maintain their independence 
                                                
21 Shapiro, 79-80. 
22 Ibid., 23. 
23 Ibid., 24. 
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from central regimes.”24 Indeed, Shapiro cites Vietnam as a case where the Cao Dai, 
rebels against the French occupation and the central regime of Southern Vietnam, created 
a separate court system that drew litigants away from official state courts and bolstered 
support for the rebels.25 According to this logic, we should expect dissident groups to 
create their own courts, both to gain the ability to administer their own laws and norms 
and to increase support for the group’s institutions.  
The literature on the rule of law also offers both a theoretical and empirical 
challenge to judicial decentralization. Most rule of law theories argue that citizens should 
be treated equally under the law, with the implication that everyone should be governed 
by the same sets of laws. Although there are usually legal exceptions for minors, those 
deemed mentally incompetent, and some other categories of people, today grounds for 
exception in most normative theories do not fall along ascriptive lines such as religion or 
race. Theories of the rule of law also view the state as legally monistic, claiming that for 
states to exercise authority over their citizens in a legitimate manner, certain requirements 
must be met such as holding the rulers accountable under the same set of rules that 
govern their citizens and treating all citizens equally under the law.26 Until recently, most 
rule of law consultants working in developing states advised legal centralization.27 
The state building literature in comparative politics also indicates that we should 
expect states to avoid delegating coercive power, particularly if it involves property rights 
or punishing crimes. Scott, in Seeing Like a State, argues that states developed property 
                                                
24 Ibid., 24. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, Macmillan (1897); Lon L 
Fuller, The Morality of Law: Revised Edition, Yale University Press (1969.) Dicey and Fuller’s theories 
were developed partially in response to older theories of law (such as legal positivism, e.g. Austin 1885) to 
complicate the argument that the source of the law is its most important legitimizing characteristic.  
27 Kleinfield in Thomas Carothers, Ed, Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2006). 
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law codes to simplify tax collection. States could not levy taxes on land unless there was 
an individual associated with the land who could pay the tax.28 State officials thus set out 
to destroy customary land tenure, which often allowed for rotating, temporary, and 
communal ownership. They replaced it with “modern” property law, which specified 
individual ownership.29 Scott notes “the very concept of a modern state presupposes a 
simplified and uniform property regime that is legible and hence manipulable from the 
center.”30 Additionally, as states have become the primary agents of property rights 
enforcement, they have gained an effective coercive tool in the form of threats to 
property (fines, fees, loss of land, etc.). We should thus expect states to resist devolving 
these capacities to local authorities—particularly local authorities not under the direct 
control of the state. 
For Huntington, in Political Order in Changing Societies, a major source of 
political institutionalization lies in state autonomy from society. Institutionalization, for 
Huntington, is the best way to ensure that political institutions survive the process of 
modernization, which they must do if the polity is to avoid social upheaval and political 
violence.31 State autonomy involves developing institutions that pursue the interests of 
the state rather than those of families, clans, or other sub-state groups.32 This applies to 
the judiciary, in particular, which is “independent to the extent that it adheres to distinctly 
judicial norms and to the extent that its perspectives and behavior are independent of 
those of other political institutions and social groupings.”33 A legal system that has 
                                                
28 James C Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, 
Yale University Press (1999), 33. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 35. 
31 Samuel P Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven (1968), 53-55. 
32 Ibid., 20. 
33 Ibid. 
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separate courts for different groups would necessarily contravene this principle and 
thereby hinder institutionalization.  
In Boundaries and Belonging, Migdal explains that one of the primary functions 
of a state is to maintain its boundaries, both as physical borders and the more general 
conception of the state, against sub and supra-state challenges to them.34 He argues that 
boundaries are preserved through checkpoints such as borders, identity cards, and other 
means of separating entities within the state from those outside of it, and through mental 
maps, which “incorporate elements of the meaning people attach to spatial 
configurations, the loyalties they hold, the emotions and passions that groupings evoke, 
and their cognitive ideas about how the world is constructed.”35 When the mental maps 
held by subgroups within the state are incongruent with the physical boundaries of the 
state, people have to decide “which boundaries, principles, and practices to submit to and 
which to violate (with all the attendant consequences).”36 Migdal emphasizes that the 
decision to contest boundaries often involves challenging state law. He writes: 
 
But in fact, the contestation of boundaries can be much more subtle and less 
immediately obvious. One way to think about these less obvious, but still insidious 
challenges to state boundaries is through a central institution of the state, the law. 
For states, probably nothing constitutes them more than law, the rules of conduct 
that prescribe proper behavior for its members and the control implied by the 
enforcement of the codes. Not only does the law set out the ways of doing things, it 
also projects an essential part of the image of the state, as when it denotes the whole 
body of rules, institutions (such as courts) associated with them, and their affective 
component (as in “respect for the law”). People are classified by whether they stay 
within state laws (law-abiding) or step outside them (lawbreakers). State law, then, 
                                                
34 Joel S. Migdal, Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and 
Local Practices., Cambridge University Press (2008), see introductory chapter. 
35 Ibid., 6-7. 
36 Ibid., 23. 
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both prescribes behavior within the boundaries of the state and symbolically 
demarks those boundaries by signifying the realm and limits of the state’s law.37 
 
Thus, law is a constitutive and central element of the state such that “when others put 
forward an alternative code to state law—let’s say, that of a street gang—they contest not 
only the code itself but the realm and its limits suggested by the law.”38 When the group 
is not a street gang but a group of immigrants, or co-religionists, or indigenous 
inhabitants, the challenge is correspondingly stronger.  
 For several scholars, there is something inherent in the nature of the modern state 
that requires it to demand unquestioned sovereignty within its borders. In “State, Power, 
and Citizenship in the Middle East,” Butenschon notes “The state commands 
monopolistic control over coercive means within its jurisdiction. No other authority 
structure in society—be it based in the family, religious leadership, or tribal 
organization—can legitimately demand loyalty from one of its members in a way that 
contradicts his or her obligations toward the state.”39 Migdal, in characterizing the state’s 
relationship to society, argues “what has distinguished the modern state from most other 
large-scale political organizations in history, such as empires, has been its insinuation 
into the core identities of its subjects…they aim to shape people’s entire moral orders…a 
transformative state simply cannot let any struggle over domination within its official 
boundaries go uncontested; state leaders want the state to matter most, enough to die 
for.”40 Thus, there is also a normative dimension to a state’s relationship with its 
                                                
37 Ibid., 13. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Butenschon in Nils Butenschon, Uri Davis, and Manuel S. Hassassian, Citizenship and the State in the 
Middle East: Approaches and Applications, Syracuse University Press (2000), 13. 
40 Joel S Migdal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue, State Power and Social Forces: Domination and 
Transformation in the Third World, Cambridge University Press (1994), 13.  
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subgroups—although the complexities of state bureaucracy generally compel a certain 
amount of delegation to local officials, a state will not accept challenges to its 
sovereignty. 
 There are clearly many compelling reasons for states to avoid judicial 
decentralization. Although local officials may administer state finances or run the local 
branches of state programs, there is a qualitative difference between these types of 
decentralization and judicial decentralization, because only the latter involves sharing or 
devolving coercive power. Even federal states, which are the most likely to accord 
substantial law-making and enforcement power to their federated sub-regions, often 
forestall unlimited local judicial discretion by mandating that local laws and practices be 
in accordance with a federal constitution. Nevertheless, at least half of the world’s states 
pursue some form of judicial decentralization. How can we explain why do they do so, 
and what accounts for different patterns of judicial decentralization? 
 
Conceptualization of Judicial Decentralization 
 
One of the challenges in studying judicial decentralization (or legal pluralism, in 
general) is that it is difficult to define the concept in an easily quantifiable manner. Even 
with a definition that permits coding, it is challenging to measure in practice. Nor do 
proxy variables manage to capture the concept accurately. What does it mean, really, for 
a state to decentralize judicial power? In some places, it involves an effort to codify 
group law for use in state courts by state judges. In others, it means turning a blind eye 
when groups choose to ignore the law on the books and solve community disputes 
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according to local standards of justice. Discovering the extent of judicial decentralization 
requires both familiarity with a country’s laws and observation of its courts in practice—
most especially those in areas where conflicting, local norms appear to predominate. 
Until there is a better picture of the scope of legal pluralism world wide, quantitative 
analysis is limited in its ability to explain the phenomenon. 
The overall methodology adopted here is thus qualitative. I rely on the 
comparative method in the form of paired cases, examined through process tracing. 
Before theorizing about the causes of judicial decentralization, we need to both define the 
term and map the full extent of the concept. The former gains specific content from the 
latter, so I will begin with a conceptual typology that demarcates the different forms of 
judicial decentralization. Collier, LaPorte, and Seawright distinguish between typologies 
that serve a conceptual or descriptive purpose and those whose function is mainly 
explanatory.41 Conceptual typologies, appropriately developed and applied, “explicate the 
meaning of a concept by mapping out its dimensions.”42 By contrast, explanatory 
typologies, according to Elman, are “multidimensional conceptual classifications based 
on an explicitly based theory.”43  
Collier et al define explanatory typologies as those in which “cell types are the 
outcomes to be explained and the rows and columns are the explanatory variables.”44 
Explanatory typologies most often serve as a visual representation of the author’s causal 
                                                
41 David Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing,” PS: Political Science & Politics 44, no. 04 (2011): 
823–30, 218, citing Elman (2005) for the term “explanatory typologies.”  
42 Ibid., 218. 
43 Colin Elman, “Explanatory Typologies in Qualitative Studies of International Politics,” International 
Organization 59, no. 02 (2005): 293–326, 296. 
44 Collier et al 218. Many studies of typologies and typological reasoning precede those of Collier et al and 
Elman, including Marradi (1990), Bailey (1994), and others, but I rely on the two more recent studies 
because they extend the logics of previous analyses and discuss their applicability to more recent research 
methods.  
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argument, usually depicted as a two-by-two cell matrix whose contents are the product of 
certain combinations of variables. According to Elman, descriptive typologies answer the 
question “What constitutes this type?” while explanatory typologies answer the question 
“If my theory is correct, what do I expect to see?”45 Elman argues that explanatory 
typologies must be based on a preexisting theory, which may be derived through the 
inductive method of observation, or the deductive method of formal models, although 
they are more appropriately suited to the latter. 46 Deductive reasoning, where variables 
yield types without prior reference to empirical observations, runs the risk of creating 
empty cells in a matrix.47  Comparing the typological reasoning used by Elman as 
opposed to that of Collier et al, one could argue that researchers who employ inductive 
reasoning begin with conceptual typologies and work toward explanatory ones, whereas 
deductive researchers begin with explanatory typologies and, based on them, generate 
conceptual ones. 
Comparativists also rely on typologies in the process of case selection.48 Often, 
these typologies are preexisting. For researchers interested in developing new theories, or 
theories only peripherally based on preexisting work, both kinds of typologies are 
needed. This is particularly true of areas of the discipline that have been under theorized 
or weakly theorized in the past. For example, although authoritarianism had been the 
subject of previous study, Linz’s typology of different kinds of autocratic regimes 
                                                
45 Elman, 298. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Some researchers do employ explanatory typologies that yield empty cells. For instance, Elman cites 
Schweller’s balance-of-interests typology, 317-18. 
48 For example, Gerring (2002) refers to nine different methods of case selection, including typical, 
influential, crucial, and pathway cases, all of which are chosen based on the case’s relationship to 
explanatory variables x and y (and sometimes x2 and y2), 89-90. A co-authored follow-up article (with 
Seawright) provides qualitative and quantitative methods for each type of case selection, but the exercise of 
defining a case as crucial, typical, or otherwise relies on the ability to classify the case as compared to 
similar cases, which is an inherently typologizing exercise. 
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brought clarity to the study of non-democracies and a wave of research based on his work 
followed.49 Catherine Boone’s Political Topographies of the African State is a good 
example of the use of both kinds of typology to develop a new theory. It begins with a 
conceptual typology that delineates four variations of rulers’ institutional choices in 
Africa.50 Using the categories from this typology, she introduces three variables that are 
causally linked to the four institutional outcomes.51 Together, the two typologies map the 
domain of her theory and introduce variables and outcomes that she explores through 
case studies of each type.52  
This study follows the analytic two-step of pairing conceptual and explanatory 
typologies in building a theory to explain judicial decentralization. First, it is necessary to 
create a theoretically oriented conceptual typology that maps the complete domain of the 
concept both for analytic clarity and to ensure that the resulting theory does not omit 
crucial types. Three typologies of legal pluralism already exist, but they are unsuitable for 
present purposes for several reasons. Sezgin, Forsyth, and Malik all categorize legal 
pluralism, although Sezgin’s study is restricted to family law and Malik’s is limited to 
                                                
49 Juan J Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, Lynne Rienner Publishers (2000). 
50 Catherine Boone, Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional 
Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2003), 33. She uses two variables drawn from the public 
administration literature, namely the spatial configuration of the regime (concentrated or de-concentrated) 
and the identity of local authorities (rural elites or state agents) to categorize four types of regime strategy: 
power sharing, usurpation, non-incorporation, and administrative occupation. Given the presence of 
variables, it is tempting to see this typology as explanatory, but that is a mistake—the parameters of spatial 
configuration and identity are used to define, not generate, the resulting categories, i.e. a regime is 
categorized as power sharing because it is characterized by rural elites and a deconcentrated power 
structure, but those two variables alone are not enough to predict its presence. Rather, a regime’s choice of 
a power sharing strategy is explained by the presence of three variables: cash producing crops, a rural 
social hierarchy, and an elite dependent on the regime. 
51 Ibid., 37. 
52 Other scholars who use conceptual and explanatory typologies to generate new theories include Dahl 
(1971), Tilly and Tarrow (2007), and Falleti (2010), among others. This is by no means to claim that theory 
development is only possible, or even successful, if it incorporates typological reasoning. Many 
groundbreaking studies (Levi 1988; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992, and Brownlee 2007, 
among others) do not make use of typologies. Nevertheless, typologies have tremendous potential benefit 
for theory development, particularly as concerns developing well-defined concepts. 
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analysis of the United Kingdom.53 Forsyth’s typology is based on original fieldwork and 
an extensive review of the literature and presents the most wide-ranging framework of 
the phenomenon. She includes seven ways in which states choose to address legal 
pluralism including repression of non-state legal orders, tacit acceptance, active 
encouragement despite an official ban, and four types of government recognition of other 
legal orders.54 By mapping her types of legal pluralism along a single variable, degree of 
autonomy, Forsyth cannot distinguish between different sites of government policy, such 
as the difference between incorporating codified versions of group law into state courts 
versus delegating judicial power directly to group officials.  
Accordingly, I propose a new conceptual typology of judicial decentralization 
mapped along two axes: the first concerns the structure of the national courts, and the 
second concerns the state’s legal doctrines. These dimensions are chosen because 
together, they describe the form and content of the judiciary. The structure of the national 
courts refers to whether or not the state permits the existence of multiple judicial forums 
with separate legal rules and procedures. We should expect, and indeed find, that most 
states attempt to preserve a unitary court system. This is true because a plural court 
structure is a larger delegation of power than merely incorporating separate legal codes or 
assessors into state courts. However, not every attempt to maintain a unified judiciary 
succeeds, so there are three sub-types within the larger category of a unified judiciary 
(see table below). Unitary national court systems are those in which the state successfully 
                                                
53 Yuksel Sezgin, “Theorizing Formal Pluralism : Quantification of Legal Pluralism for Spatio –Temporal 
Analysis,” Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 50 (2004): 101-18.; Miranda Forsyth, “A 
Typology of Relationships Between State and Non-State Justice Systems,” Journal of Legal Pluralism 56 
(2007); Maleiha Malik, Minority Legal Orders in the UK: Minorities, Pluralism and the Law, British 
Academy for the Humanities and Social Sciences, 2012. 
54 Forsyth, 70-72. 
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maintains a single national court system. Failed Unitary states are those whose policy 
preference is legal centralization, but for any one of a number of reasons, cannot attain 
full unity. Most states in this category intentionally adopt limited structural pluralism 
because they are unable to succeed with unification. Those that do so in combination with 
a unified legal doctrine mostly choose, however, to only tacitly accept the presence of 
non-state legal forums, whereas those with a plural legal doctrine usually explicitly 
permit a limited plural legal structure (see below for full definitions of both types). Plural 
court structures occur when the government acknowledges the existence of, and either 
recognizes or chooses to work with, one or more legal forums controlled by non-state 
agents. 
The variable of the state’s legal doctrine refers to whether or not the state’s legal 
doctrine encompasses a single source or multiple sources of law.55 In unitary doctrinal 
systems, the state has a single, clearly defined legal doctrine and is not willing to admit 
any other legal codes or doctrines into state courts. In doctrinally plural states, the state 
engages with multiple legal codes or doctrines. Sometimes these separate laws are 
litigated in state courts by state judges, and sometimes in separate, group-based forums 
by group judges.  
Like all ideal types, those used here involve necessary simplification. Regimes 
often use multiple strategies simultaneously. For example, Tanzania’s government 
incorporates the codified customary laws of many of its patrilineal tribes into state law, 
and judges are supposed to use this law when adjudicating disputes that fall under the 
                                                
55 The question of multiple sources of law necessarily excludes private international law. Even the most 
legally homogenous states do, by and large, honor legal covenants and contracts that its non-citizen 
residents entered into in the state that holds their citizenship. See Westlake and Topham (2013) and 
Borchers (2014) for more on private international law. 
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jurisdiction of customary law. In reality, however, most of Tanzania’s judicial 
decentralization is exercised at the level of its separate Ward Tribunals and ten-cell 
arbitration forums, run by local elders, and the assessors (also local elders) whose opinion 
is binding upon primary court judges. The delegation of judicial authority to community 
elders without legal training is both Tanzania’s most significant devolution of judicial 
power, and also the site of the greatest volume of adjudication, so it is fair to categorize 
Tanzania’s judicial decentralization as primarily sited outside of its state courts despite 
the addition of tribal law to Tanzania’s legal code. Similar caveats apply to each of the 
following types, but, following a tradition of ideal types in political science stretching 
back to Weber, the analytic clarity achieved by creating types outweighs the risks of 
oversimplification. 
 
Table 1 
Conceptual Typology of Judicial Decentralization 
  Structure of the National Courts 
  Unitary Failed Unitary Plural 
Legal 
Doctrine 
Unified Full Centralization 
(France) 
Tacit Devolution** 
(Malawi) 
(UK—Common law) 
 
Diverse Partial Incorporation 
(Egypt) 
Partial Decentralization  
(Tanzania) 
Full Decentralization 
(Lebanon) 
 
**Common Law Devolution: A small category of states in the Unified/Failed Unitary 
category warrants special attention (and a separate name). Some liberal, common law 
states choose to devolve certain amounts of judicial power for political purposes, such as 
integration, the protection of diversity, etc. These states form a category titled “Common 
Law Devolution.” See below Table 2 for a description of each type. 
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All of these categories represent some degree of judicial decentralization with the 
exception of the full centralization type. A partial incorporation state, such as Egypt, 
incorporates the legal codes of minority groups into state law, allowing modification only 
through judges or parliamentary acts, whereas in a partial decentralization state such as 
Tanzania, the state creates structures that allow local elites more of a say in judicial 
matters. See below, following Figure 2, for a full description of each type. Before moving 
to causal analysis, however, it is useful to provide one further schema detailing the 
relationship between the above types. The conceptual typology maps the domain of 
judicial decentralization but does not fully indicate which types involve a greater transfer 
of judicial power. Although a typology that uses degree alone is not as useful as one that 
can more fully explicate each type, placing each type in order from the least to most 
amount of decentralization creates a useful visual and another dimension of comparison. 
The risk of doing so is that judicial power can be measured in a number of different ways, 
especially vis-à-vis questions of decentralization.56 Has more decentralization taken place 
when the regime openly transfers judicial power through legislation, or when it officially 
bans non-state adjudication but deliberately turns a blind eye toward the operation of a 
complete parallel justice system? Perhaps surprisingly, the latter usually involves more 
actual autonomy for non-state agents who wield local-level judicial authority. Because 
                                                
56 For example, Forsyth categorizes Botswana as repressing non-state justice, the equivalent of the category 
“fully centralized” in the typology used here, because the state has officially incorporated customary law 
courts into the state system (73; 102-106). However, tribal chiefs or their deputies adjudicate disputes in 
these courts, and, with the exception of criminal law, they may apply non-state, tribal law as long as it does 
not conflict with state law. Additionally, as Forsyth acknowledges, many chiefs extend their delegated 
judicial function to rule on village-level customary cases outside state-based customary courts (73). 
Accordingly, based on the understanding of judicial decentralization used here, Botswana cannot be 
categorized as a fully centralized system. Rather, it is an example of partial decentralization, where non-
state agents are deputized in particular domains (family law, etc.) but not others (criminal law). 
 22 
the outcome of interest is judicial (de)centralization, it is tempting to view “official”, 
legislation-based transfers of power as involving more decentralization, but the decision 
to tacitly accept an officially banned form of adjudication, as long as the rules are 
understood by the actors involved, does constitute a larger, if more precarious, transfer of 
power. Accordingly, the metric adopted here is one of effective rather than de jure power. 
From this standpoint, a ranking from least to most judicial decentralization is as follows: 
 
 
 
Figure 1  
A Ranking of the Types of Judicial Decentralization 
 
A description of each type of legal pluralism follows below. 
 
Full Decentralization: 
Full decentralization involves the complete delegation of judicial authority to a 
group such that it enjoys full autonomy over legal substance and procedure in a defined 
area. It is characterized by a plural judicial structure that incorporates multiple legal 
forums and a plural legal doctrine that recognizes more than one source of law. Although 
this is somewhat rare, it occurs most frequently in Latin American states such as Bolivia 
that are attempting to honor their commitment to ILO 169 and certain Middle Eastern 
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states, such as Lebanon, where family law is delegated to religious groups to the 
exclusion of the state. The most important feature of these states is that within the domain 
of law in which group courts have exclusive jurisdiction, there is no possible appeal to 
state courts. That said, states do not necessarily decentralize judicial power across the full 
legal realm; no state currently permits the existence of a complete parallel justice system 
that to which it lends its coercive power. However, full delegation in a domain such as 
family law, land law, and the like is a serious devolution of judicial power. States of this 
type include Lebanon, Bolivia, and Israel. 
 
Tacit Devolution:  
Like partial decentralization, tacit devolution is one of the broadest and most 
populated types. In this category, states maintain a unified judiciary that does not 
incorporate elements of minority group law, and they do not officially recognize group-
based legal forums either. At the same time, the state chooses to ignore the existence of 
one or more sets of minority group judicial institutions that often provide the majority of 
judicial recourse at the local level. The state’s legal doctrine is unitary; its national courts 
recognize no source of law other than state law. The state maintains a unitary court 
system, but at the same time, it “delegates” the adjudication of disputes according to 
other legal systems to structures that it does not officially acknowledge. Crucially, the act 
of delegation is deliberately unofficial; although no acts or laws acknowledge it, every 
judicial and government officials are aware of the situation. As Forsyth argues “In the 
vast majority of countries in the world where there is both a weak state and a non-state 
justice system of some sort, there is no formal recognition given to a non-state justice 
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system, but the state turns a ‘blind eye’ to the fact that the non-state justice system 
processes the vast majority of disputes, and state actors often unofficially encourage 
reliance on the non-state justice system.”57  
In most cases of this type, lack of resources is a compelling reason for states to 
unofficially permit parallel justice systems to handle most adjudication. However, in 
many places that are just as under-resourced, the state has managed to either incorporate 
tribal courts into the state judiciary or build sufficient numbers of courts to close down 
rival systems. Lack of resources is therefore not the primary reason for this policy. 
Instead, rural elites may possess the power to corral votes for candidates, or to delay or 
implement development projects, or other, similar types of authority that make urban 
rulers reluctant to curtail rural elite power in any kind of way that would lead them to 
oppose the ruling coalition. Lack of official recognition gives these states very little 
means of regulating parallel justice systems, and, as a consequence, these other tribunals 
are mostly left to establish their own laws and procedures. Examples of this type include 
Malawi, Ghana, Kiribati, the Solomon Islands, and Lesotho.  
 
Partial Decentralization:  
This category is perhaps the most broad and encompasses a larger number of 
cases than either of the previous two types. Partial decentralization includes a wide range 
of measures that give minority communities the right to adjudicate certain types of 
disputes without seeking recourse in state courts. It also gives them control over the 
content of their laws, as opposed to the static codes that characterize partial 
incorporation. The state consciously adopts a plural legal doctrine, and although it 
                                                
57 Forsyth, 75. 
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maintains a unitary national court system, it uses two separate mechanisms to make space 
for its plural doctrine: assimilating group law into the national courts through the use of 
assessors, and delegating petty instances to forums operated by village elders that sit just 
below the bottom rung of the judiciary. In this category, it is usual for the state to 
preserve exclusive jurisdiction in criminal law matters of a non-petty nature and civil law 
cases that involve above a certain value of money. The state also retains control of at 
least parts of the appeals process, so that a case that begins in a non-state forum can 
always be appealed in state courts.  
Beyond these measures of control, the state can decentralize judicial power in one 
or more ways, for instance by creating a layer of village or neighborhood-level 
adjudication forums operated by local lay officials where most, if not all judicial 
questions begin. These forums are usually not required to conform to standards of state 
law and instead are meant to achieve reconciliation or, in more serious cases, preliminary 
fact-finding before cases are passed along to state courts. States pursuing partial 
decentralization can also incorporate assessors into state courts, possibly giving them an 
important role in the evidentiary phase of the proceedings or even the ability to overrule 
the magistrate.58 The state can also designate a particular area of the law, often land law 
or family law, as being under the jurisdiction of local, community-run courts, with 
jurisdiction covering a higher monetary value than would be permitted in neighborhood 
                                                
58 Several European countries such as Denmark and Germany use the term “assessor” to signify either a 
qualified magistrate or a judge-in-training. In the United Kingdom, assessors are technical content experts 
who provide specific testimony. Here, the term assessor is used in the sense in which it still operates in 
many former colonies, which is that of a lay official, usually a community member, whose role is to advise 
the magistrate or judge during trial proceedings and sometimes offer an opinion on questions of fact, local 
law, or even the verdict. Assessors were initially introduced to replace the seemingly more cumbersome 
full jury, and their participation is intended to provide community participation in adjudication and local 
knowledge, rather than expert or technical content. For more on assessors, see Gray (1958), Jearey (1961), 
Sawyerr (1969), and Vidmar (2002) 
 26 
forums. In Tanzania, for example, until 2002 all land cases up to the value of three 
million shillings were required to be submitted first to locally-run Ward Tribunals, whose 
staff were not magistrates.59 In essence, partial judicial decentralization involves the 
delegation of certain, delimited judicial powers to non-state actors in a way that gives 
them flexibility regarding the contents of the law, but that preserves the state’s right to a 
final say through the appeals structure. The extent of decentralization varies from one 
case to the next, as does the amount of effective judicial power that is transferred. In 
many places, a dearth of state courts at the village level make local arbitration forums the 
first and last recourse for the majority of disputes that arise, petty or otherwise, and the 
option to appeal is rarely exercised. Examples of this type include Tanzania, Kyrgyzstan, 
Samoa, Botswana, and South Africa, among others. 
 
Partial Incorporation:  
States in this category have a unitary judicial system in which only state judges 
may adjudicate disputes. It differs from the next category, however, in that its judicial 
system incorporates multiple sets of legal codes that apply to different sectors of the 
population, usually according to ascriptive characteristics such as religious affiliation or 
ethnicity. It thus combines a unitary national court system with a plural legal doctrine. In 
these cases, state judges adjudicate all disputes and, in most places, they do so without 
regard to the identity of the litigants, i.e. in Egypt, a Muslim judge uses codified Coptic 
Orthodox law to judge a family law dispute between Coptic Orthodox co-religionists, 
although some places may stipulate that only co-group members can adjudicate disputes. 
                                                
59 In rural areas, Ward Tribunals still have the authority to adjudicate land disputes, but in municipal and 
urban areas, new land courts created by the Land Disputes Court Act of 2002 (Cap 216) have taken over 
this function. 
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Unlike partial decentralization states, however, partial incorporation states retain control 
over all legal codes used in its national courts, i.e. it uses a codified version of group law 
that the group may not alter. It is usual for the existence of separate codes to be limited to 
the domain of family law, although sometimes other types of civil law are included as 
well. In other words, there exist separate laws for separate communities, but these laws 
are fixed and often quite difficult to change. Examples of this type include Egypt, Jordan, 
and some states in India. 
 
Common Law Incorporation 
The fourth category is common law incorporation, in which liberal, common law 
states use various mechanisms to create judicial space for the customs and traditions of 
religious and ethnic groups. These states have a unitary legal doctrine of common law 
and unitary assimilating national courts. Assimilation takes place when, for reasons of 
equity, they temporarily and voluntarily incorporate group-based legal systems into the 
courts through the testimony of legal experts, or allow religious law to form a temporary 
standard for arbitration. It should be noted that this category is somewhat rare and is 
limited to states whose legal systems are not a hybrid between common law and other 
legal systems. The most common mechanisms for accommodating non-state law are 
arbitration, common law recognition, and permitting extrajudicial forums to exist on the 
sidelines of state courts with the explicit understanding that their rulings are not legal 
decisions. As opposed to countries in the full centralization type, these states permit, and 
sometimes encourage, religious or identity group-based arbitration.  
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In England, for example, groups may offer particularistic adjudication services, 
such as Sharia arbitration, so long as they use only those elements of Sharia law that are 
compatible with state law.60 In some states, magistrates and judges can choose to use 
group membership as a criterion in judicial decision-making such that they incorporate 
elements of the group’s legal system into the adjudication process despite having 
officially adopted neither the group’s legal code nor its legal procedures. In England, for 
reasons of equity, courts have chosen to recognize the validity of religious marriages that 
are otherwise precluded from official status by the 1949 Marriage Act.61 States in this 
category often also allow minority groups to provide wider-reaching adjudication outside 
the purview of state law. For example, in the United States and the United Kingdom, 
Jewish Beth Din and Muslim Sharia courts provide divorces and settle other family law 
disputes, although these decisions are neither recognized nor enforced by the state. At the 
same time, the government chooses not to eliminate these forums, unlike full 
centralization states. The best exemplar of this type is the United Kingdom, although 
certain states in the United States, such as New York, are also good examples. 
 
Full Centralization: 
                                                
60 The Muslim Arbitration Tribunal in the United Kingdom offers Sharia arbitration according to the 
Arbitration Act of 1996. 
61 These types of legal exceptions or equity-based decisions also happen in adoptions, inheritance disputes, 
and other religious and family law cases. See, among others, the cases of Alhaji Mohamed v Knott [1969] 1 
QB1, Chief Adjudication Officer v Kirpal Kaur Bath [2000] 1 FLR 8 CA, and the unreported 2000 case of 
Ali v Ali in Werner Menski “Governance and Governability in South Asian Family Laws and in Diaspora,” 
The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 45:1 (2013), 42-57. In theory, common law states use 
community norms to arrive at standards of behavior that are used to guide legal practitioners when relevant 
legal codes are either lacking or in need of clarification. In general, the standard used has been the behavior 
of the “rational man.” Recently, cultural critiques of the rational man argument have begun to emerge and 
to challenge a single, homogenous standard of rationality, and to promote the idea of different standards for 
different communities. Whether or not states are willing to tolerate multiple common law standards is still 
up for debate, but decisions that acknowledge plural communal norms begin to create grounds for diversity 
within common law. 
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States characterized by full centralization are those whose laws do not recognize 
the binding jurisdiction of any other judicial forums apart from the state judiciary. Their 
legal doctrines are unitary, as are their national court systems. By and large, these are 
civil law countries. Some states in this category permit arbitration tribunals, usually non-
permanent, to resolve certain types of disputes, such as those involving business 
contracts, although not all of them do so. Even the ones that do allow arbitration retain 
the authority to remove certain areas of law from arbitration entirely. For example, in 
France, arbitration cannot ever be used in family law matters. Additionally, most 
countries require that an arbitrator disclose any reason as to why he may not be fully 
impartial in any given case. Religious or community membership can constitute such 
grounds. Many of these states, such as Germany and France, are also secular. In the 
judicial realm, this means that using religious standards for arbitration is impermissible, 
unlike in common law states such as Britain and the United States.62 Finally, these states 
do not tacitly accept the existence of minority group forums, even if they do not interfere 
with state courts. In sum, then, these states fully centralize law to the best of their ability. 
Examples of this type of state include France, Germany, Tunisia, Morocco, and Japan. 
 
Methodology 
 
With these six types established and defined, the next task is to develop a unified 
theory to explain judicial decentralization, accounting for its different iterations. 
Following Boone’s approach in Political Topographies of the African State, the 
                                                
62 The distinction between common and civil law states here is not absolute, but, by and large, common law 
states have more judicial structures in place to accommodate judicial diversity. 
 30 
framework of analysis used here is one of institutional choice.63 The institutional choice 
approach is particularly useful for explaining variations in institutional structure in 
settings of contested authority where the state and other powerful groups, such as rural 
elites or interest groups, vie for control over resources. Institutional choice theory has 
been deployed to explain many different political and economic outcomes such as state 
formation (Levi 1988), regime structure (Frye 1997, Boone 2003, Benoit and Schiemann 
2001), democratic transitions and consolidation (Elster 1996, Bastian and Luckham 2003, 
Bernhard 2005), and economic development (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1998, Bates 
1998). Because it was developed, by and large, by scholars working in the state-society 
literature, it was initially used to explain the process of state making—how do states 
develop effective taxation strategies (Levi 1988)? How does the level of power vested in 
the executive emerge (Frye 1997)? Boone summarizes the components of this type of 
theory: “models of bargaining or competition over institutional choice should specify 
actors’ choice sets, interests, resources, and relative bargaining power.”64 Institutions are 
thus seen as the product of negotiations, or what Boone terms “battling”, between 
multiple actors with different capacities for obtaining different sets of policy preferences.  
                                                
63 Limiting the study of judicial decentralization to more liberal states, it is tempting to see it as a process of 
political accommodation, which has been variously defined as “the outcome of the process of consultation, 
negotiation, compromise, and conflict whereby elites allocate public resources” (Presthus 1973) and “the 
objectives, arrangements, processes, or outcomes of mutual conciliation of people’s competing political 
interests and perspectives” (Hilal et al 2014). Although accommodationist politics can occur in contested 
settings, it is generally reserved for “situations where there is absence of comprehensive consensus but not 
a complete lack of consensus” (Hilal et al). Because states fundamentally oppose granting judicial 
autonomy, they do so only in situations of constrained choice, and so institutional choice theory is the 
better framework of analysis. Even states that have a normative commitment to judicial diversity prefer to 
honor it in ways that do not weaken state power. In Tanzania, for example, President Nyerere wanted to 
create a unified tribal customary law code that would bring African values into the legal system, but his 
preference was not to allow each tribe to preserve its own separate customary law, which was what actually 
happened. 
64 Boone, 8. 
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As will be further explained below, I argue that the degree of judicial 
decentralization is shaped by bargaining between minority group elites and state elites. 
The outcome of this bargaining is determined by the capacities that group elites and state 
leaders bring to bear in the bargaining process. These capacities involve various factors, 
such as control over and access to coercive force; control over institutions; popular 
support; access to natural resources; wealth; and the degree of coordination that state 
leaders and group elites are able to achieve, among other factors. The importance of any 
one of these particular capacities depends on the context of the bargaining scenario, i.e. 
what the state most needs from group elites at the moment of bargaining over levels of 
judicial (de)centralization. Colonial legacies have a strong, but not exclusive role in 
shaping these capacities, as I will show in the following case study chapters. Colonial 
legacies alone, however, cannot explain changes in the degree of judicial decentralization 
that have taken place since the original postcolonial bargaining moment.  
It is common for states to modify their policies of judicial decentralization over 
time, but the original degree of decentralization is usually arrived at during the process of 
state formation and consolidation, often in the years after independence (for post-colonial 
states). As such, any study of the phenomenon necessarily looks back in time to the 
state’s first attempt to navigate judicial diversity. Ideally, it would be possible to know 
each actor’s capacity and policy preference, and to track the process of bargaining 
through all of its stages. However, using historical data, sometimes going very far back 
(for example, Greif 1998, Levi 1988), or even in more recent cases where archival 
material has been destroyed or badly preserved, it is usually impossible to meet this 
standard. Even so, institutional choice theory is particularly well suited to situations 
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where access to data is constrained. It is effective even without quantitative measures, 
and for that reason it has been used to explain political outcomes in historical cases such 
as ancient Rome and medieval Europe where full retrospective measurement is not 
always possible.65  
The more successful uses of institutional choice theory do not take actors’ 
interests as given, but rather use available data, historical or otherwise, to reconstruct 
preferences and capacities involved in the bargaining process. As such, this study views 
capacity formation as endogenous to the process as a whole. Accordingly, the first task 
for institutional choice theorists is to infer the capacities and interests of the parties 
involved from the available data. If one cannot know precisely what a group’s capacity is 
relative to the state, it should at least be possible to find evidence that it was high enough 
to prevent the state from implementing policy, or high enough to warrant attempts to win 
the group over to supporting the state’s position, etc. Process tracing devices such as 
smoking gun and straw in the wind tests (see below) can be used to ensure that the 
inference has strong empirical support.66  
Because colonial legacies play a role in shaping the capacity of both group elites 
and state leaders, this study emphasizes the importance of temporality.67 Not all causal 
processes unfold at the same pace or occur simultaneously, but in many cases, events that 
happen earlier in a sequence have more causal weight than those that happen later.68 
Pierson argues “placing politics in time—systematically situating particular moments 
                                                
65 For example, in Of Rule and Revenue Levi op. cit. argues that shifts in the bargaining power of the 
regime compared with that of the commons and changes in transaction costs allowed England to increase 
its tax collection during the eighteenth century (127-37). At no point does she quantify either bargaining 
power or transaction cost. 
66 Collier 2011, Mahoney 2012. 
67 See the following section for the full causal argument. 
68 Pierson in James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social 
Sciences, Cambridge University Press, (2003). 
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(including the present) in a temporal sequence of events and processes—can greatly 
enrich our understanding of complex social dynamics.”69 Accordingly, the trajectory of 
the variables is traced back at least one, and sometimes two, historical periods before the 
bargaining process.70 However, because bargaining happens at a defined moment in 
history, these capacities must be examined through the lens of the bargaining context, i.e. 
what the state most needs from the groups in question such that it is willing to give up a 
degree of judicial control. 
 Because the analysis here involves inferring capacity formation across time, the 
method adopted is one of process tracing. Bernhard argues that institutional choice theory 
faces problems of evidence in articulating actors’ interests and preferences, but that these 
difficulties can be attenuated by relying on thick description rather than surveys of cross-
national data.71 His argument is borne out by how many institutional choice studies rely 
on historically rich accounts.72 Process tracing has become widespread as a method to 
guide the researcher’s use and interpretation of historical narratives and to map causal 
processes over time.73 Process tracing involves the creation of theory-guided dense 
                                                
69 Paul Pierson, “Not Just What But When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes,” “ Studies in 
American Political Development 14 (2000): 72-92, 72. Incorporating timing and sequence into causal 
analysis does not necessarily imply path dependence. Although some sequences are self-reinforcing, 
Pierson maintains that it is plausible to find that a sequence is causally relevant without arguing that it 
necessarily self-replicates. Equally, even a self-reinforcing sequence can be interrupted by an exogenous 
shock. Here, timing is incorporated into the analysis without prior commitment to either very long or self-
reinforcing sequences. 
70 By this logic, newly independent states or new colonial regimes have weaker preferences than do the 
societal groups that they come to rule. For the most part, this is true, evidenced by the fact that regimes are 
often willing to trade one set of policy priorities for another according to various institutional choice 
scenarios. Sometimes, however, other forces aside from time, such as treaty obligations, inflexible budgets, 
or constitutional rules can make a regime’s commitments just as strong or stronger than those of interest 
groups, even when they form over a short period. 
71 Michael Bernhard, Institutions And The Fate Of Democracy: Germany And Poland In The Twentieth 
Century, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press (2005), 16. 
72 See, in particular, Levi 1988, Boone 2003, and Bernhard 2005. 
73 Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 
MIT Press (2005). 
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narratives. Many different sources of data can be used to construct these narratives, but 
most process tracing involves using historical sources, interviews, and other qualitative 
data.74 George and Bennett describe process tracing in the following terms: “In process 
tracing, the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and 
other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case 
is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case.”75 
Although there are several varieties of the method, they all involve the use of narrative 
accounts to test for the presence of sequences of events that permit the researcher to infer 
causal processes that lead to specified outcomes.76 One of the greatest concerns is thus 
ensuring that the hypothesized sequence of events is empirically borne out through case 
studies. Various tests have been proposed to assess the strength of evidence brought to 
bear in the causal narrative and to guide the researcher in determining whether particular 
components of the theory constitute necessary or sufficient conditions.77  
 The most effective process tracing techniques involve the use of causal 
mechanisms, which Falleti and Lynch define as “relatively abstract concepts or patterns 
of action that can travel from one specific instance...of causation to another and that 
                                                
74 Vitalis (in Perecman and Curran 2006) argues that it is important to treat narratives of past events as 
quasi-statistical data points, and that with a wide enough sample, it is possible to discern a metaphorical 
line of regression that reveals the most probable causal narrative to account for the events of interest. When 
the event of interest is the subject of multiple historical analyses, it is preferable to follow Vitalis’ 
suggestion and avoid over-reliance on a handful of historical sources. When available data is scarcer, it is 
advisable, at a minimum, to attempt to triangulate between available sources using both primary and 
secondary source material where possible. Recent studies of process tracing make the case that it is a 
method ideally suited to situations in which data are scarce or difficult to come by, such as civil wars, 
because they allow for counterfactuals and elaborate theories that yield a larger number of predicted 
outcomes that can be observed. Both of these techniques help researchers test the presence of sequences of 
events or mechanisms even if the full sequence or mechanism cannot be observed. (Lyall in Bennett and 
Checkel eds, Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool, Cambridge University Press (2014)]). 
75 George and Bennett, 6. 
76 See, for example, Bennett and Checkel for a range of new process tracing procedures and tests; Falleti 
(2006) on theory-guided process tracing. 
77 See, for example, Collier 2011 and Mahoney 2012. 
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explain how a hypothesized cause creates a particular outcome in a given context.”78 
They specify that causal mechanisms must be observable, generalizable across cases, and 
irreducible, and that they are portable across cases with proper attention to context and 
periodization.79 Causal mechanisms are valuable because they allow researchers to 
establish causation with a greater degree of certainty than many other methods. 
Problematically, few studies that use the paradigm of institutional choice refer to causal 
mechanisms, although most rely on process tracing. In the absence of mechanisms, 
process tracing techniques often fall back on sequence. However, most users of 
institutional choice theory are for the most part unconcerned with sequences and 
temporality, focusing instead on actor interests and capacities that are assumed to be 
developed prior to the bargaining process. Without mechanisms and sequences, it can be 
argued that institutional choice theory does not really use process tracing so much as the 
approach modeled in Analytic Narratives.80 In a later exposition on the method, Levi 
makes clear that analytic narratives are distinct from process tracing. Although the former 
combine strategic, contingency-based choices with path dependence, they all explicitly 
rely on rational choice theory.81  
 How then, can institutional choice theory best be used in conjunction with process 
tracing? As previously stated, the institutional choice approach used here emphasizes 
temporality and locates the various components of its theory, including preference 
formation and bargaining or contestation, in time. Principally, it argues that long-held, 
                                                
78 Tulia G Falleti and Julia F. Lynch, “Context and Causal Mechanisms in Political Analysis,” Comparative 
Political Studies 42, no. 9 (2009): 1143–66, 1145. 
79 Causal mechanisms interact with their surrounding contexts, so although they are portable across cases as 
a generalizable causal explanation, they cannot be presumed to operate in isolation of “relevant aspects of 
the surroundings” (Falleti and Lynch 1152). 
80 Robert Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Analytic Narratives, Princeton:  
Princeton University Press (1998). 
81 Levi in Mayntz (eds.) 2002. 
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unchallenged preferences give rise to stronger interest articulation before and during the 
bargaining process. As such, timing matters. Next, it proposes to treat institutional choice 
itself as a causal mechanism.82 In that it is an irreducible pattern of action that is both 
context-dependent and portable across cases, the specific act of “choosing” an institution 
acts as a causal mechanism. It has multiple inputs in the form of preferences, capacities, 
and context, all of which are explained through prior processes in the causal sequence of 
events, but the institutional configuration that is the outcome of interest ultimately results 
from the mechanism of institutional choice.  
Although only the latter explicitly acknowledges the role of causal mechanisms, a 
comparison of Boone’s and Bernhard’s theories illustrates the point. Boone articulates a 
theory of institutional choice to explain configurations of regime structure in rural 
Africa.83 She argues that cash crop production, rural social hierarchies, and elite 
economic dependence on the regime account for four outcomes that reflect the regime’s 
strategy for navigating political contexts in which the regime has more or less local 
authority and political presence.84 The causal mechanism is situated at the moment of 
institutional choice, which results from the regime’s solution to maximizing power in 
rural areas despite constraints. Bernhard, by contrast, argues that institutional choice 
theory can explain democratic survival by bringing clarity to the democratic transitions 
literature on political pacting.85 Examining two cases of democratic breakdown and two 
cases of democratic survival in Germany and Poland, he contends that the coalitions that 
assembled to create new rules of government did so using one of four choice 
                                                
82 Falleti and Lynch, for example, treat rational choice as a causal mechanism (1150). 
83 Boone, 2003. 
84 Ibid., 33-37. 
85 Bernhard 2005. 
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mechanisms: consensus, imposition, splitting differences, and trading support across 
issues.86 These four types of decision processes are, in his theory, the mechanisms that 
interact with contextual variables to produce democratic breakdown or stability. His 
causal mechanism is thus four-fold, with each mechanism acting in context to produce a 
different outcome.87  
This difference reveals two ways in which institutional choice theory can engage 
with causal mechanisms. In the first, the single mechanism of constrained choice results 
in various outcomes depending on context. In the second, actors select different 
mechanisms of choosing, and the variation in types of decision-making is what accounts 
for the variation in outcome. Although the second method has strong appeal because it 
relies less heavily on context variables and can account for variation based on differences 
in mechanism alone, it requires a tremendous amount of data about the actual process of 
bargaining or negotiating between actors with different interests. For legislative debates 
or treaty negotiations, it is a sophisticated method. However, for contexts in which there 
is less evidence concerning the bargaining/contestation process, it is not feasible. 
Accordingly, most institutional choice theories use mechanistic frameworks that more 
closely resembles Boone’s, even if, like hers, they are not explicitly theorized. This study 
follows the single mechanism approach.  
 
Research Design and Data 
 
                                                
86 Ibid., 18. 
87 Although the four causal mechanisms he identifies lead to the outcomes he posits, institutional choice 
theory would posit a prior causal mechanism to those he identifies: the original choice of which decision 
method, or mechanism, to pursue during the transition. 
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The aim of this study is to build a theory to explain judicial decentralization, but 
to do so the conceptual typology includes judicial centralization as well, so as to not 
select only positive instances of the phenomenon. This project thus encompasses three 
full case studies accompanied by three shadow cases (six cases, each representing one of 
the six types of judicial decentralization) to study the full range of the theory.88 The three 
full case studies are of Lebanon (full decentralization), Tanzania (partial 
decentralization), and Egypt (partial incorporation). The three shadow cases are Malawi 
(tacit devolution), England (common law incorporation) and France (full centralization). 
Limited observations from the three shadow cases are interwoven into the three primary 
case studies. Apart from choosing one case of each type, cases were selected based on 
two criteria. One is that the case be a good example of its category (Gerring uses the term 
“typical case”).89 Using typical cases helps bring clarity to the inner workings of each 
type.  
The second is that cases were selected, wherever possible, to rule out competing 
causal explanations. For instance, Tanzania and Malawi share a border and have similar 
histories of Arab invasions followed by British colonialism, and they achieved 
independence within two years of one another. Following independence, they were both 
ruled by a powerful and mostly popular lifelong president who governed through a one 
party system until the introduction of multi-party democracy in the mid 1990s. 
Nevertheless, they adopted widely different policies on judicial decentralization. John 
Stuart Mill’s famed comparative methods logic tells us that none of the factors that these 
                                                
88 Barbara Geddes, “How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in 
Comparative Politics,” Political Analysis 2, no. 1 (January 1, 1990): 131 –150. 
89 John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices, New York: Cambridge University Press 
(2006). Here, typical means exemplary of the particular type, not average. 
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two cases hold in common can be the cause of the divergent outcome. Additional 
variation across cases provides even stronger support for ruling out what would otherwise 
be plausible hypotheses. Given that Egypt also went through a long period of British 
colonial rule and adopted yet another type of judicial decentralization, it is safe to argue 
that differences in the colonial regime’s legal system are not the only driving force 
behind variation in outcome.90  
Likewise, Lebanon and Egypt are characterized by similar levels of government 
decentralization in terms of administrative, fiscal, and political decentralization, but they 
pursued nearly opposite approaches to judicial decentralization. Prior experience with 
decentralization can thus be ruled out. England and France are in different categories in 
the above typology and both are liberal democracies. Whether the relevant group law is 
ethnic or religious does not seem to be important either. Variation within cases also 
makes it possible to eliminate hypothesized causes such as minority group size. The size 
of Malawi’s groups has remained more or less constant over time despite the 1990s shift 
from full to tacit decentralization. As will become clear in the case study chapters, some 
of these variables (such as whether the group is immigrant or indigenous) do have some 
causal weight for their role as part of the context in which institutional choice occurs. For 
the most part, however, comparison between cases helps to eliminate rival hypotheses. 
Data used for process tracing is drawn from original fieldwork in each case study 
country as well as primary and secondary historical sources.91 I conducted 22 months of 
                                                
90 It has been argued in a wide range of literatures that the legacy of the colonial legal system, i.e. whether 
the newly independent state inherits a common or civil legal system, is largely responsible for a number of 
outcomes including stable trade regimes, the ability to attract international finance, rule of law 
performance, and human rights protections. See, for example, Blanton et al 2001; La Porta et al 1998; La 
Porta et al 2007; Joireman 2001 (and 2004); Mitchell et al 2013 op. cit. 
91 Because legal pluralism and judicial diversity have not been thoroughly studied in every country, 
fieldwork was particularly crucial. Although Sezgin and Kunkler (forthcoming) are developing a 
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fieldwork in my case studies, divided as follows: Egypt (3 months), the UK (3 months), 
France (3 months), Lebanon (4 months), Tanzania (5 months), and Malawi (4 months). 
During this time, I conducted four hundred and fifty three interviews with litigants, 
judges, group elites, non-state judges, local experts, NGO workers, community 
stakeholders, and members of government. Most of these interviews were conducted one 
on one, but I also held several group interviews, particularly of participants in a court 
case. I also observed court sessions at state and non state courts, and interviewed 
participants afterward whenever possible. In addition, I accessed preexisting local 
primary sources where I could find them, including court records, conference 
proceedings, parliamentary debates, and interviews and raw data from Masters and PhD 
theses written at local universities. I also used multiple histories of each case study 
country for secondary source information, useful in particular for better understanding the 
colonial legacies particular to each case. 
Law is a vast field, encompassing the subfields of criminal law, tax law, civil law, 
and family law, among many others, and its various branches differ from one country to 
the next. For instance, one of the three branches of Tanzania’s High Courts, which are its 
first level appeal courts, is its section of land courts—a form of law that doesn’t exist as a 
discrete category in the United States. As a consequence, the domain of law in which 
decentralization takes place (or is desired to take place) differs from place to place. 
However, there are a few nearly universal trends concerning which domains of the law 
are the most and least decentralized. Criminal law is almost never decentralized, and any 
                                                                                                                                            
quantitative measure of legal pluralism that they plan to use to assemble a dataset that will contain a 
judicial diversity score for every country, at present no such data exists. Additionally, most legal texts focus 
on the formal judicial system, neglecting to mention parallel judicial systems that the state does not 
recognize. Any study of judicial decentralization based purely on library sources would miss a good deal of 
judicial diversity. 
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non state criminal adjudication tends not to be recognized by the state. Branches of law in 
which the state is a litigant are almost never decentralized. Family law is the most likely 
to be decentralized, both formally and tacitly, as is land law, in places where it exists as a 
separate branch of law. For the most part, then, this study focuses on family law (also 
called personal status law) as the legal site at which judicial decentralization is predicted 
to be mostly likely to occur. I do not restrict the domain of inquiry solely to family law, 
but focusing on it helps to set useful limits on the scope of the study. 
Compared with the more attention-drawing fields of criminal law, where crimes 
are punished and societal justice is meted out (in theory, at least), and commercial law, 
where lucrative contracts are negotiated and enforced, family law is perhaps 
unglamorous. It is nevertheless an important area of the law, and should not be dismissed 
as being of secondary importance. Personal status law and family law, although 
considered to be different fields in some countries, govern marriage, the dissolution of 
marriage, alimony and other transfer payments between spouses, custody, guardianship, 
adoption, and inheritance, as well as further specialized fields in certain places. 
Inheritance and the formation and dissolution of marriage entail property transfer 
between individuals, which involves considerable sums of money and tracts of real estate 
(just think of the perennial melee that ensues over the estate tax in the United States).  
When, as in places like Lebanon and Egypt, personal status and family law are highly 
decentralized, the result is that citizens of the same state may have their wealth, property, 
and economic rights determined by very different rules.  If we think property is 
important, we must think family and personal status law are important.  
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Additionally, custody and guardianship concern the welfare of children and their 
education, as well as the right of parents to see their children, and is of tremendous 
consequence. Family and personal status law are important for more than the crucial 
question of who has rights to raise a child.  It is also crucial for determining which 
children will be citizens, and as members of what groups, who are eligible for often 
varying individual and group rights.  As Sezgin argues, “Family law has long been 
considered by political elites as a useful instrument to ascertain the rules of inclusion and 
exclusion within the political community by telling their subjects who could marry whom 
or who could inherit from whom through juridification of reproductive relations in 
society.”92 Diamant adds, “modern state rulers have both envisioned a new family order 
and devoted considerable resources to remolding family structure and relations according 
to this vision.”93 As such, personal status law is an important site of negotiation between 
states and state sub-groups over group rights to maintain a distinct community within the 
state and individual rights to live according to rules they find meaningful. 
Although many people go through their lives without ever writing a formal 
contract of sale or employing a lawyer, moreover, most inherit, marry, and have children. 
Personal status law is the area of the law that probably touches the greatest number of 
people, and as such it is one of the most important points of contact between the judicial 
system and individual citizens. It is the most perennially relevant area of the law for most 
people, which why it is also so deeply contested. In England, for example, some 
Muslims, both citizens and non-citizen residents, seek out Sharia councils to decide 
                                                
92 Yuksel Sezgin, Human Rights under State-Enforced Religious Family Laws in Israel, Egypt and India, 
Cambridge University Press (2013), 18. 
93 Neil J Diamant, Revolutionizing the Family: Politics, Love, and Divorce in Urban and Rural China, 
1949–1968, University of California Press (2000), 27. 
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matters of marriage, guardianship, and property, even though these decisions are not 
binding according to state law or, indeed, even recognized by it. Ordinary people feel 
sufficiently involved in family law, and feel that they have enough at stake, that they will 
risk violating state law to preserve their personal status system. Accordingly, the 
decentralization of personal status law involves more than a token transfer of power to 
religious authorities. It allows non-state officials to regulate property transfer, determine 
norms regarding the rights of women and children, and influence larger areas of state law 
such as citizenship rights and civic education.   
 
Causal Argument 
It is proposed that states adopt one of six patterns of judicial decentralization as 
the result of a process of bargaining with groups whose elites have a strong preference for 
exercising judicial autonomy. Having outlined a conceptual typology above, the next task 
is to develop an explanatory typology that serves as an effective model of the institutional 
choice theory deployed here. Before continuing, however, it is necessary to establish a 
domain for the theory. Specifically, the model proposed here applies to non-federal 
states. This is true because institutional choice theory is best suited for situations in which 
a government and societal groups are able to bargain or battle directly. Also, policy on 
judicial decentralization may well differ between subunits in a single federal state. It 
would be possible to analyze each subunit separately, but for the sake of clarity, 
simplicity, and generalizability, this study is restricted to non-federal states.  
To reiterate the point made above, institutional choice theory should articulate the 
interests, resources, and relative bargaining power of the relevant actors. However, these 
 44 
factors must be assessed in context. Context informs both interest and capacity. For 
example, in some contexts, small minority groups can exercise outsize power. During 
Egyptian President Sadat’s visit to President Carter in 1978, protests by Orthodox Copts 
caused Sadat considerable embarrassment and nearly stalled the ongoing peace process 
with Israel. In response, Sadat tabled a constitutional amendment that would have 
curtailed Coptic Orthodox law.94 Had Sadat been relying on the help of a non-majority 
Christian country instead of the U.S., these protests would have been much less effective.  
States bargain for various iterations of judicial centralization and decentralization 
as the result of strategic interactions with ethnic or religious minority group elites. 
Specifically, when states find that they need the cooperation or support of these groups in 
achieving particular goals, and when groups strongly prioritize retaining separate law, 
states compromise on certain aspects of judicial centralization to win group support.95 
The outcome of the bargaining involved in this compromise is determined by the 
capacities that the state leaders and the capacities that the group elites are able to muster 
during the negotiations. I will further discuss some of these capacities below, but two sets 
of capacities are the most important: first, for the state, the relative advantage of its 
institutional development, along with its popular support, vis-a-vis the specific matter in 
dispute, and second, for the group, its ability for group elites to effectively coordinate, 
and the extent of its strength in the issue area that is being bargained over. For the 
purposes of this argument, then, state capacities will refer to the state’s popular support in 
                                                
94 S. S. Hasan, Christians versus Muslims in Modern Egypt: The Century-Long Struggle for Coptic 
Equality, Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press (2003), 109. 
95 When states have relatively narrow policy interests, such as election laws or environmental reforms, they 
can trade concessions in one policy area, such as judicial decentralization, for gains in another that they 
prioritize more highly. Each group must be willing to make concessions in the domain that it values less. In 
the institutional choice model used here, when states are unable to achieve a policy or policies that they 
value more highly than judicial centralization, and when groups place a high value on decentralization, 
states permit some degree of judicial decentralization in order to achieve their full objectives elsewhere.  
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the area of bargaining and the strength of its related institutions, and group capacities will 
refer to group elites’ ability to coordinate support and/or resources for bargaining. This 
will be expressed through two variables--group capacity relative to the state, to capture 
state capacities, and elite coordination, to capture group capacities—in the explanatory 
typology below. 
A brief review of the existing literature on state capacity will show the extent to 
which this work draws on existing conceptualizations of the term and how it subtly 
differs. Sikkink defines state capacity according to how well state institutions can 
implement the state’s goals.96 Other studies have attempted to find proxies for state 
capacity or to build quantitative tools to measure it. For example, Fearon uses state 
reliance on lootable resources to proxy for state capacity.97 Following Krasner’s 
argument that capacity varies from one political sector to the next, two recent studies 
have developed multivariate measures of state capacity.98 Hendrix examines state 
capacity in the context of civil war onset. He compiles 19 conceptualizations of state 
capacity used in literature on civil wars and subjects each to construct validity tests. He 
finds that bureaucratic quality and the percent of a state’s GDP that is made up of tax 
revenue are the best measures of state capacity because they are highly correlated with 
other indicators of capacity and are linked through direct causal mechanisms.99 Hanson 
and Sigman emphasize the importance of tax revenue as a proportion of GDP, although 
they find that the extractive, coercive, and administrative capacities of states are often 
                                                
96 Kathryn Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina, Cornell Studies in 
Political Economy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press (1991). 
97 James Fearon, “Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 4 
(2005): 483–507, 485. 
98 Krasner 1978, see also Skocpol in Evans et al 1985. 
99 Cullen Hendrix, “Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Implications for the Study of 
Civil Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 3 (2010): 273–85. 
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inextricably inter-woven and are thus difficult to measure in isolation.100 A Harvard-
based consortium of scholars has recently developed a measure of state capacity based on 
three variables: extraction, reach, and allocation. This Performance of Nations project 
resulted in a web-based data tool that allows researchers to access longitudinal data on 
each variable for all of the world’s states.101  
However, as Hendrix argues “Decisions about how to best operationalize the 
concept of state capacity are, to a certain extent, driven by the topics that researchers are 
addressing.”102 This study finds that states have widely different capacities in different 
policy areas. For example, the state may have greater capacity to impose its trade policy 
interests on groups because they have no way to negotiate trade agreements without the 
state as intermediary, whereas the state may be more constrained in the area of 
agricultural reforms because it generally has a weaker presence in rural areas. Two sets of 
interests are necessarily held constant: the regime’s desire to centralize its judiciary, and 
the group’s preference for judicial autonomy.103 It is the state’s other policy priorities, 
such as economic development and trade regimes, that are of primary interest here. 
Relative capacity is thus assessed within the specific domain of the policy interest that 
forms part of the institutional choice scenario. Because the state’s political goals shift 
over time, I use a context-specific measure of relative capacity that I establish through 
process tracing. Process tracing allows me to uncover levels of support for the state, as 
                                                
100 Jonathan Hanson and Rachel Sigman, Leviathan’s Latent Dimensions: Measuring State Capacity for 
Comparative Political Research, APSA Annual Meeting Paper, Social Science Research Network (2011); 
see also Evan Lieberman, “Taxation Data as Indicators of State-Society Relations: Possibilities and Pitfalls 
in Cross-National Research,” Studies in Comparative International Development 36, no. 4 (2002): 89–115. 
101 Marina Arbetman-Rabinowitz, Ali Fisunoglu, Jacek Kugler, Mark Abdollahian, Kristin Johnson, 
Kyungkook Kang, and Zining Yang, Relative Political Capacity Dataset, V4 ed. Transresearch Consortium 
[Distributor] (2013). http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/16845. 
102 Hendrix 273-4. 
103 See literature review section. States do not willingly give away or share judicial power, and it thus 
follows that they would not do so if there were not a strong concomitant desire for it on the group’s part. 
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well as its institutional resources, which are the capacities of most interest to this study. 
Once process tracing has helped to uncover the factors underlying relative capacity, it is 
categorized as high, medium, and low, as shown in the table below, because a binary 
variable does not capture sufficient variation.  
The second variable is elite coordination, meaning the extent to which group 
elites share a strong interest in judicial autonomy and are able to muster resources and 
support in their negotiation with the state. Elites disproportionately benefit from being 
given the authority to adjudicate disputes or participate in the adjudication process, so it 
is they who represent the group’s interest in maintaining separate law during the 
contestation process. They derive advantages from several components of the 
adjudication process. The first is that granting even partial judicial autonomy usually 
gives group elites considerable say in determining the content of their laws. Given the 
opportunity, they create norms that extend or preserve their status.104 When the same 
elites are also in control of the judicial process, they can ensure that norms are enforced 
and transgressions are punished. The act of adjudication in and of itself generates 
power.105 Elite coordination is thus the primary vehicle for conveying interest in judicial 
decentralization to the state. Process tracing is used to assess the group’s interest in 
judicial autonomy and elite coordination. It should be noted that coordination does not 
necessarily imply direct lobbying; merely having a coordinated, strong interest in judicial 
                                                
104 For example, when Western sociologists worked with local elites to codify Tanzanian tribal law, the 
resulting codes disproportionately emphasized rules that favored senior men (see Tanzania case study 
chapter).  
105 This logic is similar to that used by Stone Sweet (2000 pp. 14-19) except that Stone Sweet “assumes a 
purely consensual world” in which judicial power accrues from the community’s decision to vest normative 
authority in a third party and the third party’s decisions begin to shape community behavior. Here, consent 
is neither required nor implied. Elites who possess power from other means entrench power-generating 
devices in local norms and shape behavior by punishing non-conformers. 
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autonomy should be sufficient to signal to the state that judicial decentralization is a 
fruitful area for granting concessions in return for cooperation elsewhere.106  
Various factors may interfere with the ability to coordinate such as splits between 
elites, geographical distance, or identity politics. Elites are able to overcome some but not 
all of these obstacles, so elite coordination is not a binary variable.107 Instead, level of 
coordination is categorized as high, medium, or low, as with the first variable. 
With these two variables taken as its axes, the following table results: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
106 See, in particular, the case study of Tanzania for an example of this. 
107 As with the first variable, process tracing is used to uncover elite coordination or the lack thereof. The 
various factors that help or hinder elite coordination are too diverse to lend themselves easily to the 
construction of a quantitative set of indicators for the variable. For example, in Tanzania, the abolition of 
the chieftaincy and geographical distance hindered coordination, but the strong preference of the new, party 
elites for judicial decentralization and the absorption of former chiefs into the party structure kept 
coordination high enough to effect partial decentralization. In Egypt, geography favored strong 
coordination, but the delegation of powers to church and secular elites during the end of the period of 
Ottoman rule created power struggles between different factions of elites that severely hindered 
cooperation, leaving non-Muslim minorities with only partial incorporation of their laws into the state legal 
system. The most important factor here is the level of elite coordination regardless of its source.  
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Table 2 
Determinants of Judicial Decentralization 
 
 
The greatest amount of judicial decentralization is predicted to take place when 
the state’s capacity is low relative to that of the group and group elite coordination is 
high, and the least amount when state capacity is high and elite coordination is low. 
Crucially, even when elites are able to coordinate or strongly share an interest in judicial 
autonomy, if the state’s capacity is high relative to that of the group, the state is not 
expected to devolve judicial power. It should have no need to in this configuration 
because it can impose its preference without needing to bargain or trade concessions. 
Only one type of state is predicted to decentralize judicial power to some degree under 
these conditions: liberal, common law states (described above). When state capacity is 
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either medium or low, if elites fail to prioritize judicial decentralization highly enough or 
are unable to coordinate to communicate their preference to the state, then judicial 
decentralization does not occur because the state chooses some other policy concession to 
win the group’s cooperation. The four primary types of judicial decentralization should 
be found in the middle ranges, where state and group capacity are more evenly matched, 
and elites can coordinate sufficiently to achieve various iterations of judicial 
decentralization.  
To summarize, then, bargaining or contestation between states and group elites 
creates an institutional choice scenario that results in judicial decentralization, the degree 
of which depends on the level of elite coordination and relative capacity. Next, it is 
necessary give a temporal dimension to the theory. As made clear above, the variables 
occur at different moments in time and the processes that shape them unfold at different 
rates. Elite coordination changes relatively slowly over time.108 For example, the process 
that split elites into rival factions in Coptic Orthodox Egypt unfolded over approximately 
seventy years.  
By contrast, relative state capacity changes more quickly because it depends 
heavily on the context of the bargaining. For example, Sadat’s attempt to further 
centralize the Egyptian judiciary in the early 1980s was borne of an initiative to win 
support from conservative Muslims, and from start to finish the proposal lasted only 
months. The schema outlined above represents the level of each variable at the moment 
of contestation or bargaining. If either variable later changes, the level of judicial 
decentralization may change as well. Other institutional choice models allow for 
                                                
108 See Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions 
in Comparative Perspective (1997). They argue that institutions constructed in the previous phase have a 
strong carryover effect in articulating the rules for the next iteration of the causal process.  
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institutional change as well. For example, Levi finds that changes in the relative levels of 
bargaining power between parliament, the crown, and ministers in eighteenth century 
Britain help account for changes in tax policy.109 However, the initial institutional choice 
usually happens at moments of political transition, such as state formation, independence, 
and the transition to democracy. Other types of transitions can also trigger these 
processes, such as demographic shifts (including immigration and baby booms) and 
economic changes (including recessions or exogenous shocks). Malawi’s institutional 
configuration changed from the full decentralization adopted at independence to tacit 
devolution during the shift to democracy in the early 1990s.  
Generally, then, the sequence of events is as follows: elite preferences and ability 
to coordinate coalesce slowly in the period before the political transition. Then, a political 
transition creates space for the state and group elites to arrive at a new level of judicial 
decentralization. Once the transition has occurred, the new regime decides on its policy 
priorities. If it does not have sufficient capacity to enact them without the group’s 
support, and if elite coordination in favor of judicial autonomy is high enough, then either 
direct or indirect bargaining leads to some degree of judicial decentralization. The 
resulting institutional configuration lasts until there is a large enough change in one of the 
two key variables, or another moment of political transition intervenes. See the 
illustration below for a visual representation of how the two variables unfold over time, 
with the resulting bargaining matrix. 
 
 
 
                                                
109 Levi, 1988 127. 
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Figure 2 
Illustration of Causal Theory 
 
 
 
The following chapters provide detailed analysis of each case. They are ordered 
from the greatest to the least extent of judicial decentralization among the full case 
studies considered here. Chapter two examines the case study of Lebanon, which is an 
example of full decentralization, where the state is relatively weak compared to societal 
groups. The Lebanese state functions badly, or not at all, without compliance from 
religious groups. Group elites in Lebanon are also well organized and able to make 
coherent demands of the state. They strongly resist subsequent changes to the judicial 
autonomy they are able to win. This is the sole category in which the state lends its 
coercive power to enforce judicial decisions that it takes no part in. In Lebanon, religious 
groups have full autonomy over personal status law, which encompasses the important 
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areas of inheritance, marriage, divorce, child custody, and guardianship. Groups have full 
control over both the content of the laws and the adjudication process. Until 2015, the 
state was not even authorized to issue civil marriages. Decisions made by religious 
tribunals cannot be appealed in state courts, which is the greatest extent of judicial 
decentralization possible. 
Chapter three assesses partial judicial decentralization in Tanzania, which occurs 
when the state has somewhat less relative capacity than with the partial incorporation 
type, but elites retain a high level of coordination. In the post-independence period in 
Tanzania, the state had enough capacity that it could obtain more uncontroversial policy 
objectives without needing group cooperation. However, when it came to larger projects, 
or projects in a geographical area or interest domain where rural elites possess some 
capacity, the state needed their support. Here, elite coordination did not involve direct 
demands to the state. Instead, elite preferences aligned sufficiently strongly around 
judicial autonomy that state was able to discern these preferences without specific 
demands. Because the preferences were aligned so strongly, the cost for the state of 
ignoring these preferences was high. Tanzania thus allowed groups to retain control over 
the content of their customary law through codification as well as the use of assessors, 
community elders who advise magistrates on local customary law and have a binding 
vote on the verdict. It also created land tribunals and community arbitration forums that 
use local customary law. Its post-independence constitution eliminated the provision, 
preserved by many other African states, which automatically struck down customary law 
that was repugnant to the constitution. Some of its national laws, such as its marriage law, 
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preserve large portions of customary law. Nevertheless, it retains a unitary court system 
with an appeals process that can reverse the decisions of all lower courts. 
Chapter four examines the legal pluralism type of partial incorporation through a 
case study of Egypt. In this case of partial incorporation, the state and group were 
relatively well matched in terms of capacity at the moments of bargaining, although that 
of the state was slightly higher. In this case, elites were able to coordinate only 
moderately well. They were thus less well equipped to resist state demands or to hold out 
for more concessions. The state was able to successfully offer concessions on terms that 
it controls, such as by incorporating codified group law into state courts. In Egypt, 
Orthodox Copts, Protestants, and other religious groups have the right to adjudicate their 
personal status cases according to codified laws particular to each group, but they do so 
in Egyptian state courts that are usually run by Muslim judges. Additionally, only cases 
between co-religionists are subject to group law. Cases that involve members of two 
religions default to Muslim personal status law. In Egypt, partial incorporation involves 
only limited concessions to each group, amidst an otherwise strong and centralized state 
court system. 
Within chapters two, three, and four, comparisons from Malawi, England, and 
France are incorporated in the form of shadow cases. To make these comparisons more 
effective, I will briefly summarize each case here. The case study of Malawi investigates 
the legal pluralism type of tacit devolution. Cases of tacit devolution are characterized by 
high group capacity relative to the state, but only moderate amounts of elite coordination. 
In Malawi, because the state needs the cooperation of tribal groups to secure electoral 
coalitions, and to pursue rural development initiatives, it is loath to interfere in the 
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strongly institutionalized domain of community dispute adjudication. Because elites are 
unable to articulate a strong demand for judicial autonomy, Malawi does not lend its 
coercive power to tribal courts, but it knowingly and purposely permits them to operate 
their own judicial forums without state recognition. Especially after democratization in 
the mid 1990s, political parties used chiefs to corral votes, and were thus unwilling to 
erode any of their traditional powers. Accordingly, although the tribal court system that 
the previous regime used as a parallel justice system for punishing dissidents was severed 
of all ties to the state, it was left in place to function unofficially. Because there is no state 
oversight, chiefs adjudicate disputes in their own forums according to local norms. A 
recent law that has been passed by parliament but not yet implemented would re-
authorize an attenuated version of these courts. 
 I evaluate the category of common law incorporation through a case study of 
England. Common law incorporation is in some ways the most unintuitive because it is 
restricted to a particular type of state: liberal democracies with common law legal 
systems. Because state capacity is very high relative to that of the groups, there is no need 
for the state to decentralize judicial power at all. It should be able to impose its policy 
preferences without doing so. However, elite coordination in this category is quite high, 
so the state is able to read the group’s strong preference for judicial autonomy. Because it 
values inclusion and possesses the necessary legal mechanisms to achieve it, this type of 
state is able to grant some judicial autonomy without giving away very much of its own 
judicial power. That said, this only happens if specific groups of elites are committed and 
coordinated enough to press these demands. These states are quite rare, but England is a 
good example. Some members of the Muslim community in England have expressed a 
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desire to have access to legal forums that use Muslim personal status law. The state has 
accommodated this request in three separate ways. The first is through arbitration—
citizens have the right to have many types of disputes arbitrated outside of courts, and 
specialist Sharia tribunals have opened to fill this demand. Second, British common law 
courts are increasingly beginning to work with Muslim personal status law, for example 
by recognizing as valid Muslim marriages conducted in England that are not legal under 
the country’s law. Finally, the state refrains from closing the unofficial, unrecognized 
Sharia law tribunals that issue religious personal status decrees. It makes clear that these 
forums have no legal force, but does not shut them down, as other European states have 
done. Interestingly, its response to the Jewish community in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries was similar. 
  France serves as a case study of full judicial centralization, with particular 
attention to the legal practices of immigrant Muslims. Full centralization occurs when 
relative group capacity and elite coordination are both low. France, like England, has no 
need to devolve judicial power to achieve policy objectives. Although some elites in the 
Muslim community may desire judicial autonomy, either they are in a minority or they 
are unable to articulate their preference. France’s Muslim community is internally 
divided into rival factions that approximate national divides between its three largest 
North African Muslim former colonies. Because components of French society have been 
suspicious of Muslim culture and personal status law, and French law is strongly secular, 
elites do not publicly voice their preference for Sharia law. As a result, France does not 
acknowledge any legal system apart from its own national law, and it even takes 
preemptive steps to prevent private religious arbitration. For example, it is illegal in 
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France to have a religious marriage ceremony before a civil ceremony, and France briefly 
jailed several imams who broke this law. 
 The final chapter offers some empirical observations from my case study 
research. It offers a glimpse of some of the court cases heard in state and non state courts 
in both the case studies presented here and the shadow cases. It also suggests avenues for 
further research on legal pluralism.  
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Chapter Two: Full Decentralization in Lebanon 
 
Introduction 
 
Lebanon is a case of full judicial decentralization within a particular delimited 
jurisdictional domain, in this case personal status law. Although a central legal system 
governs criminal, property, and other types of law, the vast and important domain of 
family law is entirely decentralized, with each of eighteen religious groups administering 
its own system of family law courts. Because Lebanon was never able to even partially 
centralize its personal status legal regime, until very recently the state had no power even 
to issue a civil marriage license. It is relatively common in Middle Eastern states, such as 
the case of Egypt (chapter four), for each religion to have a separate family law code, but 
Lebanon is unique in the region for the extent of the power that it devolves to sub-state 
groups. Religious groups, known as confessions (and sometimes sects) have the right to 
determine their own legal codes, to modify them without the consent of the state, to 
adjudicate family law matters, and to prevent laws that touch on their religious interests. 
Additionally, as we will see, the state judiciary is curtailed in the extent to which is can 
rule on issues such as women’s rights, citizenship laws, and inheritance tax, because all 
of these issues touch on personal status law. In Lebanon, non-state groups are powerful 
enough to rein in the central judiciary to preserve the powers of their separate courts.  
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Causal Argument: The Enduring Strength of the Lebanese Sect 
 
The weakness of the Lebanese state is well known, and discussions of state 
strength and capacity are widespread in Lebanon. During research in other cases for this 
study, locals who agreed to be interviewed rarely mentioned the state, and if they did, it 
was in the context of a lack of state capacity to adjudicate certain types of disputes. In 
Lebanon, taxi drivers, waiters, and political science professors spoke with nearly equal 
fluency about the merits and perils of state strength for their country. The weakness of the 
Lebanese state is a consequence of the same forces that produced support for legal 
decentralization, and this central state weakness, in turn, contributes to the persistence of 
legal decentralization. The driving forces behind both decentralization and state weakness 
are, as further articulated below, the extraordinarily strong institutionalization of 
confessional legal practices (and confessional loyalty), which produced durable elite 
coordination in favor of decentralized authority, and the bargaining process between 
strong, coordinated confessional groups and first the Ottoman, and then the French 
administrators who ruled Lebanon. 
 Group elite capacities in Lebanon are sufficiently strong as to have blocked all 
state attempts at centralization. This state of affairs came about through the period 
leading up to and during state building, at which time political power was apportioned to 
religious groups based on their share of the population. This compromise, meant to share 
power between Lebanon’s diverse groups, ended up creating strong incentives for sects to 
control their group membership to make sure that no members left the group, which 
entailed the use of personal status law (family law) to police the group’s boundaries. By 
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the time the first centralizing efforts came, under the French Protectorate, decentralized 
personal status law had been so strongly institutionalized that the capacities of the 
religious group elites were far stronger than the capacities of the state leaders. 
Confessional leaders had strong popular support from their members and strongly 
hierarchical institutions that facilitated coordination among group elites. State leaders, by 
contrast, relied on their sect for their appointment to power (or their election to it). They 
thus lacked the direct popular support awarded to group elites. Furthermore, the status 
quo meant that state leaders were unable to centralize those portions of the law that 
would change this situation, by eroding confessionalism. The durable strength of 
Lebanon’s group elite capacities, pictured below, firmly place Lebanon in the category of 
full decentralization.  
Table 3 
Trajectory of Failed Judicial Centralization in Lebanon 
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In Lebanon, each confessional group, and there are eighteen of them, has strong 
control over its coreligionists. However, the three largest sects have the greatest amount 
of political power, both for the obvious demographic reason of proportional 
representation, and because the original political formula crafted to share power between 
Muslims and Christians gave the three most powerful political positions—the presidency, 
the office of prime minister, and also of speaker of parliament—to the Maronite 
Christians, Sunni Muslims, and Shiite Muslims, respectively (see below for more on 
this). For this reason, this chapter will primarily focus on Maronite Christians (36% of the 
population), Sunni Muslims (28.7 percent of the population), and Shiite Muslims (28.4% 
of the population.110  
The remainder of the chapter is divided into two sections. The first considers the 
historical origins of the strongly institutionalized confessionalism that empowers 
Lebanon’s group elites, thereby creating a political structure that involves strong group 
elite capacities and levels of coordination. It also argues that the defense of decentralized 
personal status law, individually controlled by each group, is essential to the preservation 
of this governing formula. The second section examines moments of contestation 
between state leaders and group elites during state efforts to centralize the judiciary. It 
demonstrates how group elites were able to prevail in these encounters. 
 
Personal Status Law and the Institutionalization of Confessional Politics 
 
                                                
110 The CIA World Factbook, “Lebanon,” 2019. Accessed at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/le.html#People. 
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Lebanon’s creation and maintenance of legal pluralism in the domain of personal 
status law is closely bound up with sectarian politics and the institutionalization of the 
confession-based consociational political system there. According to historian Safia 
Saadeh, it is impossible to have a civil personal status law in Lebanon, even as an 
optional alternative to confessional law, because “the preservation of the personal status 
laws within society complement the sectarian representation of the political system and 
the consociational system as a whole.”111 The consociational system relies on 
demographics because parliamentary seats and other political offices are apportioned 
proportionally, based on the size of the confessional groups. Were the lines around these 
groups to fade, it would become difficult to count the number of adherents to each 
confession and thus allocate seats accurately. Confessional leaders also fear that members 
of their religion might opt for civil marriage and thereby reduce their demographic clout 
in the next census.112 The fact that the last census was taken in 1932 does not seem to 
diminish these fears, or the accompanying reluctance to allow any jurisdiction over 
family law to leave confessional control. There is thus a strong and mutually reinforcing 
relationship between confessionalism and a decentralized judiciary.  
This state of affairs grew out of the Ottoman millet system, summarized below, in 
which subject populations within the Ottoman empire were permitted to be governed by 
their own personal status laws even though they fell under central Ottoman jurisdiction in 
all other matters. In Lebanon, this had the effect of strengthening two groups who did not 
share the Sunni Muslim religion of the Ottoman Empire: Maronite Christians and Druzes, 
an offshoot of Shia Islam, who lived, respectively, in the north of the area known as 
                                                
111 Safia Saadeh, The Quest for Citizenship in Post Taef Lebanon, Sade (2007), 51. 
112 Author interview with M. Nokkari; Saadeh, 52. 
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Mount Lebanon, in and around Bsharre, and in the south of Mount Lebanon, in the Shouf 
mountains. Preservation of their personal status laws gave both groups the opportunity to 
at first retain and later expand their influence vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire, such that in 
the mid eighteenth century, reinforced by external alliances, both groups put forward a 
claim for self-rule. The Ottoman Empire, unwilling to further subdivide its territory, 
created an autonomous area ruled by both groups, and also apportioned a certain amount 
of power to the other groups living in Mount Lebanon, such as the Greek Orthodox and 
Greek Catholics. From this moment onwards, confessionalism became a self-reinforcing 
institution.113  
The preservation of personal status authority allows Lebanese confessions to draw 
boundaries around their group based on distinctions in religious practice. These 
boundaries keep group members distinct from adherents of other groups, and they operate 
as a basis for counting these members for the allocation of political authority. The 
institution of confessionalism becomes self-reinforcing because demographics are the 
basis of political power, so each group has a strong incentive to increase their population.  
The only way to do that is to keep people within the boundaries of the confession by 
regulating their marriages and the propagation of children by that particular group’s laws. 
As early as 1936, before Lebanon gained independence from France, Muslim community 
leader Salim Salam wrote to French High Commissioner Damien de Martel, in response 
to a proposal to partially centralize family law “Your Excellency knows that the main 
                                                
113 “Self-reinforcing” is used in this context in the sense meant by Greif and Laitin (2004). An institution is 
self-reinforcing to the extent that it can continue to operate despite major systematic change, i.e. it is an 
institution that is able to reproduce itself despite the introduction of new variables. It attains this status 
when it becomes hegemonic. See Antonio Gramsci, Quintin Hoare, and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith. Selections 
from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. New York: International Publishers (1971). 
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principle on which the political system in Lebanon stands is the proportion of the 
populations of the communities to each other. The size [of community] determines the 
distribution of rights, [so the demographic issue] is vital from the view point of the 
Muslims.”114  
Having separate personal status courts creates a world in which sub-state groups 
can manipulate their demographics, which is to their advantage in a proportionally 
representative system. Without separate personal status law, it would be possible to 
distinguish between groups, but only based on the more fleeting ties of voluntary 
association. To compete politically in a confessional system, the groups therefore prefer 
to make religious affiliation an ascriptive characteristic that is recorded at birth, 
registered on each citizen’s national identity card, and changeable only with maximum 
cost to the individual. As long as the Lebanese political system is consociational and 
based on confessionalism, Lebanon’s confessions fight hard to maintain control over 
personal status law, and thereby control group demographics. And as long as Lebanon’s 
confessional groups control personal status law, the largest groups have no incentive to 
permit the system that so benefits them to lapse. A summary of Ottoman and post-
Ottoman Lebanese history will illustrate the self-reinforcing nature of an institutionalized 
confessional personal status regime and demonstrate the depth of its institutionalization. 
In 1922, an anonymous American commentator on the King-Crane mission and 
the beginning of the French mandate observed. “The intricate mixture of races and 
religions that constitutes the population of Syria [greater Syria, including Lebanon] 
interferes naturally with any real national solidarity…In addition to the great 
Mohammedan-Christian division there are also the many subdivisions whose hostilities 
                                                
114 Letter from Salim Salam to D. de Martel, Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres Archives, in Firro, 157. 
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toward each other are often equally acute. The Maronites, Greek Catholics, Greek 
Orthodox, Latin Catholics, and other Christian communities have at times almost the 
same aversion to each other that the Sunnite Moslims have for the Shiites. Nor may one 
forget the communities of Aleouts [Alawites], Jews, and Druses that add their variations 
to the variegated whole. Religiously and racially, for the two factors are often 
inseparable, the Syrians have little unity.”115 
Although this fragmentation has been overcome periodically, when temporary 
alliances between disparate religious groups formed to protest particular laws, the 
community-based divisions delineated above are long-standing. They date from the 
Muslim conquest of the Middle East and the accommodations reached between the newly 
dominant religion and the preexisting enclaves of Christians of various denominations 
and Jews.  
 Lebanon was conquered by Muslim invaders from the Arabian Peninsula in the 
630s and was officially ruled by Muslim empires (including the Ummayad, Abbasid, 
Mamluk, and Ottoman) from then onwards. The area was already home to Jewish and 
Christian communities. From almost the beginning of the period of their coexistence in 
Lebanon, Jewish, Christian, and Muslim communities shared space but lived according to 
their own sets of rules. During the beginning years of the Abbasid Caliphate, legal 
scholars gathered the texts of previous treaties between Muslim rulers and the Christian 
communities living within their jurisdiction.116 The Abbasids referred in particular to the 
“covenant of ‘Umar,” Caliph Umar’s instructions for the treatment of non-Muslims living 
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in Muslim lands. The actual covenant varied from place to place according to the ruler’s 
preference. By the early-middle Abbasid period, scholars had reached a consensus that 
the covenant had eleven precepts, including a prohibition on building or repairing places 
of worship without permission, required service in the army, along with a mandatory tax 
“in return for protection from enemies.”117 In practice, however, these rules often fell into 
disuse, as evidenced by the periodic decrees issued by rulers to eject non-Muslims from 
the governing apparatus.118  
 By the time the Ottomans invaded Lebanon in 1516, the dominant groups in 
Lebanon were the Druze, an offshoot of Shii Islam, and the Maronites, a Christian group 
from Syria who settled in the north of Lebanon.119 As was their standard practice, the 
Ottomans placed Lebanon under indirect rule. They tasked local notable families with 
collecting taxes for the empire in return for substantial local power including political 
administration and the creation and maintenance of a judiciary.120 These families built up 
considerable client networks and wealth derived from extra taxes that they were 
permitted to collect, and by the mid sixteenth century had amassed sufficient power to 
revolt against Ottoman rule. Over the next three centuries, rule over Mount Lebanon 
alternated between direct Druze rule, when rebellions against the Ottomans succeeded, 
and the reimposition of Ottoman rule and the tax-farming system.121 Lebanon even fell 
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briefly under Egyptian rule between 1831-1840, when Muhammed Ali invaded Lebanon 
and Syria.122 
 During this period, Lebanon was not considered to be a separate state, but rather 
part of Greater Syria, which included Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Palestine.  There is no 
consensus as to when a distinct Lebanese political identity emerged. Zamir, an Israeli 
historian, dates “the history of Lebanon as a separate entity…[as beginning] in the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries during the reign of Fakhr al-Din II,” a Druze 
Ma’nid ruler who ruled Mount Lebanon from 1590-1633.123 For most of his rule, he 
served as Emir of the Ottoman sanjak (province) of Sidon-Beirut, an area approximately 
one-fifth the size of present-day Lebanon; but between 1605-7 and 1621-1633 successful 
rebellions allowed him to rule independently.124 Interestingly, a crucial part of his success 
in an even temporary victory against the Ottomans was an alliance with Florence, which 
prompted Pope Gregory XIII to write to the Maronite Patriarch to ask him to lend 
Maronite military support to Fakhr al-Din’s campaign.125 Fakhr al-Din even spent five 
years in exile in Florence from 1613-1618. During his stay, he noticed that one of the 
most profitable trade goods entering Italy at that time was silk, and he resolved to 
introduce silk production to Lebanon upon his return. His success in this project changed 
Lebanon in two fundamental ways: first, by bringing Maronite farmers from the north to 
the Druze-dominated Mount Lebanon to cultivate silk, he created the first mixed Druze-
Christian principality, which would eventually become Christian-dominated. Second, his 
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silk exports drew the attention of France, which would later become Lebanon’s largest 
trade partner and official protector of the Maronite confession. 
 The first major shift in Lebanese politics during the Ottoman era, and the moment 
most historians point to as the beginning of a Lebanon separate from Greater Syria, was a 
series of peasant revolts, which mostly took the form of Maronite-Druze clashes, between 
1841-1861, and the consequent administrative reorganizations of 1843 and 1860. In 1843, 
the Ottoman Empire imposed the “double qa’imaqamiyyah” system on Lebanon, under 
which a dual administrative structure governed Lebanon, ruled by a Maronite Christian in 
the north and a Druze in the south.126 This division came about primarily because of 
increased European interest in the Levant following Napoleon’s incursion into Egypt in 
1798 and the strengthening of the French-Lebanese silk trade through the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. In fact, the “double qa’imaqamiyyah” system was suggested by 
Chancellor Metternich of Austria, who brokered the agreement with England, France, and 
the Ottoman Empire to help bring an end to fighting caused at least partially by foreign 
intervention.  
France, the largest import market for Lebanese raw silk, which had considered 
itself the foreign protector of the Maronites since the Crusades, a status Louis XIV 
renewed officially, backed Maronite domination of Lebanon as Ottoman influence began 
to wane.127 The British supported the Druze claim to counter that of the Maronites, and 
indirectly, the French. Austria hoped to replace France as the guarantors of the Maronites. 
The Ottoman government, in the meantime, “tried to reassert its authority over the 
semiautonomous amirate [sic] by convincing the European powers that local rule was 
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impossible.”128 Metternich’s solution left the Ottoman Empire in control of the region but 
gave the two most influential groups significant spheres of influence by creating a 
Maronite governor for the north of Lebanon and a Druze governor for the south.  They 
were each advised by a Maronite and a Druze wakil (deputy), each of whom would 
exercise judicial and fiscal power over their community.129 
The “double qa’imaqamiyyah” was Lebanon’s first foray into confessional 
governance, i.e. the allocation of political power and representation based on religious 
affiliation.  It did not stop the fighting between Druzes and Christians. By 1860, 
widespread massacres of Maronites living in Druze-dominated areas precipitated a civil 
war and the expulsion of Druzes from northern Maronite villages and Maronites from 
southern Druze areas.130 France, in their role as protector of the Maronites, invaded the 
Chouf mountains to pacify the Druze troops.  In 1861, the Ottomans invited France, 
England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia to a conference to find a solution to the fighting. 
The result was the Règlement Organique of 1861, which made Lebanon an autonomous 
province within the Ottoman Empire, to be governed by a non-Lebanese Christian 
authority appointed by the Ottoman administration and approved by the European 
signatories to the Règlement Organique.  
This system, known as the “mutasarrifiyyah” after the appointed mutasarrif 
(governor), also created Administrative Council to advise the governor and exercise veto 
power over tax increases and permission for Ottoman troops to enter the territory. It was 
elected by village notables on a proportional basis. Christian groups were awarded six 
seats of twelve seats, with the remainder reserved for Muslim deputies, until the 
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Règlement was altered in 1864 to give the Christians, then the largest group, seven seats 
to the Muslims’ five.131 This gave the Maronites four seats, the Greek Orthodox two, the 
Greek Catholics one, the Druze three, and a single seat each to the Sunni and Shia 
Muslims.132 The signatory powers arrived at this apportionment by excluding Beirut, 
Sidon, and Tripoli from the mutasarrafiyyah and leaving them under the control of the 
Ottoman province of Damascus.  Otherwise, Sunni Muslims would have been the 
dominant group demographically.133 The treaty further divided the territory into seven 
smaller provinces to be administered by the majority confession in each area, which gave 
judicial and administrative control of each province to the largest group in it. The 
judiciary was made up of both officials elected by the central governor and locally 
appointed village notables, although minorities within each province were allowed to 
continue to seek out their own religious officials for matters of personal status law.134  
When asked about their history, the Lebanese frequently point to the 
mutasarrafiyyah as the moment when confessional politics in Lebanon became the status 
quo.135 Although the “double qa’imaqamiyyah” divided Lebanon into two zones, each 
administered by one of the two dominant religions, the mutasarrafiyyah went further by 
including six different confessions in the governing formula and institutionalizing the 
idea of confession-based proportional representation. Indeed, just sixty years later, when 
Lebanon was a French Mandate territory and the French conducted opinion polls of 
Lebanese politicians and notables concerning provisions to be included in the new 
constitution, opinion was almost unanimous that confessional politics was a necessary 
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evil. In his analysis of the Lebanese constitution, Edmond Rabbath summarizes the 
findings of the French commission. The sixth item on the questionnaire asked the 
deputies, drawn from prominent families, a wide range of professions, and government 
officials, whether they would support a confessional basis for apportioning parliamentary 
seats.136 Of one hundred thirty two deputies consulted, there was unanimous agreement 
that confessional politics would create prejudice between the various religious groups and 
undermine Lebanon’s stability.137 Nevertheless, one hundred twenty one of the deputies 
voted for confessional apportionment because they were concerned that failing to ensure 
representation for the smaller groups would give too much power to Lebanon’s largest 
groups, and also that Lebanese citizens would never accept a system in which confession 
was deemphasized for the sake of the larger political unit.138  
The constitution promulgated by the French Mandate in 1926 did apportion 
parliamentary representation politically in Article 24, which also left changes in electoral 
law, such as a move away from proportional representation, to be determined by future 
electoral laws.139 This system has resulted in a certain amount of instability in the run up 
to elections in Lebanon, because each group attempts to change the law to whichever 
option would give it the greatest representation. The proportional system in place today is 
based on a census taken in 1932, which determined that Christians were the majority in 
Lebanon, with approximately 54% of the population.140 Since then, no census has been 
taken, and calls for a new count are seen as politically inflammatory because they might 
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change the makeup of the Lebanese government. As a consequence, anything touching on 
demographic issues, such as laws concerning nationality, birth, and marriage, are 
particularly sensitive. Attempts to legislate around these issues are met with strong 
resistance, as will be shown in the next section, which covers political bargaining over 
personal status laws.  
Article Nine of the 1926 constitution had the effect of further institutionalizing the 
already strong role of religious groups in Lebanese politics. Article nine states “There 
shall be absolute freedom of conscience.  The state, in rendering homage to the Most 
High, shall respect all religions and creeds and it guarantees, under its protection, the free 
exercise of all religious rites, provided that public order is not disturbed.  It also 
guarantees that the personal status and religious interests of the population, to whichever 
religious sect they belong, are respected.”141 This article is directly derived from the 
French Mandate document for France and Syria, Article Eight of which states “The 
Mandatory shall ensure to all complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all 
forms of worship which are consonant with public order and morality,” and Article Six of 
which pledges “The Mandatory shall establish in Syria and the Lebanon a judicial system 
which shall assure to natives as well as to foreigners a complete guarantee of their rights. 
Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and for their religious interests shall 
be fully guaranteed.”142 Edmond Rabbath notes that Article Nine has the effect of 
constitutionalizing the customary right that had governed Lebanese groups for centuries, 
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and thereby also guaranteed the “particular morphology of confessionalism.”143 Rabbath 
further notes the irony of including an article that guarantees absolute freedom of 
conscience in a country that does not recognize the right to disassociate oneself from a 
religious group.144 
Lebanon won independence from France in 1943, although French troops did not 
leave Lebanon until a year after the end of the Second World War in 1946. Post-Mandate 
Lebanon had two sources of governing principles: the new Lebanese constitution, based 
heavily on the 1926 text, promulgated in 1943, and an unwritten understanding known as 
the “National Pact.” The new constitution changed very little from the old except to 
remove any reference to the Mandate and to strengthen the role of the presidency to adopt 
some of the former powers of the Mandate.  The National Pact, in contrast, changed 
Lebanon fundamentally.145 It was arrived at by two leaders of French resistance, 
Maronite Beshara al-Khoury and Sunni Riad al-Solh, as a means of creating a mixed-
confessional governing structure that would be acceptable to both Christians and 
Muslims. The terms of the unwritten pact specified that the President of the country 
would be a Maronite, the Prime Minister Sunni, and in 1947, the position of Speaker of 
the House was reserved for the Shia community, then Lebanon’s third largest.146 In 
addition, it left the Head of Security, the Head of the Army, and other key security 
positions in the hands of the Maronites and reserved a certain number of cabinet posts for 
Muslim deputies. It addressed the greatest fears of both sides by guaranteeing that the 
Maronites would not seek external interference in Lebanese affairs by the French, and 
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that the Muslims would not attempt to reattach Lebanon to Syria or any pan-Arab 
alliance.147  
Although the Pact was never written, it became the dominant understanding of 
Lebanese politics, such that even when provisions of the Constitution fell into disuse, the 
Pact was maintained. The 1989 Ta’if Accord that ended Lebanon’s civil war was based 
largely on the Pact, although it also extended the previous agreement in certain areas. 
Later, the terms of the Ta’if accord were incorporated into the constitution. In effect, the 
Accord reapportioned the confessional system, giving Christians and Muslims 1:1 parity 
in the number of parliamentary seats and ministerial posts and strengthening the role of 
the Prime Minister while diminishing the President’s power.148 More importantly here, 
the Ta’if Accord gives concrete expression to the absolute power held by Lebanon’s 
various religions over personal status law. Article Three calls for the creation of a new 
Constitutional Council competent to determine the permissibility of laws already passed 
by parliament, and Section B[2] of Article III stipulates “To ensure the principle of 
harmony between religion and state, the heads of the Lebanese sects may revise the 
constitutional council in matters pertaining to: 1. Personal status affairs; 2. Freedom of 
religion and the practice of religious rites; 3. Freedom of religious education.”149 This 
gives the heads of Lebanon’s religions the right to petition the Constitutional Council if 
the Parliament makes any law concerning personal status affairs that any of the religious 
authorities has not already approved. Although this seemingly gives a large amount of 
power to Lebanon’s confessions, as personal status law touches on many other areas of 
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national life, in reality section B[2] merely codifies the centuries-old principle of state 
non-interference in religion and the legal effects of religious affiliation. 
Following centuries of communitarian life, it is unsurprising that levels of support 
for non-community based institutions are low. Only in recent years has the level of 
support for even optional civil marriage attained a majority. French political scientist 
Theodor Hanf conducted opinion polls in Lebanon on matters pertaining to attitudes on 
coexistence through and after the civil war, and in the mid 1980s began to track support 
for civil law as well. He finds that in 1987, fifty percent of the population would have 
supported an optional civil personal status law, and in 2006 that number had increased to 
70%.150 Polls conducted by the International Information Center, published in Lebanese 
newspaper Al-Nahar in January, 1997, report much lower levels of support for an 
optional personal status law. Although a majority of college students were in favor, only 
seventeen percent of the general population would have chosen to allow civil personal 
status law, even in optional form.151 The poll revealed that wealthier and more educated 
Lebanese tended to favor optional civil marriage, and that of the confessional groups, 
Christians were the most in favor and the Druzes most opposed.152 It is possible that the 
higher levels of support in Hanf’s poll in 2006 are a reflection of a general liberalizing 
trend, but interview evidence from 2012 evidences levels of support below fifty 
percent.153 The next question on Hanf’s poll also contradicts his findings, as fifty four 
percent of Lebanese in 1987 and sixty-nine percent in 2006 agreed that “it doesn’t matter 
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what anyone wants, secularization doesn’t seem to have a chance in Lebanon. 
Community membership is a reality you have to accept.”154  
Further evidence of the high level of institutionalization of community authority 
lies in the relative lack of judicial independence. In 2007, Judge Jon al-Azzi ruled that 
Lebanese women should have the right to pass on their nationality to their children even 
if the child’s father is not Lebanese, which had never been permitted, ostensibly on the 
grounds that it would open the door to many Palestinian refugees gaining Lebanese 
citizenship.155 His decision was reversed only months later, and Judge Azzi was 
transferred from the Court of Cassation (Lebanon’s highest court) to a lower level court. 
His state-appointed office was confiscated as well, leaving him to borrow a desk in a 
colleague’s office or work from home.156 Judge Ahmed Ayoubi was transferred from a 
central appeals court in Beirut to the real estate court of Tripoli after ruling against a 
Sunni judge in two cases.157 Even judges on the religious courts have been punished for 
upholding tenets of civil law in religious courts.158 Historian Safia Saadeh notes that a 
true sectarian system like that of Lebanon precludes an independent judiciary because the 
judiciary is prevented from arriving at rulings that might threaten sect interests.159 She 
further explains that "the demand for an independent judiciary means the eradication of 
the consociational system, because the sectarian grand coalition ascribes to itself absolute 
power, a reality that robs the judiciary of its two basic and fundamental principles: 
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impartiality and integrity."160 Thus, in Lebanon, the primacy of non-state law results in a 
system where the power of the state judiciary is reduced to safeguard confessional 
personal status law. According minority group rights to adjudicate family law according 
to each confession’s religious precepts has the net effect of weakening the state judiciary.  
This stands in direct contrast to places like England, where the legal system was 
fully institutionalized before identity groups with different norms sought to carve out 
spaces where their separate rules could apply. It was only in the early 2000s that Muslim 
immigrants to England began to form Sharia councils, and they never attempted to win 
state recognition for them.161 The adjudicators in these councils view their rulings as 
having a binding effect only insofar as the disputant’s faith dictates she follow them.162 
Perhaps most importantly, these councils have no state-backed enforcement power. Thus, 
their existence has no effect of weakening the state judiciary’s monopoly on access to 
enforcement for its rulings, or legitimacy for the vast proportion of citizens.163  
Confessional politics and personal status law, as described above, have a mutually 
reinforcing tendency at the institutional level. That large groups would favor the 
maintenance of a system that guarantees their dominance makes sense, but the support of 
smaller groups is less intuitive. Lebanon’s smaller groups, such as the Syrian Catholics 
and Coptic Orthodox are complicit in keeping the system in place. Religious leaders 
realize that they would gain little by switching to majoritarian democracy, as they would 
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still be a minority group, and they would perhaps lose even the small share of influence 
they possess under consociationalism.164 Additionally, both small and large groups gain 
substantial revenue from managing personal status affairs. Although Muslim courts are 
included in the state budget, bribery is widespread and non-Muslim courts, which are not 
part of the state apparatus, are self-financed and thus charge hefty fees for annulment, 
guardianship transfer, and other family law services that require more than just the 
registration of an action such as marriage.165 At the individual and group level, family 
law adjudication is a lucrative business. Perhaps more importantly, the ability to 
adjudicate personal status disputes gives religious judges the power to set and reinforce 
community norms.166 It also reinforces the authority and legitimacy of the religious 
authorities.  As Becker and Shapiro note, courts are effective in centralizing political 
power for whoever administers them.167 Religious judges in Lebanon are very much 
aware of the benefits that accrue to both them, individually, and to their confession from 
adjudicating personal status disputes, and as such are committed to keeping the system in 
place.  
 
Contestation and Bargaining: Preserving Judicial Decentralization 
 
Saadeh sees the preservation of confessional personal status law as a game that 
the various confessions play to keep power away from the central regime. In Lebanon, 
she claims, “the sects did not extricate powers from the state all at once, but proceeded to 
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follow the step by step method. First…[they acquired] a legal status that give them a wide 
range of leverage within the political system.”168 While Saadeh’s description is perhaps 
too cynical to be strictly accurate, Lebanese history evinces many episodes of bargaining 
between the leaders of confessional groups and the governing authorities concerning 
personal status jurisdiction. Thus far, none of the attempts to centralize Lebanon’s 
judiciary has succeeded even partially. 
Although the French Mandate document for Syria and Lebanon guarantees the 
preservation of religious personal status law, France had always envisaged the creation of 
a general civil law statute that would apply to everyone regardless of religion and end a 
system that privileged religious law over civil law.169 Accordingly, the Mandate 
authorities sought on several occasions to centralize judicial authority and to introduce a 
civil personal status law. During the first attempt in December, 1921, High 
Commissioner Gouraud abrogated Article 156 of the 1917 Ottoman Family Law code, 
which gave authority to each religion to manage its own family law and associated 
courts. Widespread protests immediately broke out and after only weeks, Gouraud 
reinstated the law to restore peace as the League of Nations oversaw the final 
preparations for the beginning of the Mandate in 1922.170 The Mandate Document itself, 
as discussed previously, guaranteed the preservation of the Ottoman personal status 
system. In 1923, the first full year of Mandate authority, France decided to officially 
recognize the authority of confessional law in Arrêté No. 2851, and in the 1926 
constitution guarantees the preservation of religious personal status law.171 Shortly 
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thereafter, however, High Commissioner de Jouvenel issued Arrêté No. 261, which gave 
civil tribunals the jurisdiction to hear personal status cases and created a civil marriage 
option; but the law was suspended with Mandate Decree 102 only two months later when 
protests grew difficult to contain.172 
 The French authorities did not attempt to alter the personal status law again until a 
decade later, when High Commissioner Damien de Martel issued Arrêté No. 60 of March 
13, 1936, amended by Mandate Decree 136 of November 23, 1938, which together 
reformed personal status law in Lebanon.173 Arrêté No. 60 recognized Lebanon’s 
confessions as distinct legal entities and required them to submit a copy of their legal 
code and rules of procedure, as well as their internal functioning, structure of their 
hierarchy, and many other details to Mandate Authorities.174 The laws of 1936 and 1938 
together introduced three major reforms to the personal status system. The first created a 
procedure by which a Lebanese citizen could move from one personal status community 
to another, in effect an official means of conversion from one religion to another. The 
second placed Muslim and non-Muslim communities on an equal footing according to 
state law, such that Muslim personal status courts, previously part of the state, became 
independent and privately administered entities like their non-Muslim counterparts. The 
third divided Lebanese citizens into two groups: those who belong to historical personal 
status communities, of which the Arrêté lists fifteen, and those who belong to the 
common law community, an original French creation comprised of anyone who wanted 
to opt out of their confession and place themselves under the jurisdiction of secular, civil 
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law.175  
In 1938, massive protests broke out.176 Muslim leaders said that they would never 
consent to be treated as just another minority community in the state, and Druze and 
Alawite authorities refused to submit their personal law codes, because their religions 
required that these codes remain secret.177 All confessional groups expressed outrage over 
the creation of an optional civil status community available to all Lebanese, particularly 
coupled with the introduction of an official way to move from one community to another. 
Muslim protests, however, were the largest, and so in March 1939, High Commissioner 
Puaux, who took over from de Martel, issued Arrêté No. 53 to except Muslims from 
Arrêté No. 60 and Mandate Decree 136.178 In effect, this exempted approximately half of 
the population from the new laws, which severely dampened their effect. Nevertheless, 
both remain on the books and apply to non-Muslim communities. Combined, they are 
what allow Lebanese citizens to travel overseas to conduct a civil marriage that is then 
recognized in Lebanon.179 1936 was the last attempt any of the French High 
Commissioners made to alter Lebanon’s judicial system. 
 In 1951, five years after the final French troops withdrew from Lebanon, 
President Beshara Khoury’s government again passed a law requiring Lebanon’s 
confessions to register their personal status code with the state, and again the confessions 
refused to do so.180 Although the government was prepared to accept failure, the Lawyers 
Syndicate decided to press the issue and went on strike on January 12, 1952 for eight 
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months in an attempt to abolish confessional law and create a unified civil code for 
personal status law. They claimed that working across eighteen different personal status 
codes undermined efficiency and wasted state resources when policemen were routinely 
sent after Muslim wives who had left their husbands without a legal divorce.181 
Furthermore, they protested the violation of Lebanese sovereignty that occurs every time 
a Lebanese couple marries abroad and then returns home, where the marital law of the 
country where they were wed must govern their union.182 The strike ended when the 
Grand Mufti, the leader of Sunni Muslims in Lebanon, and the Patriarch, the head of the 
Maronite community, joined together to petition the President for an end to the strike, and 
to threaten to send their followers into the streets if the Lawyers Syndicate succeeded in 
its demands.183 
 During the 1960s and 70s scattered attempts took place to introduce a civil 
marriage option, but 1952 was the last time that any attempt was made to eliminate 
confessional courts. From then onwards, and particularly in the period after the civil war, 
contestation in the domain of personal status law was reduced to attempts to introduce an 
optional civil law for secular Lebanese citizens. The state ended any attempts to 
centralize its legal system and instead attempted to assert equal authority in the area of 
family law to give its citizens a civil option. What is striking about the attempts to curtail 
confessional law described above is that there was very little true bargaining, in the sense 
of negotiations between rival parties. Contestation has thus far involved religious 
authorities inciting their followers to demonstrations, strikes, and sometimes-violent 
protests until the governing authority reverses its course. The 1998 attempt by President 
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Elias Hrawi to introduce an optional civil status law nicely demonstrates a wider range of 
tools available to religious authorities in bargaining with the state beyond protest. 
In early 1998, President Hrawi worked with lawyer Ibrahim Traboulsi to draft a 
law that would create an optional civil law for marriage, divorce, and all other areas of 
the law covered by personal status law. On February 2, he submitted the draft law to the 
Council of Ministers, which approved the law on March 18 and passed it to Prime 
Minister Rafiq al-Hariri to present to the President to forward on to the Parliament for 
debate.184 Before submitting the law to the Council of Ministers, Hrawi shared the text of 
the law with the heads of Lebanon’s religious communities to ask for their input, which 
was universally against the bill. As soon as the Council of Ministers approved the law, 
the confessional leaders began to campaign against it. According to Lebanese newspaper 
Al-Nahar, the Islamist group Jama’ah Islamiyya, based in Tripoli, organized mosque sit-
ins for a month, at the end of which the group organized for its followers to be bused to 
Beirut to fight against the law by organizing massive protests outside the Parliament 
building and the homes of Council members.185 The Grand Mufti of Lebanon issued a 
Fatwa announcing that any Muslim who contracts a civil marriage in Lebanon would be 
considered guilty of apostasy.186 The Head of the Shia High Council, Mohammed Mahdi 
Shamseddine issued a statement saying “this law threatens to undermine Muslim and 
Christian religious courts and infringe on people's private lives; Lebanese citizens cannot 
be ruled by a law common to all sects.”187 
 Some religious figures did support the draft law. Mohamed Hasan al-Amin, a Shia 
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cleric, publicly announced that the law was necessary for Lebanon as a first step to erode 
sectarianism, which weakens Lebanon with internal divisions.188 But these isolated 
statements were insufficient to stop the momentum building against the law, particularly 
once Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir took the lead in attacking the proposed 
law.189 The leader of the Maronite Union told Al-Nahar “President Hrawi has connected 
the issue of civil marriage with that of the abolition of sectarianism in politics. We 
believe this act to be extremely dangerous as it violates the principle of power sharing 
between the sects.” By tying the introduction of civil personal status law to the 
weakening of the Lebanese confessional system, statements like these spread distrust of 
the law among the smaller Christian sects that had originally supported the bill. Patriarch 
Sfeir was slightly more subtle in his opposition to the bill, claiming that on a personal 
level, he was neither for nor against the bill, but as long as Grand Mufti Qabbani opposed 
the law he could never support it, and he thought it was bad timing for President Hrawi to 
raise religious tensions immediately before an election.190  
 When it appeared that Parliament might debate the bill, religious leaders escalated 
their tactics. Patriarch Sfeir spread the word that as far as he was concerned, anyone who 
contracted a civil marriage would be denied the last sacrament, and he urged his 
followers to protest against any Members of Parliament who voted in favor of the law.191 
Grand Mufti Qabbani warned that if the bill moved to open debate he would take 
Lebanon back into civil war and command his followers to attack the state.192 Privately, 
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Qabbani also made phone calls to Muslim Members of Parliament to ask them to oppose 
the law, and he approached Prime Minister Hariri and urged him not to let the bill reach 
Parliament. Qabbani also noted that both he and Patriarch Sfeir were prepared to exercise 
their constitutional right to challenge the law, if it passed, in front of the Constitutional 
Council.193 Allegedly to forestall violence, Hariri shelved the bill in violation of the 
Lebanese Constitution, which mandates that once a draft law has been approved by the 
Council of Ministers, the Prime Minister, as Head of that Council, must present it to the 
President to send on to the Parliament for debate.194 Nevertheless, the law was never 
presented to Parliament. 
 Hrawi’s draft law demonstrates the power of Lebanon’s confessions. Religious 
leaders were able to not only eliminate the law—they prevented it from even reaching 
open debate in Parliament. Lebanon’s religious communities have a considerable amount 
of political power, delegated both officially in Lebanon’s constitution and rules of civil 
procedure and unofficially, through their ability to exercise leverage over their followers. 
As Saadeh notes, politicians generally follow the interests of their confession and the 
religious leaders who help them attain power—and who can just as easily endorse their 
rivals.195 The Grand Mufti and Patriarch also both use public sermons, the Friday khutba 
and the Sunday sermon respectively, to instruct their believers on religious matters, but 
also about who to vote for and how to respond to political events.196 The Lebanese state 
is more than an agglomeration of the confessional groups it is made up of, as 
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demonstrated by the occasional passage of laws that one or another religious group 
opposes, such as a recent law concerning violence against women.197 The procedure for 
passing laws is democratic, however; even if elections are not always entirely free and 
fair, laws are not created by decree—they only come into being once voted into existence 
by Parliament and signed by the President and Prime Minister. As such, religious 
officials are able to maintain control over Lebanon’s legislative agenda so long as they 
exercise influence over Members of Parliament. That they do so is well known.  
According to Parliamentarian Ghassan Moukheiber, certain Maronite Members of 
Parliament are known to bring calculators to sessions of Parliament so that they can 
determine, during the course of the debate, the demographic effect of a proposed law.198 
As long as Deputies are elected along confessional lines, religious officials are vital to 
helping candidates secure their seats, and once elected, the Deputies make sure to retain 
the support of their confession by voting in its interest. At yet another level, 
confessionalism is a self-reinforcing institution and creates conditions that make it 
difficult, if not impossible, for Members of Parliament to ever vote to centralize personal 
status law. 
 
Contemporary Legal Pluralism in Lebanon 
   
 Several case studies of personal status law disputes in Lebanon show the ongoing 
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problems that durable judicial decentralization creates for Lebanese citizens. Mirna 
Shirdawi is a consultant who works for various non-governmental organizations such as 
USAID on Lebanese electoral reform. Her father is a Maronite Christian and her mother 
is a Sunni Muslim. Her parents had a civil marriage and, in order to respect both of the 
religions in their household, opted not to baptize their children.199 Under Sunni law, as 
applied in Lebanon, Mirna is not considered to be Muslim because her father is not 
Muslim, and religion is determined according to paternity.200 Although the Lebanese state 
considers her to be a Maronite Christian because she, like all other Lebanese children, 
was registered at birth as belonging to the religion of her father, the Maronite religious 
establishment does not consider her to be Maronite because she was not baptized.201 
Accordingly, she may not inherit from either her mother or her father, as Muslims and 
Christians have adopted internal laws that prohibit inheritance from non-group 
members.202  
One of her friends, a personal status lawyer, has helped Mirna put together a 
revocable trust that should permit her and her siblings to gain the property of their parents 
after their death, but only because the property will be considered to have already passed 
into the children’s hands before death.203 If anyone were to contest the arrangement, it is 
likely that, at a minimum, the Sunni religious establishment would be able to divide her 
mother’s estate according to sharia rules of inheritance, which would give her uncles the 
bulk of her mother’s property and block Mirna from inheriting at all.204 Mirna’s brother 
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decided when he attained the age of majority that he wanted to be baptized, and he is the 
only one of the children who can officially inherit his father’s property. However, when 
he wanted to separate from his wife, he was unable to procure an annulment from the 
Maronite church, which does not permit divorce, so he converted to the Syrian Orthodox 
Church, which solved his divorce problem but cut him off from his family and 
confession, as he is barred from rejoining the Maronite church.205 
Perhaps one of the most (in)famous cases of personal status law-related problems 
involves Selim Hoss, former Prime Minister of Lebanon. Hoss and his wife had only one 
child, a daughter, who under Hanafi law, would inherit half the share of her brothers if 
she had brothers, and if not, then she would inherit nothing and her uncles would inherit 
her share instead.206 To allow her to inherit, he converted to Shii Islam because Jaafari 
law allows daughters to inherit as much as half of the family estate, even if they have no 
brothers.207 However, under the terms of the National Pact (and reinforced by the Ta’if 
Accord), the Prime Minister must be a Sunni Muslim, so Hoss converted back shortly 
after safeguarding his daughter’s inheritance so that he could remain Prime Minister of 
Lebanon.  
 These cases vividly illustrate the potential problems caused by legal pluralism in 
personal status law. It would take a book-length study to document cases of all of the 
jurisdictional problems that result from Lebanon’s system, but it is worth summarizing a 
few more of them. According to Lebanese lawyers, only certain types of mixed marriages 
can take place in Lebanon. For example, a Muslim man may wed anyone from Lebanon’s 
eighteen confessions within the Sunni Muslim faith, but a Muslim woman cannot, and 
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only certain of the confessions that her husband might belong to would recognize their 
union unless she converts. As Lebanon does not have any civil marriage option, Lebanese 
solve the problem by leaving the country and marrying in another country that does have 
civil marriage.208 Cyprus is considered to have the most neutral laws for both parties, so it 
is a popular choice.  Adoptions are banned for all Muslims and couples who married 
under Muslim law, even in mixed marriages. As previously mentioned, Muslims may not 
inherit from Christians and vice versa. Without recognition of civil law, all Lebanese are 
bound into one or another of these systems. Even if they marry abroad, issues relating to 
their children are often (but not always) governed by religious law. Some cases are never 
resolved because both civil and religious courts deny jurisdiction, leaving the litigant 
searching for a court to take up his case. Although a convenient means for groups to 
police their boundaries, decentralized personal status law creates legal quagmires in 
Lebanon that one suspects could rival Jarndyce and Jarndyce. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Lebanese example stands in opposition to the trajectory of judicial 
centralization in Egypt (see chapter four).  Unlike in Egypt, confessional courts are firmly 
established in Lebanese family law and have deep roots in the Lebanese political system.  
Repeated effects to repeal or legally circumvent their power and authority have failed, 
despite the popularity of the proposed reforms and their widespread adoption by other 
states.  That religious law has such power demonstrates the self-reinforcing nature of 
Lebanese confessional politics. Unlike in other cases, strong institutionalization of these 
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norms and the extensive bargaining power of confessional elites at the time of the 
system’s formation guaranteed the existence and preservation of independent family law 
courts. 
As long as ascriptive identity groups form the basis of political power in Lebanon, 
demographic policy will be a site of strong political contestation. The ability to draw 
boundaries between groups and control marriage, divorce, adoption, and other actions 
related to family life, is of central importance to group demographics, and thus political 
power. Once confessional politics was in place, it became self reinforcing by giving its 
constituent groups the need to police their boundaries. This necessitated preserving legal 
pluralism in family law.  
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Chapter Three: Partial Judicial Decentralization in Tanzania 
 
Introduction 
 
Tanzania is a case of partial judicial decentralization that allows space for locally 
distinct customary law, the content of which is determined by local or tribal communities. 
Although there have been several attempts to further centralize its judicial system, the 
contours of today’s judiciary were established soon after independence in the early 
1960s, and efforts to change the balance between unified law and local law have not gone 
far. Nonetheless, largely as an artifact of other policies during the state building period, 
greater degrees of centralization in practice have been achieved over time.  Consistent 
with the theory proposed in Chapter 1, Tanzania’s partial decentralization, stemming 
from the conditions of its modern origins and still only slowly altering, can be ascribed to 
a combination of the state’s need for the support of rural elites in implementing economic 
development programs after independence, and the strong, coordinated support of tribal 
elites for locally distinct customary law.  
That coordinated support was far from inevitable.  Challenges to elite 
coordination and support for local law came during the British colonial period, when the 
policy of indirect rule so radically altered the structure of the chieftaincy that deep splits 
formed between rival factions of elites. These splits worsened during the movement for 
independence, when the nationalist party’s strongest supporters were mostly anti-
traditionalist, whereas the chiefs who practiced customary law by and large aligned 
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themselves with the British colonialists. Nevertheless, support for locally distinct 
customary law did survive among both more pro-nationalist and more traditionalist rural 
elites.  During the post-independence period of reform, the nationalist party decided that 
it would support preservation of customary law as a means of diminishing rural elite 
opposition to its policies, thereby creating the system of partial decentralization that has 
endured since then. 
Table 4 
Trajectory of Judicial Decentralization in Tanzania 
 
 
In Tanzania, there are over 120 tribes, and the largest makes up only 13% of the 
population. The next largest comprises less than 5% of the population.209 Accordingly, no 
one group has anything close to a plurality of the population, so it is less fruitful to study 
only one or two groups, as I do in the cases of Lebanon and Egypt. I therefore focus on 
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the largest group, the Sukuma, along with several of the smaller tribes including the 
Chagga, Nyamwezi, Haya, Kuria, and Shambaa. These tribes have been selected for their 
high level political involvement, and the depth with which they have been studied across 
multiple historical periods by anthropologists and historians. However, Tanzania’s 
history has been subjected to much less scrutiny than that of most European countries, 
and the existing accounts were by and large written by European scholars. Before the 
colonial era, there was very little record keeping, and records were not well preserved. 
The German and British colonial periods brought more widespread record keeping, as did 
independence, but not all of these records are accessible to researchers. Accordingly, 
while I have attempted to make mention of the majority of the above listed tribes in each 
section of the following chapter, I am not able to trace each individually through each 
historical period. However, their histories are similar, which suggests that there are broad 
commonalities in the trajectories of Tanzania’s tribes. Reference to supplementary 
material on other tribes helps to confirm this. While I would never claim that each tribe’s 
history is the same, I find that their shared characteristics, such as the ways in which they 
were managed by each colonial power, and their relationship to the post independence 
central government, are sufficiently similar to allow me to draw causal conclusions about 
their elites’ capacities and levels of coordination. 
 
Summary of the Argument 
 
The remainder of the chapter is divided into three sections. The first examines the 
evolution of support for locally distinct customary law during the German and British 
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colonial periods, despite widespread changes that were likely to have eroded its salience. 
This section begins with a brief history of pre-colonial East Africa, followed by an 
examination of the German and then British colonial periods. During the discussion of 
colonial rule, it emphasizes the changes made to the chieftaincy and the use of custom 
and tradition to support the structure of indirect rule. During these two periods, the 
primary variable of interest is elite coordination. It was the British structuring of 
customary law that created strong rural elite support for judicial decentralization.  
The second section of the chapter considers the evolution of group elite 
coordination and the relative capacities of state leaders and group elites vis-à-vis post 
independence reforms. It also focuses on bargaining between group elites and state 
leaders over levels of judicial decentralization. During independence, divided elite 
opinion (some supported continued British involvement, and others favored 
independence) weakened the ability of rural elites to coordinate in support of 
decentralization. This left the state with sufficient capacities to enact certain components 
of centralization. However, the elimination of the chieftaincy after independence served 
as a rallying point to bring group elites together to coordinate in favor of judicial 
decentralization. As a result the state leaders, led by Julius Nyerere, acquiesced to a 
limited amount of judicial decentralization in return for group elite support for the 
government reforms in rural areas that were the group elites’ areas of strength. The sheer 
scale of Nyerere’s desired reforms provided the opening for contestation that resulted in 
the level of decentralization that persists today.  
The third section considers judicial decentralization in Tanzania over the last 
twenty years and offers a perspective on the contemporary situation in Tanzania’s rural 
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courts. The chapter concludes that the relative though still partial centralization of 
Tanzania’s judiciary, particularly compared to other African countries, was caused more 
by the increase in group elite relative capacity that resulted from Nyerere’s nation-
building policies than his original plan for judicial unification. 
The case of Tanzania makes for an interesting comparison with that of Malawi, its 
neighbor to the south. Although the two share many characteristics, they adopted widely 
different approaches to judicial centralization after independence. Both are former British 
colonies that achieved independence at nearly the same time, were governed by single 
parties dominated by strong presidents, they share a border, and they have similar ethnic 
makeups, but Tanzania ended up partially decentralizing its judiciary, while Malawi 
began by fully decentralizing it, and then changed course to only tacitly devolve judicial 
authority. In Malawi, state leaders had relatively higher capacity than those in Tanzania, 
mostly because the post independence government was able to take over indirect rule 
system to concentrate power in the hands of President Banda, while Tanzania replaced 
the indirect rule structure with a decentralized governing system that gave more power to 
local elites. Tanzania’s decision to eliminate the chieftaincy brought group elites together 
to defend locally distinct customary law, one of their few remaining arenas of power, 
whereas Malawi’s government coopted group elites by binding the structure of the 
chieftaincy to the state, and thus making group elites dependent on state leaders for their 
authority. 
 
The Evolution of Customary Law and Elite Coordination 
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Pre-Colonial and Early German Tanganyika 
 
 It is difficult to generalize about judicial and political institutions in pre-colonial 
East Africa because practices varied widely from one geographic area to the next. Most 
East Africans were members of tribes, but a large number of them were not, instead 
living in loose kinship associations without a single leader or group of leaders. The two 
most common units of political organization were the kinship group and the tribe, 
although there were many different ways of organizing authority within each. While 
some of East Africa’s tribes were strongly organized and hierarchical, others were 
components of much looser structures where village elders and other elites were part of 
the decision-making process.210 Mamdani emphasizes “the diversity of the pre-colonial 
experience” that encompasses stateless communities, traditional chiefs, administrative 
chiefs, and the melding of matrilineal and patrilineal practices within single societies.211 
Far from the colonial perception of the tribe as a concrete, long-lasting, and locally 
legitimate form of rule, the power of chiefs was often highly contingent, subject to 
takeover or conquest, and tempered by the limits of obedience that were invisible to 
colonial officials. 
Herbst notes that conquest was not a purely colonial endeavor.212 Because there 
were no maps with agreed-upon borders, expansion was a perennial project, and tribes 
                                                
210 John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika, Cambridge University Press (1979), 318. Iliffe argues that 
the Nyamwezi, one of Tanzania’s more prominent tribes during and after the colonial period, had no strong 
tribal identification before the arrival of the Germans. 
211 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject : Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism, 
Kampala: Fountain Publishers (1996), 40-41. 
212 Jeffrey Ira Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control, 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press (2000), 35-37. 
 97 
raided one another for cattle and arable land.213 Some tribes conquered others to form 
empires, some of which endured until the German conquest. These conquests spread and 
altered some tribal customs at the expense of others. To the extent that conquest changed 
local norms, judicial reform took place routinely; however, without a single 
administrative apparatus for the territory.  Consequently, these episodes of transformation 
cannot be viewed as judicial centralization or decentralization. Rather, it is important to 
examine pre-colonial legal institutions and practices to gain an understanding of the 
norms that were, at least to some degree, institutionalized among their practitioners, as 
well as the power structures within them. There are over one hundred twenty different 
tribes in present-day Tanzania, so it is not practical to scrutinize each in depth. However, 
a brief look at some of the larger tribes provides an idea of pre-colonial structures and 
norms, and adjudicative practices. 
Sally Falk Moore describes organization among the Chagga of Kilimanjaro in the 
18th-19th centuries as highly institutionalized and complex, consisting of a patrilineal 
chieftaincy with several layers of authority including chiefs, sub-chiefs, and lineage 
heads as well as the heads of age-set groups.214 Adjudication among the Chagga was both 
highly routinized and highly contingent. Most legal disputes were settled among 
particular social groupings such as the age-set, which included all young men born within 
several years of one another who progressed through life stages together. ⁠215 More formal 
dispute resolution began with the leader of the patrilineage, and it was considered taboo 
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to seek recourse outside the lineage group.216⁠ Unresolved cases were sent to the 
chieftaincy for a hearing at one of approximately thirty Lawns of Justice, where chiefs 
judged disputes.⁠217 In all legal venues, context and social ties were important to deciding 
how general norms should apply to a specific case.218 Enforcement of judicial decisions 
was achieved through shaming or the threat of exclusion from the community. 
Adjudication was thus a component part of and reflection of the political structure. Minor 
disputes were managed at the lowest-level political unit, the age-set, and appeals and 
more serious cases went to the higher levels of the kin group head and chief. The male 
heads of age-sets, lineage heads, and chiefs accordingly derived power from their 
adjudicatory role, and the norms they enforced typically upheld Chagga hierarchy. 
 By way of contrast, Wijsen and Tanner describe pre-colonial Sukuma social 
organization and adjudication as markedly different from that of the Chagga. The 
Sukuma, Tanzania’s largest tribe, never adhered to an age-grade structure or its 
associated life-cycle rituals of circumcision and other puberty-related ceremonies.219 
Sukuma social groups were generally flexible, and it was possible for a person to belong 
to several different social sets simultaneously and identify with each of them depending 
on context. ⁠Norm enforcement relied much less heavily on authority structures or 
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hierarchies and more on institutional mechanisms. For instance, community elders had 
the power to overrule the chief, and the numerous resulting veto points had the effect of 
decentralizing power. The position of chief was also not inherited, nor was the chief 
awarded extra land or property upon ascension to office.220 Authority nevertheless 
resided in the same places as other tribes: the families of chiefs and male village elders. 
Legal structures, too, were diffuse, with large variations in law between neighboring 
chieftaincies.221   
The most routinized norms were those concerned with family law, and in 
particular, marriage, divorce, and child custody rights. In particular, most kinship groups 
had a bride wealth system to govern marriages, and as Abrahams notes, “in bride-wealth 
marriage, a husband customarily acquires full rights over the children his wife bears.”222 
Men also had “customary rights to compensation” in the case of his wife’s adultery, but 
only in bride wealth marriages.223 Wijsen and Tanner, however, note that in matrilineal 
areas the bride wealth price was often set so high as to be impossible to pay fully over the 
course of a lifetime, which ensured continuing support for the wife’s family and a 
measure of control over her treatment.224 Although in matrilineal areas the wife’s family 
typically retained rights over children in marriages without bride wealth, the husband’s 
family had the option to purchase full rights to their labor.225 Cases of bride wealth 
payments, adultery, and other family law matters were typically settled between lineage 
groups, and inheritance cases rarely went beyond the immediate family for settlement. As 
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such, chiefs wielded less direct judicial authority than in other tribes. Crucially, the 
family law system gave tremendous power to men, and particularly village elders, who 
came to own the rights to labor of multiple wives and their offspring. Possession of labor 
gave them the ability to farm more acres and, accordingly, accrue more wealth.  It has 
been argued that African customary law is usually structured to privilege the accrual of 
wealth and power by a small set of elites.226 
Malawi had a similar level of variation in types of adjudication and in the extent 
to which tribal court systems were formalized in the pre-colonial era. Before the arrival 
of British authorities, tribes in the south had a highly institutionalized method of dispute 
resolution that began with adjudication by family elders, followed by village elders and, 
as a last resort, the tribal chief.227 Tribes on the border of present day Zambia had some 
of the most powerful chiefs in pre-colonial East Africa, and their efforts to preserve their 
power to adjudicate disputes in post-independence Malawi were a strong component of 
its later judicial decentralization.  The fact that in Malawi, unlike Tanzania, commitments 
and practices of local dispute resolution were more strongly institutionalized helps 
explain why the British strategy of indirect rule did not divide local elites as much as in 
Tanzania, requiring greater state acceptance of judicial decentralization in Malawi from 
the very start of independence.228 
Variations in Tanzanian tribal politics, however, continued into the era of German 
colonialism from the late 19th century to the end of WW I, when the peace settlement 
included transferring imperial governance to the British. Although the German colonial 
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officers sought to standardize political and judicial structures in East Africa, their level of 
penetration varied considerably across the territory. The majority of German settlers who 
arrived in East Africa in the mid-1800s settled in the northern, mountainous parts of the 
country, whereas many fewer chose to live in the arid central plains. Accordingly, their 
ability to enact lasting reforms was stronger in the north. In the center of the territory, 
tribes such as the Bena led a revolt against German rule to resist change, mostly 
successfully. According to Swartz, the German presence eroded the importance of the 
warrior class and introduced new taxes, which forced a transition to growing more cash 
crops. But the overall social organization did not change, and the Bena chiefs, who had 
wide powers to allocate land, marry into important families, and adjudicate disputes, 
retained their influence.229  
The arrival of Germans settlers near Kilimajaro, on the other hand, altered the 
Chagga tribal power structure significantly. Colonial administrators sought allies among 
local rulers, in the manner of Britain’s “indirect rule,” because they also believed their 
work would be easier without local opposition. They accordingly abolished the tribe’s 
warrior class, effectively eliminating the only checks to the chief’s power. 230 While the 
new German civil law courts had little effect on the Bena, as few of them ever came into 
contact with the new institutions, German colonialism altered Chagga judicial practice by 
giving the chief more judicial authority, supported by a German-run native affairs court 
whose decisions usually backed chiefly power.231 While German-introduced courts had 
little influence among the Sukuma, Abrahams notes that Sukuma kin groups that were 
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matrilineal were converted to being patrilineal during the German colonial period, as 
German administrators recognized only the existing chiefs’ son as rightful heir.232 Thus, 
in the areas of heaviest German penetration, there was a certain amount of judicial 
centralization around the figure of the tribal chief, but the Germans did not attempt to 
create a single court system for all of the tribes. Early efforts at building alliances 
between colonial administrators and tribal chiefs began to change the selection of and 
powers accorded to chiefs, but unevenly across the territory.233 
At the end of this period, certain chiefs had gained in power through cooperation 
with German settlers, and others, particularly among the Bena and their allies, had been 
stripped of the chieftaincy. In the center of the country, there was thus strong anti-
German feeling, but there were no territory-wide coalitions or movements to displace 
German rule. At the same time, however, though customary law had shifted in some 
areas to accommodate German reforms, such as the strengthening of chiefly courts and 
weakening of age-set heads’ adjudication, there was no systematic attempt across 
German East Africa territory to replace local law with German law or the practices of 
other tribes. Entering the next critical period, tribal elites (including chiefs and lineage 
heads) and non-elites still supported local customary law, which was often the only local 
option. Accordingly, by the end of this period, the processes important to judicial 
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centralization and decentralization had not yet begun to unfold. 
 
The British Colonial Period 
 
The transfer of German East Africa from Germany to the United Kingdom in 
1918 as part of the settlement that ended the First World War brought major reforms that 
would eventually reshape the chieftaincy and the practice of customary law. The League 
of Nations gave Britain a mandate over the territory, which, since Kenya and Uganda 
already formed British East Africa, they called Tanganyika.234 Unlike German rule, the 
British colonial period was transformative for all of East Africa’s tribes. During their 
tenure, British colonialists created a central judiciary based on Britain’s common law 
tradition, which would soon come to compete with local customary forums, and they 
fundamentally altered both the tribal system and the local balance of power with the 
imposition of indirect rule. The transfer of the colony can thus be taken as the first critical 
moment in the causal sequence because of its effect of strengthening chiefly authority 
through indirect rule, thereby increasing rural elite support for customary law, and their 
subsequent desire to protect it against centralization. 
Because early British colonialists were able to build on Germany’s infrastructure 
of roads and defensive installations, they were able to provide for their own defense and 
so faced relatively few armed insurrections. Previous colonial experience in India, 
Rhodesia, and, in particular, Nigeria, gave them the groundwork for putting a governing 
structure into place quickly. Although British administration at first took the form of 
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direct oversight and intervention, Donald Cameron, Tanganyika’s second governor, 
imported the indirect rule structure that Lugard had used with such comparative success 
in Nigeria.235 Indirect rule involved centralizing power around willing local tribal chiefs 
who were made dependent on British support for their authority.236 With the 1926 Native 
Authority Ordinance (Cap. 72), Cameron recognized traditional chiefs as rulers of their 
tribes, incorporating them into the colonial administrative structure. These men were 
expected to collect taxes, adjudicate disputes, and carry out development projects, among 
other things. They reported to District Offices, local outposts of the colonial regime 
usually manned by a District Officer and sometimes one or two other officials.  
Cameron used indirect rule because it was an effective method to run a colony 
with very few resources, but he and his fellow officers were also concerned with building 
a structure that they believed could eventually function after Tanganyika gained 
independence. Because the most prominent indigenous political structures were tribal, 
they believed that tribes should form the basis for local governance. According to Iliffe, 
among colonial officials “the belief was that as every European had a nation, so every 
African had a tribe.” During the same year that Cameron introduced indirect rule to 
Tanganyika, he wrote “It is our duty to do everything in our power to develop the native 
on lines which will not Westernise [sic] him and turn him into a bad imitation of a 
European…We want to make him a good African…We must not destroy the African 
atmosphere, the African mind, the whole foundations of his race, and we shall certainly 
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do this if we sweep away all his tribal organisations…” 237 As he announced to his fellow 
administrators, “If we aim at indirect administration through the appropriate Native 
Authority—Chief or Council—founded on the people’s own traditions and preserving 
their own tribal organisation, their own laws and customs purged of anything that is 
‘repugnant to justice and morality’ we shall be building an edifice with some foundation 
to it.”238 Realizing this vision required radically restructuring East Africa’s tribes. 
In some areas, colonial officers encountered pre-existing hierarchies led by chiefs 
with whom they could form alliances. In many places, these structures did not exist 
naturally, and British administrators were required to create local partners for the project 
of indirect rule. The goal, as one provincial administrator explained to his staff was that 
“Each tribe must be considered as a distinct unit…Each tribe must be under a chief.”239 
Accordingly, colonial officers, sometimes aided by anthropologists, decided which tribes 
would participate in indirect rule, and how. When they found groups who claimed no 
tribal identity, they usually classified them as members of the nearest large tribe. Small 
tribes without a strong hierarchy were similarly lumped together with other tribes. The 
Nyika of southern Tanzania, for example, were classified as a sub-group of a nearby 
tribe, despite linguistic differences and historic mistrust between the two peoples.240 In 
large or well-defined tribes that lacked a clear ruler or hierarchy, the British appointed 
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chiefs selected from locally prominent families.241 In other areas, they aggregated tribal 
subsets into larger units, such as the Nyakyusa, who shared a language, but had 
previously lived as separate smaller chiefdoms.242 In the Usambara mountains, the British 
discovered evidence of a powerful Shambaa kingdom that had existed before the arrival 
of the Germans, which they decided to revive under the rule of a previous contender for 
the throne.243 The new Shambaa territory was much larger than the old one, and included 
the Zigua and Pare people, who had previously formed separate tribes, and who 
maintained strong opposition to Shambaa rule.244 
In tribes that already possessed a clear structure of authority, British officials built 
new levels of hierarchy to centralize administration under as few leaders as possible. For 
instance, several separate Bena lineages were brought together under a single paramount 
chief in 1926.245 The eight separate Haya chiefdoms were unified in 1926 under the rule 
of Francis Lwamugira, whose ability to force “through the building of schools and 
dispensaries and roads” and support for “any project of economic development unless it 
threatened the established order” won him strong British support.246 When local 
resistance to centralizing power around the chieftaincy was too strong to overcome 
easily, colonial officials found other ways to organize rule. According to Rwezaura, the 
British faced setbacks when they tried to appoint a paramount chief of the previously 
acephalous Kuria, who for a long time had been governed in small agnatic groups whose 
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lineage head represented his group in a non-hierarchical tribal council.247 The British 
resolved this with the creation of a Kuria federation, which left the lineage heads (who 
they called sub chiefs) in control of their kin-group, but jointly responsible for a common 
treasury and court.248 Sukuma administration also took the form of a council rather than a 
single chieftaincy.249  
Many of the newly appointed chiefs worried about their legitimacy among their 
constituents, especially since their promotion came at the instigation of occupying forces. 
To bolster their claim to the chieftaincy, British officials revived and prioritized historical 
accounts that emphasized the importance of the families from which the new chiefs were 
drawn. Chiefs also spent considerable time and resources building histories of their 
family’s historical and hereditary right to rule.250 Iliffe quotes a Pare chief who claimed 
that when he chose to claim his tribe’s chieftaincy, he “wrote a ‘history’, which 
established that the chieftainship of the Pare District was [his].”251 Opponents to their rule 
and rival chiefs created separate histories to support alternate claims to power. The 
Ndamba tribe, which British officials categorized as part of the larger neighboring Bena 
tribe, sent historians Anton Mwilenga and John Kwalevele to Dar es Salaam to present 
their tribal histories and ethnographies to the British colonial government to make their 
case for independence from Bena rule.252 Similarly, according to Iliffe, “a Chagga 
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dissident of 1937 wrote a history of Kilimajaro aimed against chiefly authority.”253 
Histories of the Shambaa, Haya, Gogo, Safwa, and numerous other tribes appeared 
during the interwar years, and these treatises made a strong argument for or against the 
lineage-based legitimacy of particular chiefs.254 
Aside from commissioning or writing histories, chiefs reinforced their authority 
through references to, and sometimes reformulations of local customary law, and in 
particular those aspects connected to family life. Because the hierarchical structure 
introduced to many chieftaincies was usually unfamiliar to locals, chiefs attempted to 
portray “chiefly authority as an extension or elaboration of the authority normally 
exercised by senior men over their families.”255 In doing so, they often affirmed practices 
that shored up the power of senior men in the tribe, some of whom supported their claim 
to rule in return. They also used old rituals or invented new ones to lend legitimacy to 
their practices.256 Colonial officials collaborated with chiefs in articulating and 
formalizing (and sometimes inventing) versions of local custom that privileged the role of 
local elites, and in particular male village elders and patriarchs. These projects were often 
advanced even in areas where the population had a significant number of matrilineal kin 
groups.257  
In comparison, British rule in Malawi (known as Nyasaland) actually began 
earlier than in Tanganyika. The first British Consular Court, at first reserved for use for 
British officials only, was established in 1891, after Nyasaland declared a crown 
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protectorate.258 This court was expanded into a three-tiered system of courts for 
Europeans, Asians, and “natives”, respectively, in 1902. In 1933, colonial administrators 
created a class of Native Courts, which were meant to adjudicate customary and petty 
criminal disputes. These were meant to bring tribal law under the control of the state, but 
because these courts were staffed with outsiders who were friendly to the colonial 
regime, they were mostly ignored in favor of preexisting local courts.  Hence, this limited 
effort did not significantly alter already well-institutionalized patterns of judicial 
decentralization. At this stage, this pattern in Malawi largely replicates the British 
experience in Tanzania, in that both countries emerged from the colonial era with a multi-
tier court system that used the preservation of customary law to bind traditional 
authorities to the colonial state. In both countries, the system’s skeptics would become 
some of the first anti colonial-nationalists. 
The varied conditions in what would eventually become Tanzania, however, 
provided more opportunities for the British policy of indirect rule. Through it, the British 
created Tanganyika’s first centralized government, made up of British administrators and 
the tribal chiefs who enforced their laws. While some of these chiefs quietly opposed 
British rule, the majority of them supported British reforms, principally for the increased 
power and status that their cooperation brought.259 As in nearly all other colonies of the 
period, British or otherwise, a strong nationalist movement then grew to challenge 
colonial rule. One of the earliest movements was the Tanganyika African Association, 
founded in Dar es Salaam in 1929 as a forum of discussion for African urban elites.  It 
wasn’t until the 1950s, however, that the Association, brought under the leadership of 
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Julius Nyerere, one of twenty-six children of the chief of the Zanaki and the first 
Tanganyikan to pursue higher education in Britain, became a widespread political 
movement. The Tanganyika African Association (TAA), which in 1954 was renamed the 
Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), drew diverse supporters, including 
dispossessed former chiefs, urban women, and educated young Tanganyikans who 
opposed colonialism as an institution.260  
Other proto-nationalists movements were also formed during this period, but the 
Tanganyika African Association was the first to gain widespread appeal beyond the 
immediate area of its inception. Others tended to be limited to membership by co-
tribesmen. Maguire describes a group of Sukuma chiefs near Mwanza organizing, in 
1937 to block changes to local treasuries, and a petition to the first United Nations 
visiting Mission to Tanganyika by the Sukumaland Federation in 1948, detailing 
demands for further African representation in the nationwide Legislative Council, more 
opportunities for education, greater allowance for native societies, invitations to trade 
meetings, and the prohibition of land alienation without the consent of local chiefs.261 
The Sukuma Union, formed in 1945, began as a mutual aid society but quickly morphed 
into a forum for airing political grievances as its members, mostly teachers and clerks, 
began to realize that their economic complaints were bound up with the system of 
colonial governance.262 Hyden describes the activities of the Bahaya Union in the Haya 
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tribe, which brought grievances to British administrators.263 Here, as well, the TAA 
eventually gained greater local support when it more vocally demonstrated against British 
agricultural policies such as mulching banana stems.264 The Kilimanjaro Union served the 
same purpose for the Chagga.265 
Maguire argues that the development of nationalism in Tanganyika “varied in 
pace and differed in certain other respects in disparate areas depending on the impact of 
the colonial government’s policies, on the character of traditional tribal institutions, and 
on the nature of the economic and social environment.”266 Across most regions, however, 
some of its most prominent early followers were members of families who had been 
passed over for chieftaincy despite some claim to the title, or former chiefs whose small 
tribes had been amalgamated into larger tribes. When Anton Mwilenga and John 
Kwalevele, the Ndamba historians who traveled to Dar es Salaam to present their case for 
independence from the Bena, failed to win support for their cause, they went to a TANU 
rally to learn more about the nationalist movement.267 They decided to join the party, and 
they took 54 membership cards back home with them, which eventually yielded over one 
hundred Ndamba supporters who thought that TANU might be able to help free them 
from Bena rule.268 Iliffe cites Nyamwezi rival chiefs and village dissidents as the tribe’s 
first members.269  
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Because chiefs were directly responsible for carrying out some of the most widely 
opposed colonial initiatives, such as taxes and land alienation, opposition to colonial rule 
across the territory took the form of opposition to chiefs. Lord Hailey wrote a paper in 
1950 warning that British over-reliance on Native Authorities would create opposition to 
their rule. His memorandum led to efforts to create more representative local government, 
but most chiefs refused to accept elected advisors.270 In the Arusha region, popular 
protests against colonial rule were almost always directed against local chiefs.271 In 
Njombe, British administrators forced local chiefs to help with confiscation of land for a 
large wattle (acacia) farm managed by the Colonial Development Corporation, which 
earned the latter widespread resentment.272 TANU accordingly received widespread 
support in Njombe as “TANU activists blamed the ruling clans for denying positions to 
well qualified and educated individuals, protecting unqualified office-holders, preventing 
appeals against the decisions of chiefs’ courts, and perpetuating inefficiency and 
corruption.”273 In Sukumaland, farmers came increasingly to resent the mandates that 
forced them to change the way they farmed by requiring that certain crops be fertilized 
with manure, demarcating where new cultivation might take place, ordering the killing of 
certain numbers of cattle every year, and the planting of a minimum acreage of cassava 
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and cotton.274 Elites among the Sukuma accordingly created local associations and 
cooperatives meant to represent crop producers’ interests to the British administration. 
Concerned that these associations would provide alternative forums for political 
organization, the local District Officer prohibited them from operating in units other than 
that of the tribe.275 As a consequence, association and cooperative leaders became 
outspoken critics of the Native Authorities. Although in some cases chiefs chose to ally 
themselves with TANU, in most cases they remained loyal to the source of their 
authority. The British viewed party membership as open resistance to colonial rule, so 
many chiefs either joined in secret or never joined at all.276  Many of the early conflicts 
between British colonialists and nationalists was mediated by the role of the chiefs, which 
only grew worse as TANU began to address the British directly, rather than channeling 
their concerns through their chiefs, especially since many of their grievances concerned 
chiefly rule.277 Accordingly, the elimination of chiefly power formed an early part of 
TANU’s political platform, which meant that most traditional authorities remained strong 
supporters of the colonial regime.278 
TANU also drew early support from women who hoped that they might gain 
personal autonomy if it followed through on promises to eliminate traditional authority. 
By 1955, the majority of TANU members were women.279 Women were particularly 
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enthusiastic about TANU because it promised dignity and equality and a vision for the 
future that included “men and women working side by side,” which they had been denied 
in the past.280 Geiger argues that colonial authorities regulated the activities of men 
directly but often left women’s affairs to African men: “the control of women was 
invariably left to colonized men—to fathers, husbands, brothers, or uncles—while its 
legal parameters were defined and redefined by colonial officials, including Native 
Authorities.”281 Perhaps the second most important figure in TANU, and the only other 
aside from Nyerere who was instantly recognizable to most members of the public, was 
Bibi Titi Mohamed, a Muslim woman from Dar es Salaam who was the first women’s 
chapter secretary. She, along with other women she recruited from local dance troupes, 
“stimulated and facilitated the emergence of a grassroots leadership and democratized the 
process of TANU organizing while at the same time providing TANU’s central 
leadership with a readily activated network for the transmission of information….”282 
TANU also appealed to youth, who had few rights and little autonomy in most 
tribal societies.283 They, like some of TANU’s women, opposed Traditional Authorities 
and hoped for the erosion of “traditional” organization. Because TANU’s membership 
consisted mostly of opponents of the alliance between tribal chiefs and colonialists that 
formed the structure of indirect rule, TANU supporters favored eliminating chiefs and 
deprioritizing tribal identities.  
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Between 1954 and 1960, when Nyerere was elected to lead Tanganyika during the 
one-year transition from British Mandate status to independence, TANU recruited 
members and opened offices in every province. In 1959, in every district, its members 
were voted into local and district level councils created by the British in preparation for 
the transition to independence, and some chiefs began to support the party in an attempt 
to retain power, although “most proved unable to convince TANU leaders of their 
nationalist credentials.”284 The 1959 and 1960 elections made TANU Tanganyika’s 
representative in independence negotiations and gave it decisive control of the first 
representative assemblies that presided over the transition at both the local and national 
level. In December, 1961 the transition period ended and Tanganyika became officially 
independent, and in 1962, Nyerere won over 99% of the vote to become the country’s 
first president.285 
The coalition that brought TANU to power was a sometimes counter-intuitive 
amalgamation of actors whose interests were either anti-British or anti-chieftaincy. 
Unpopular agricultural measures mandated by District Officers and threats of land 
alienation for British development schemes created strong opposition to British rule, and 
because they used Traditional Authorities to disseminate and enforce these policies, 
nationalists began to oppose chiefly rule as well. Thus, the British decision to rule 
through a coalition of Traditional Authorities and local chieftaincies presaged the anti-
tradition composition of the pro-independence alliance. As will be shown in the 
following section, because the British chose to govern through local chiefs, they 
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supported, in general, most of what they believed were the traditional trappings of chiefly 
rule, and Traditional Authorities thus found it easy to institutionalize more deeply those 
components of local practice that furthered their authority. For this reason, although 
British administrators introduced a central judiciary and attempted to codify laws and 
rationalize the judicial bureaucracy, they never attempted to eliminate customary law. It 
formed the foundation of chiefly power, which was essential to the success of their 
strategy of indirect rule. However, the introduction of a centralized, British-run judicial 
system paved the way for eventual partial centralization of the post-independence judicial 
system. 
As they had done in other Mandate territories and colonies, the British introduced 
far-reaching reforms into the Tanganyikan legal system. They established a bifurcated 
judiciary that separated cases involving the personal matters of colonial officers and other 
European expatriates, as well as commercial, criminal, and other cases in which non-
Africans were involved, from “native” law, which governed East African colonial 
subjects.286 The former types of cases were heard in British common law courts, and the 
latter in tribal courts manned by Traditional Authorities and their deputies. Although they 
introduced the framework for a nationwide judiciary, then, British officials never 
seriously attempted to eliminate the adjudication function of chiefs, which they viewed as 
useful for social harmony.287 Under the new system, chiefs retained the right to 
adjudicate local cases, though now with few opportunities for the rest of the community 
to participate. Chiefs were also now required to keep records, and to pay the clerk’s 
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salary, a small fee was levied on all litigants.288 Furthermore, British officials created an 
appeals system for the “Native” courts, such that cases from chiefs’ courts could be 
appealed to regional colonial administrators.289  
After 1950, the judicial role of chiefs diminished as magistrates began to replace 
them in the “Native” courts. All of the new magistrate courts were established at the site 
of former chiefs’ courts, making use of the same building and often the same clerks.290 
Because there were very few trained magistrates available, however, only a small number 
of chiefs’ courts became magistrate courts. The new magistrates often knew little about 
customary law, so the British introduced assessors to advise them on points of local law 
and to replace a formal jury system. Assessors were similarly introduced into many 
British colonies to replace the full jury system, which was often deemed unfeasible due to 
financial and administrative constraints. Assessors are lay members of the local 
community (usually elders) who are empowered to advise the magistrate on how a matter 
might be handled according to local custom. In some places, including Tanzania, they 
were later given power to overrule magistrates at the primary court level.291 Once they 
had created them, British officials also provided magistrates with copies of codified 
versions of tribal law that they could use to adjudicate cases that fell under the purview of 
customary law. 
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In order to create these codifications, the British led a widespread effort to 
research tribal norms and customs. This project was almost universally undertaken by 
European and American researchers, primarily anthropologists, who observed tribal 
practices and interviewed locals to create written versions of local norms that could be 
compiled into legal codes. Hans Cory, an Austrian anthropologist, was responsible for 
more of the codifications than any other scholar, including those of the Gogo, Nyamwezi, 
Sukuma, Haya, and Shambaa, as well as treatises on the political organization of Arusha-
area tribes such as the Meru and Chagga. According to Maddox, Cory’s codification 
process privileged the accounts of senior men. During the codification of Gogo legal 
practices, for example, he called a group of male clan heads to a meeting in Dodoma to 
comment on his findings from several observation sessions.292 Their suggested changes 
shifted the focus to inheritance, adultery, and other family law matters that were often 
peripheral compared to other issues such as land and theft, and in any case were usually 
settled according to context rather than fixed rules.293 In protecting or promoting the legal 
agenda of village elders, Cory strengthened the alliance between them and the colonial 
administration. He also strengthened the support that patriarchs and lineage heads had for 
local customary law, because, having been given the opportunity to codify rules of their 
making, senior men took the opportunity to entrench rules that strengthened their 
authority. 
Other studies have dealt, at length, with the problems of codifying customary law. 
The primary question here is the effect of codification and the disruptions to pre-colonial 
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political organization on the institutionalization of customary legal practices.294 Because 
the level of support for local customary law changes slowly, it is important to ascertain 
levels of support for it, or for other forms of law, in the period preceding the moment of 
judicial (de)centralization. Judicial reforms during the British Mandate period had a 
somewhat paradoxical effect on the institutionalization of locally distinct customary law. 
No contemporary surveys asked Africans about their preferences for one style of 
adjudication over another, or their attitude regarding the new tribal courts or legal codes. 
It is clear, however, that by and large, locals only used British institutions when required 
to do so.  Many of them soon fell into obsolescence through disuse.295 As discussed, the 
close ties between chiefs and colonial authorities eventually earned the former the 
opposition of many of their constituents. One might expect that customary law, harnessed 
to bolster chiefly power, would lose support as well, particularly because new 
government courts provided an alternative to chiefly adjudication. 
However, most litigants chose not to use courts set up by the government, 
whether those run by chiefs or the magistrate courts introduced at the district level, so 
some form of non-chiefly customary law continued to exist outside the domain of 
colonial government authority. By all indications, locals solved disputes mostly as they 
had before the advent of other types of courts, by referring disputes to village elders or 
settling them privately between those concerned. As Wijsen and Tanner note, most 
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Sukuma used colonial courts as a threat of escalation to gain advantage in the local 
dispute resolution process.296 In some places, local customary courts persisted because 
the magistrate courts were too far away or too unfamiliar to be of use to litigants.297 In 
others, there was more active resistance to the new legal order. Rwezaura argues that 
courts in Tarime District were unable to both attract litigants and enforce the law, 
particularly in cases concerning bride wealth, the sum of money paid by one family to the 
other when a marriage is contracted.298 The Nyamwigura chief’s court registry for 1955, 
for example, shows that 48 percent of officially registered marriages involved a bride 
wealth payment above the permissible limit.299 Because chiefs could use their official 
capacity to sanction marriages, magistrates found that the only way to get locals to 
register their marriages in accordance with colonial policy was to ignore the details of the 
union. 
As previously mentioned, many of the women and youth who joined nationalist 
movements hoped that independence would weaken the hold of chiefs and tribal 
hierarchies and give them greater freedoms, particularly with regard to marriage and 
work. Their importance to TANU, and the unwillingness of most chiefs to support 
TANU, meant that there was widespread support for the idea of abolishing the 
chieftaincy. In many tribes, customary law was tied closely to chiefly power, and the 
British practice of having chiefs perform adjudication (whether or not they had 
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traditionally done so) strengthened the link. Support for eliminating the chieftaincy could, 
thus, be seen to imply similar disenchantment with customary law. At the same time, the 
only alternative to the customary law was colonial common law courts, and their promise 
of autonomy from chiefly rule was undermined by their direct association with colonial 
rule. 
Additionally, while nationalist rhetoric emphasized democracy and self-
determination, it also drew on pan-Africanism and respect for indigenous customs and 
institutions. Village elders and patriarchs were unwilling to forego rights to land and 
labor accorded them by customary law, which they could continue to enjoy even without 
chiefs to adjudicate disputes.300 Speaking generally, the women and youth who supported 
TANU had more influence in urban areas than the countryside, where customary law 
remained more popular. Also, as mentioned, the widespread invention of custom by 
British administrators, Western academics, and traditional authorities created 
stakeholders among the local elite whose status relied on the forces of tradition. 
Predictably, the beneficiaries of this arrangement continued to support it, and in rural 
areas, overall support for customary law remained high. In 1966, Tanner found “a 
noticeable withdrawal of customary law cases from primary courts” because litigants 
preferred to take their disputes to unofficial neighborhood arbitration tribunals, which 
would have been operated by community elders according to local rules of customary 
law.301 He ascribes this to the fact that “Most communities are so closely integrated that it 
would be impossible for anyone to act against their customary law and remain within the 
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community afterwards.”302 This helps account for the low usage rates of primary courts, 
which within three years became so noticeable as to bring complaints from the 
government.303 That the same people who had brought TANU to power avoided its courts 
points to strong preference for local customary law. Tanner ascribes this preference to the 
relative proximity, low cost, and familiarity of local arbitration, but also that the 
unfamiliarity of the magistrate and “the shortness of the hearing will deprive them of 
personal satisfactions” in the process.304  
During the 1980s, war with Idi Amin’s Uganda took up vast amounts of state 
resources, and the resulting poverty and lack of funding for police and magistrates led to 
a crime wave in rural Tanzania. The result, in the Sukuma and Nyamwezi middle of the 
country, was the formation of vigilante groups (sungusungu) whose job it was to find and 
punish perpetrators, particularly of cattle theft, which could be devastating to already 
impoverished communities. The quick formation of these groups and their near ubiquity 
suggest that many of these communities had continued to supplement state courts with 
non-state justice for the previous twenty years, lending support to the idea that customary 
law retained importance well beyond the colonial era.305 In 2013, there was still 
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widespread support for the settlement of local disputes by village elders rather than 
courts, although there was more willingness to take “serious” matters such as large-scale 
thefts and violent crime to the police. Helen, an assessor for the Mtae Magistrate court in 
Lushoto district, explained that although she has an official role as an assessor at the local 
court, many people, especially women, bring their potential court cases to her for private 
resolution.306  
In the same village, a wealthy bar and cafe owner joins with two fellow village 
elders to hear disputes in his café on weekends. He hears cases concerning inheritance, 
land boundary disputes, marriage problems, theft, and “many, many people who got in a 
fight.”307 The procedure varies little between cases: the elders summon the disputants and 
their families, hear each person who wants to contribute to the proceedings, and then ask 
both sides what they want from the other party and negotiate until an agreement is 
reached. The settlement or solution is rarely the same even across similar types of cases 
because the parties involved have different demands.308 During a focus group session at a 
Magistrate court in Iringa, an assessor claimed that in his village, several kilometers 
outside Iringa, it was quite common for village elders to adjudicate disputes privately 
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because the court would not recognize many transgressions as violations of law, so there 
could be no redress.309 
 
 Summary of the Argument  
 
That local customary law and village-level arbitration forums still have salience 
long after independence, especially since there has been a general erosion of tribal 
identity in Tanzania, emphasizes that formerly tribal tribunals retained support through 
the colonial era despite opposition from urban dwellers, rural youths and women, and the 
shocks to the system that resulted from power struggles between British-appointed chiefs 
and their rivals. The forces that opposed locally distinct customary law succeeded in 
undermining its hegemony to the extent that the government, after independence, 
attempted to unify customary law, and it created space for the limited success of 
government primary courts, which did receive some, if not a preponderance, of 
customary cases. However, because local elite support for a decentralized, non-state 
controlled version of customary law remained high, and villagers continued to bring 
judicial matters to the same places they had before independence, the level of 
institutionalization of these practices remained quite high. Accordingly, despite the 
divisions between local elites that resulted from the restructuring of the tribal system, 
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elite coordination remained high, as former chiefs and other types of elites all prioritized 
the preservation of local customary law.   
The vast remaking of Tanzania’s tribal landscape risks making customary law, 
and its defense, look like weak demands for a separate system of law that has no 
historical basis for its protection. That custom and customary law changed fundamentally 
during this period is undeniable. However, because local group elites were tasked with 
writing and then administering these “customary” laws, they became tremendously 
valuable to these elites as sources of power. It is largely on these grounds that they were 
so strongly defended by rural elites, rather than their historical authenticity. Group elites 
bargain for judicial decentralization based on their support for it as a source of power and 
authority, regardless of the alteration of custom over time. In fact, as I will argue in the 
next section, the elimination of the chieftaincy in Tanzania made preservation of these 
laws even more vital for chiefs, as one of the last remaining preserves of their power. 
 
Post Independence Coalition Building and Judicial Centralization 
 
As long as TANU’s supporters shared the common goal of independence for 
Tanganyika and the end of chiefly rule, they did not have to address any of the more 
contentious issues that might divide them, such as the nature of post-independence 
economic reforms or the status of customary law. Shortly after independence, these issues 
came to the forefront and resulted in the beginnings of opposition to TANU’s rule. These 
disagreements had far-reaching implications for the types of policies that were enacted, 
the coalitions needed for their passage, and the legitimating narratives put forward to 
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explain their importance to the new nation. During this period, Tanganyika faced the 
question of whether to create a centralized judicial system with a single legal standard 
that would apply to all of its citizens, or whether it should adopt some kind of hybrid 
legal system that would preserve a place for different types of customary law, or perhaps 
whether it should even retain two distinct court systems, as colonial administrators had 
done, to manage customary and non-customary cases. 
With most of TANU’s membership and supporters (made up mostly of urban 
elites) opposing chiefs and tribal custom, the elimination of locally distinct customary 
law was a logical agenda item. Early on, Nyerere outlined an agenda for judicial 
centralization that would consist of a single court system that would use both common 
and customary law, the latter of which, crucially, would comprise a single form of 
customary law that would be amalgamated from the diverse existing customary legal 
regimes. According to Nyerere’s plan, the same magistrates would preside over common 
and customary law cases. The proposal is discussed in further detail below, but it is 
important to note that although there were some commonalities across the customary 
norms of some of Tanganyika’s tribes—for example, most tribes practiced some form of 
bride wealth—there were important discrepancies even within common practices. Even 
starker differences existed across regions. For example, family law rules varied among 
matrilineal and patrilineal tribes, and there were similar differences in rules concerning 
cattle between pastoralists and farmers. Creating a single version of customary law that 
could be codified for use by magistrates with no special training in the subject constituted 
an ambitious centralization project, as did the aim of bringing the two systems together. 
At independence, the majority of magistrates in Tanganyika were British, and it would 
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take some time to train sufficient numbers of African lawyers and judges to replace them. 
British magistrates would thus preside over customary law cases in Nyerere’s proposed 
courts.  
Less than a decade later, Tanzania’s judicial system remained far more 
decentralized than Tanganyika’s leaders had initially intended. There was a single court 
system, but no unified customary law code. Instead, each tribe used its own customary 
law as interpreted either through an official codification or (and sometimes and) through 
the advice of assessors drawn from the local community. Other agents besides 
magistrates were empowered to adjudicate low-level disputes, and these neighborhood 
authorities formed a network of first instance hearings that screened cases for referral on 
to the court system when necessary. Most of these agents were TANU party officials, 
usually drawn from the ten-cell block, the most local unit of the party. In rural areas, 
many cases continued to be taken straight to village elders, regardless of whether they 
happened to also be TANU officials or not, as was customary. 
The failure of Nyerere’s judicial reform agenda can best be explained by two 
separate processes, both of which began during the colonial era. The first, described 
above, is the survival of strong group elite support for locally distinct customary law. The 
second is the formation of opposition to the policies that Nyerere and other TANU 
officials built to enact economic reforms. Nyerere prioritized economic development 
highly, and most of his proposed policies were in the area of agricultural reform and 
village reorganization. In both of these domains, the capacities of state leaders to enact 
these reforms were relatively low, and required the cooperation of local group elites. The 
section on coalition building below makes the case that to attract support for his reforms 
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from rural elites, Nyerere had to abandon full judicial centralization. First, however, it is 
necessary to review the components of Nyerere’s legislation that were most concerned 
with (de)centralization. 
 
A Summary of Legal Pluralism in Tanzania 
 
 The section that follows is not part of the causal argument. It contains an 
important sidebar on the nature of legal pluralism in Tanzania. The components of legal 
pluralism (the results of judicial decentralization) are a confusing tangle of certain 
individual pieces of legislation and exemptions to others. They are also manifest in the 
authority given to local government officials (ten cell heads) and assessors (court 
advisors). This description is vital for understanding the remainder of the causal 
argument. 
Nyerere viewed judicial centralization as a necessary component of nation 
building because if Sukumas, Benas, and members of other tribes organized family life 
on the basis of tribal law, they would continue to prioritize their tribal identity over that 
of their new nation. His other reforms, such as a national curriculum and the resettlement 
of many Tanganyikans to under-populated areas, could be undermined by what he saw as 
tribal parochialism. In 1961, he accordingly wrote a letter to the first post-independence 
parliament asking them to help him unify customary law as a prerequisite to unifying the 
nation. 310 As part of this initiative, in 1963, Tanganyika hosted a conference on local 
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courts and customary law in which it and other former African colonies gathered to 
discuss strategies for unifying the many tribal and local legal systems into a single, 
effective judiciary. Cheikh Amri Abedi, Tanganyika’s Minister of Justice, welcomed his 
fellow delegates as follows: “The Tanganyika Government, having devoted much 
attention to the integration and unification of the legal and judicial systems of the 
country, believed that it would be valuable to review developments and consider 
objectives in this area of law together with other African states.”311  
All of the countries in attendance agreed that the long-term goal was for “local 
courts to become an integral part of an independent judiciary,” but the question was how 
best to accomplish this.312 The delegates recognized that many of their citizens preferred 
the customary practice of arbitration by village elders because it was cheap, informal, 
close to the litigants involved, and trusted.313 For this reason, and because it is an 
authentically “African” form of law, “there was wide agreement that there was no 
question of the disappearance of customary law in the foreseeable future as a significant 
part of African legal systems.”314 The question was “how far this could be accomplished 
without attempting to impose a law so alien to the norms of a community as to be 
unacceptable.”315 
 Accordingly, the delegates came up with a five-step roadmap for judicial 
centralization that would preserve a form of modified customary law. Many of the steps 
had been accomplished under colonialism and, for all but a handful of countries, only 
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step five remained. In the first step, which they termed “non-recognition or toleration,” 
European courts were introduced into only limited areas of the country, so existing 
customary legal institutions continued to function as they had in the past, governing most 
of the population. They were allowed to function as long as there was no clash with 
official policy. The second step was recognition, in which colonial policies of indirect 
rule brought recognition to local courts, although their jurisdiction was restricted to cases 
where all parties were Africans and there were some limitations on the severity of crimes 
that they could judge. The third step was termed “control.” During this phase, the central 
colonial government gradually increased control through administrative officers who 
were allowed to inspect courts and transfer cases from one jurisdiction to another. In this 
phase an appellate body was also introduced. During the fourth step, “colonial re-
organization,” colonial officials begin to replace chiefs with magistrates, which reduced 
the number of customary courts but increased their jurisdiction. In the fifth and final 
stage, “African re-organization,” newly independent African states would enact 
comprehensive legislation to reform their judiciary.316 
 This last step is noticeably vague. Conference delegates disagreed on the 
necessity of assessors versus full juries, the training of magistrates, and the appeals 
structure, so wide latitude was given for each state to plan its phase of “African re-
organization.” Some states even left the conference no longer fully committed to judicial 
centralization, having newly understood the extent of possible dissent. Malawi, for 
example, chose to maintain a separate but officially recognized system of chiefs’ courts 
for political reasons. Indeed, despite Abedi’s affirmation of Tanganyika’s commitment to 
centralization, articulated in a special Appendix to his report on the conference, 
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Tanganyika’s plan for phase five noticeably leaves wide latitude for locally distinct 
customary law.317  
Nyerere’s chosen vehicle for unification was a restatement (codification) of 
customary law for patrilineal tribes.318 Cotran describes the process as follows: “tribal 
representatives, chosen for their expert knowledge of customary law by the District 
Council of the area meet to discuss their customary law, and agree on a first draft. The 
text is then submitted to a national panel of experts which considers it, makes 
amendments if it so wishes, and then refers it back to the District Council of the area 
which debates the text until it is finally approved.”319 A central panel of experts then 
compiled the various restatements into a single version that reflected the broad consensus 
of customary law in patrilineal tribes. The codification process began in 1961, and in 
1963, Parliament promulgated Government Notices 279 and 436 as the official 
restatements, with the intent that all patrilineal tribes should adopt them as binding, 
replacing or amending portions of local customary law that were incompatible with the 
new codes.320  
However, the Judicature and Application of Laws Ordinance gives district councils 
the right to amend portions of the unified restatement that they found objectionable.321 
Effectively, although a single customary law code was meant to govern the patrilineal 
tribes, each local area, as defined by district boundaries, was given the authority to amend 
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the code as it would apply to them. If a district council decided to amend the code, it was 
required to submit the modification to the Ministry of Justice for approval, but the 
Minister only had the right to overrule portions of amendments that were contrary to 
Tanganyika’s written laws or those that imposed criminal sanctions for civil offenses. 
Otherwise, he had little authority to override District Council amendments, which gave 
districts the power to reinstate local versions of law.322 When the Government Notice 279 
was sent to the districts for ratification at the end of June, 1963, only eighteen of 
Tanganyika’s then sixty-six districts signed on with no reservations or additional 
amendments.323 By 1964, twenty-six more joined, but the majority of districts did not. 
Effectively, these Notices gave tribal groups the power to preserve their own, separate 
forms of customary law. 
Abedi’s Appendix makes clear that aside from the Government Notices regarding 
customary law, the government would entirely centralize the judicial system in its 
forthcoming Magistrates Courts Act, the first post-independence piece of legislation to 
reorganize the entire judiciary, which had previously only been modified piecemeal. The 
final version of the 1963 Magistrates Courts Act, however, also preserved wide swaths of 
local customary law. The Act, which establishes the structure of and rules of procedure 
for the judiciary, states specifically in its fourth schedule:  
“In the exercise of its customary law jurisdiction, a primary court shall apply the  
customary law prevailing within the area of its local jurisdiction or, if there is more 
than one such law, the law applicable; in the area in which the act, transaction or 
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matter occurred or arose, unless it is satisfied that some other customary law is 
applicable; but it shall, subject to rules of court, apply the customary law prevailing 
within the area of its local jurisdiction in matters of practice and procedure to the 
exclusion of any other customary law.324 
The Act clarifies that no court may refuse to recognize a rule of customary law just 
because it has not been established by evidence. It must “accept any statement thereof 
which appears to them to be worthy of belief which is contained in the record of the 
proceedings…or from any other source which appears to be credible, or of which the 
court may take judicial notice.”325 The standard for determining whether particular 
citizens should be governed by customary law is a mode of life test, described in the 
Judicature and Application of Laws Act in the following terms:  
“A person may become a  
member of such a community…by his adoption of the way of life of the first-
mentioned community or his acceptance by such community as one of 
themselves, and such adoption or acceptance may have effect either generally or 
for particular purposes; (b) a person may cease to be a member of a community 
by reason of his adoption of the way of life of some other community (whether or 
not any customary law is established or accepted in such other community) or 
acceptance by some other community as one of themselves, but shall not be 
treated as having ceased to be a member of a community solely by his absence 
therefrom.326 
                                                
324 Magistrates Courts Act 1963, Schedule 4. 
325 Magistrates Courts Act 1963, PCh11s37(a). 
326 Judicature and Applications of Laws Act PCh358s11(2[a]). 
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In 1972, the High Court ruled in the case of Abdullah Shamte v Mussa (1972)HCD no. 9, 
customary law is presumed to apply in rural areas unless shown otherwise.327 For a long 
time, the presumption was in favor of customary identity, and it took several decades for 
magistrate courts to begin to use civil law codes for residents of large urban areas.328 
 These sections, read together, are unequivocal—local customary law continues to 
be binding in the vast majority of disputes that come before magistrate courts. Appeals 
concerning whether customary law is the appropriate standard for adjudication can only 
be heard at the High Court level.329 In 1963, the government also removed the 
repugnancy clause from the constitution, which had previously proscribed the use of any 
customary law contrary to human rights or natural justice.330 In its absence, magistrates to 
this day are required to accept all customary law not specifically contravened by statute, 
and Tanzania’s parliament has been slow to curtail the reach of custom. 
Other reforms adopted in the first ten years of independence continue to reflect a 
mixed agenda of centralization in some areas of the law coupled with a failure to 
centralize others. In 1962 and 1963, Tanzania replaced the British era penal code with its 
own criminal procedure code, and in 1966 and 1967 it published a binding, unified code 
of civil procedure for its courts.331 It also passed a unified Evidence Act, to make sure 
that its magistrates used consistent standards across Tanzania’s diverse districts.332 These 
                                                
327 Abdullah Shamte v Mussa (1972) HCD No. 9 in Jacqueline Tarimo, “Conflict between the common law 
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328 Author interview with High Court Registrar, Dar es Salaam, March 26, 2013. 
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330 Sawyerr 1969, 31; Ghai 1976, 48. 
331 See An act to amend the Penal Code of 1962 (Cap 12); Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act of 
1963 (Cap 48); Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act No. 2 of 1963 (Cap 69); Government Notice 
No. 410 of 1966; The Civil Procedure Code of 1967 (Cap. 33). 
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acts unified much of Tanzanian law, and eliminated distinctions between Africans and 
Europeans that had differentiated the two legal systems during the colonial era. The long-
awaited Law of Marriage Act of 1971, which was expected to unify procedures of 
marriage and divorce including norms that varied widely from place to place such as 
rules concerning bride wealth and standards for divorce, however, failed to standardize 
key areas of the law.  
The Law of Marriage Act places some limitations on forms of customary 
marriage, such as mandating the registry of all marriages, the maintenance of children, 
and stipulating equality between multiple wives, but it does so with strong deference to 
local customary law. For instance, part II, section 25(d) recognizes that a marriage may 
take civil, religious, or customary form. A state official need not be present for any of 
these types of union to be valid.333 Divorce must be granted when a marriage has broken 
down irreconcilably, and one standard for determining that is the custom of the local area. 
Perhaps more importantly, the post-divorce division of assets must take into 
consideration “the custom of the community to which the parties belong.”334 The act does 
eliminate customary law in some areas, such as by ordering state officials to treat 
marriages that are contracted without customary dowry or pre-marital gift-giving as valid 
(section 41(a)), by banning corporal punishment of wives (section 66), and freeing 
widows from all obligations to their husband’s family upon his death (section 68), among 
others. In these cases, magistrate courts can use state law in lieu of local customary law. 
If these legal codes, which operate in all of Tanzania’s courts, were the only 
evidence available in assessing the degree of centralization in Tanzania’s judiciary, one 
                                                
333 Law of Marriage Act 1971, section 43, part 5. 
334 Law of Marriage Act 1971, section 114(a). 
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could argue that most aspects of family law are left fairly decentralized according to 
locally distinct jurisdiction of customary law, whereas the more extensive criminal and 
civil procedure codes are unified, effectively centralizing the majority of the judiciary. 
Two structural components of the new judiciary, however, complicate this picture, and 
demonstrate a surprising level of decentralization. The first of these is the government’s 
decision to preserve the office of assessors, first instituted under British rule. Because 
magistrates were given little to no training in understanding customary law in general, 
assessors were on hand to explain local rules concerning polygamy, bride wealth, cattle 
loaning, or other unfamiliar legal concepts. As experts in customary law, assessors have a 
large amount of discretion in dictating the content of the law.335 Allowing local elites to 
determine their own laws, through the office of the assessor, is a major devolution of 
judicial power. Assessors are still used in all first instance courts, and also at the level of 
the High Court. Meetings with assessors in several villages in three distinct regions of 
Tanzania confirms that in most cases, the office of assessor is held by a village elder or 
someone with previous bureaucratic experience, as originally intended.336 In 1969, the 
Magistrates Courts Act was amended to give assessors a binding vote in magistrate court 
hearings.337 Because the Magistrates Courts Act requires that a primary court may not 
                                                
335 Interestingly, although assessors probably once were former chiefs who were viewed as guardians as 
custom, these days they are often made up of the elderly and retired, regardless of their actual knowledge of 
customary law. While keeping the office of assessor in primary courts did initially devolve large amounts 
of judicial power to preexisting customary norms, at the moment it means that people with no training and 
no judicial background are permitted to contravene the decisions of state magistrates. There is a widespread 
movement to abolish the office of assessor, but proponents of locally distinct customary law have been able 
to preserve the office at least for the moment. 
336 Author interview with four assessors, Lushoto Primary Court, February 20, 2013; author interview with 
assessor, Mtae Ward Court, February 23, 2013; author interview with assessor, Mazombe Primary Court, 
March 18, 2013; author interview with three assessors, Iringa Boma Primary Court, March 11, 2013; author 
interview with two assessors, Kalenga Primary Court, March 14, 2013; author interview with two 
assessors, Kimande Primary Court, March 15, 2013; author interview with assessor, Kinondoni Primary 
Court, Dar es Salaam, February 28, 2013. 
337 Note that assessors do not have a binding vote at the High Court. 
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issue judgments without two assessors present, the binding vote gives the assessors, if 
they agree with one another, the authority to overrule the magistrate’s decision.338 Village 
elders who serve as assessors therefore have the power to prevent the magistrate from 
issuing any rulings that contravene local law. 
Three additional pieces of legislation strengthened the role of local officials in 
determining the content of and managing disputes under local customary law. 
Government Acts 219 and 219A of 1969 established Ward Tribunals, which initially 
consisted of five members appointed by the local TANU party office, and today up to 
five members appointed by the Ward or District Executive Committee. According to 
Ghai, these tribunals are “intended to bring about an amicable settlement of the dispute, 
and if such a settlement is achieved, it can be filed in the primary court and then becomes 
enforceable as a judgment of that court.”339 These tribunals, although less formal than 
first instance courts, are nevertheless part of the formal structure of the judiciary because 
they are subject to the Magistrate courts through appeals.340 These Tribunals have 
original jurisdiction in civil cases up to approximately three million shillings 
(approximately $2,000), which is more than the annual GDP per person, meaning that 
most civil cases are first heard by local government-appointed officials with no legal 
training.341 They are empowered to hear both civil and criminal cases, although not 
                                                
338 Magistrates Courts Act PCh11s7(2). When it was first enacted in 1963, Part II, section 7 of the 
Magistrates Courts Act specified that each magistrate must sit with at least two assessors in every hearing. 
Six years later, then Minister of Justice Rashidi Kawawa introduced amendments to the Act to make the 
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339 Y. P. Ghai, “Notes Towards a Theory of Law and Ideology-Tanzanian Perspectives,” Journal of Legal 
Pluralism and Unofficial Law 13 (1976): 31, 69-70. 
340 Author interview with High Court Justice Samuel Karua, Dar es Salaam, January 15, 2013.  
341 Ibid. Lawi notes that in practice, the Ward Tribunals are most often frequented by ordinary farmers and 
those with low incomes, and that even rural businessmen circumvent the Tribunals in favor of Magistrate 
courts, which also have original jurisdiction up to ten million shillings. The concurrent jurisdiction allows 
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capital crimes or instances of severe assault. Ward tribunals have jurisdiction over land 
disputes, but when it comes to matrimonial cases, they have the authority only to 
reconcile disputants, not divorce them. The adjudicators are usually village elders or 
other locally prominent people who are expected to have some knowledge of local 
custom.342 They also have no enforcement power.343 Although there are legal manuals 
available in some Ward Tribunals, most reconciliation sessions take place without 
reference to the law.344 Accordingly, at the lowest level of the Tanzanian judiciary, it is 
local understandings of justice and standards imposed by village elders, rather than 
national legal codes, that form the standard for adjudication. 
Even before disputes reach the Ward Tribunals, however, they have almost 
always begun at one of two additional quasi-governmental institutions. The first is the 
head of the most local level of organization, the ten-house cell. The ten-cell was first 
instituted by TANU in 1963-4 to organize local political participation, provide 
information about the government to villagers, inform party officials about village 
activities, and provide order and security. 345 Ten-cell units were units of the political 
party, not of the central government. Each cell consisted of ten households, and the 
households jointly elected one of their heads of household to lead the cell and to sit on 
various local committees such as the Ward Executive committee. Leaders were also 
                                                                                                                                            
Tribunals to help manage the heavy case load at the primary instance level and to alleviate backlog. See Y. 
Q. Lawi, “Justice Administration Outside the Ordinary Courts of Law in Mainland Tanzania: The Case of 
Ward Tribunals in Babati District,” African Studies Quarterly 1.2 (1997), 6. 
342 Lawi (5) finds that the majority of ward tribunal members in his area of study were elderly relative to 
the local population, and overwhelmingly male. 
343 Author interview with High Court Justice Fauz Twaib, Dar es Salaam, February 4, 2013. 
344 Author interview with three assessors, Iringa Boma Primary Court, March 11, 2013. All three assessors 
also serve as Ward Tribunal members, and it is apparently common to find some overlap in these 
institutions, as they have similar recruitment requirements. Author interview with focus group of village 
elders (mostly retired teachers and business owners), Mtae, Lushoto District, February 23, 2013. 
345 Clyde R Ingle, “The Ten-House Cell System in Tanzania: A Consideration of an Emerging Village 
Institution,” The Journal of Developing Areas 6.2 (1972): 211-26, 214-15. 
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expected to adjudicate any disputes that occurred in their cell.346 By 1967 they had 
become the most influential unit of governance, and several studies that year report that 
most people would take a dispute or problem to a ten-cell leader before almost anywhere 
else, with the possible exception of former chiefs.347 Ingle argues that the ten-cell system 
functioned as an extension of the colonial system of indirect rule because ten-cell leaders 
performed the same function as the former traditional authorities, and many chiefs whose 
office disappeared following independence became a ten-cell leader.348 When TANU 
merged with the Zanzibar ruling party, the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), to form Chama Cha 
Mapinduzi (CCM), the ten-cell system continued as local party units. After the transition 
to multi-party government, the ten-cell system was officially abolished, but the vast 
majority of ten-cell units still exist, and research studies on agriculture, public health, 
local governance, and other all reference interviews with ten-cell leaders.349 Despite lack 
of official recognition, ten-cell leaders still adjudicate the majority of disputes before they 
are referred to the Ward Tribunal.350 Magistrates still ask disputants whether they have 
consulted their ten-cell leader before appearing in court.351 Ten-cell level adjudication is 
                                                
346 Ibid., 218. 
347 Miller 1967 survey; Ingle, 220. 
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based “entirely [on] customary law” and involves no reference to national laws or 
standards.352 
Although ten-cell leaders address disputes that occur within their units, conflicts 
often occur across multiple ten-cell units. The official mechanism for disputes of this type 
is recourse to the local first instance court or Ward Tribunal, depending on the nature of 
the conflict and the parties involved. Ten-cell leaders, assessors, village heads, and 
villagers agree, however, that it is common to consult a group of village elders before 
resorting to either official venue (see above). Because village elders are called upon to 
participate in so many juridical functions, it is perhaps unsurprising that in many villages, 
the same elders function as assessors or Ward Tribunal members, ten-cell leaders, and 
unofficial arbitrators. Even if they do not serve concurrently, those with ten-cell or Ward 
Tribunal experience are likely to be chosen as assessors, and vice versa. Village elders 
accordingly have a near monopoly of control over judicial processes in rural areas of 
Tanzania. In urban areas, perhaps because of greater proximity to a wider range of 
judicial institutions and the declining importance of custom, recourse to elders is less 
common, although ten-cell leaders do still provide adjudication. For the seventy-five 
percent of Tanzanians who live in rural areas, however, courts are often not the first 
recourse for disputants. Even in the course of issuing recommendations for judicial 
centralization, Abedi’s 1963 report stressed the importance of non-formal adjudication, 
noting that the customary practice of arbitration by village elders is an “authentic feature 
of the customary system” for resolving disputes.353 He acknowledged that local people 
                                                
352 Author interview with Augostini Ramadhani, Former Chief Justice of Tanzania and Vice-Chairman for 
the Commission to Reform the Constitution, Dar es Salaam, March 26, 2013. 
353 Abedi, 111. 
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prefer it and make frequent use of it because it is cheap, informal, close to the litigants 
involved, and it trustworthy. 
Many of the judicial reforms enacted during the first years of independence tread 
a fine balance between centralization and unification on the one hand and 
decentralization and the preservation of locally distinct forms of law on the other. Most 
serious crimes and civil cases involving over $6000 (depending on the exchange rate) are 
handled in a uniform manner involving a single legal code or codes adjudicated in the 
centralized judicial structure of Tanzania’s first instance and appeals courts. Petty civil 
cases as well as those concerning some matters of family law begin at the quasi-judicial 
level of the Ward Tribunal, but are still connected with the central judiciary. Even if these 
disputes go straight to a first instance court, the rules used to govern them may vary from 
place to place according to local custom as dictated by local variations on Government 
Notices 279 and 436 or as explained by assessors. When it comes to more minor matters, 
state law, until 1995, made provision for locally distinct answers provided by ten-cell 
leaders that might never make it to court. Given the strong reasons to centralize the 
judiciary following independence, as well as Nyerere’s stated intention to do so, why did 
the government never achieve more than partial centralization? Below, it will become 
clear that Nyerere’s reliance on rural elites, usually former chiefs, in implementing his 
economic reforms gave the rural elites sufficient relative capacity to protect locally 
distinct customary law. 
In Malawi, the trajectory has been far more halting, and reversed itself several 
times. A full explication of the case is beyond the scope of a brief comparison with the 
events in Tanzania as they are outlined up to this point, but even brief reference to the 
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events taking place immediately south of Tanzania’s border is interesting from a 
comparative perspective. Where Nyerere sought to bring the structure of customary 
adjudication under state control by creating local level adjudication, he stripped it of 
decentralizing tendencies by attempting to replace the vast majority of local laws with a 
central legal code. In Malawi, no such attempt was made. Malawi’s first post-
independence President, Hastings Banda, came to power as leader of an anti-colonial 
independence movement, in a similar fashion to Julius Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah of 
Ghana. Instead of eliminating tribal courts, however, he created a parallel justice system, 
where state courts and local courts had concurrent power. Instead of abolishing 
chieftaincies and creating non-tribal institutions to take their place, Banda coopted the 
colonial system and took control of it.354 He made chiefs reliant on his patronage, and 
replaced those who resisted him.355 Having created a class of dependent traditional 
authorities, he then granted concessions to them in turn. Rather than negotiating specific 
areas of the law that might remain under local customary control, or attempting to codify 
customary law to bring it under the purview of the state, Banda granted state recognition 
to customary, tribal courts that formed an entirely separate court system.356 Later attempts 
to centralize the judiciary were impeded by the very fact that these former Banda loyalists 
were unwilling to relinquish the power he had given them, and had an easy avenue to 
coordination with one another through the chiefs’ council that Banda had formed. 
 
 
                                                
354 Paul Brietzke, “Murder and Manslaughter in Malawi’s Traditional Courts,” Journal of African Law 18.1 
(1974): 37-56; Lwanda, 191. 
355 Lwanda, 192. 
356 Benda-Beckmann, 177-9. 
 143 
Capturing the Rural Elite 
 
With an understanding of legal pluralism in Tanzania in place, it is possible to 
turn back to the causal argument. In the section covering the colonial era, it was 
established that levels of support for locally distinct customary law were high enough for 
it to retain salience in the post-independence era. That precondition being met, however, 
bargaining between groups and the process of political coalition building is the most 
proximate cause of the level and type of judicial decentralization. In Tanzania, the first 
push for centralization came soon after independence, as did the coalition building that 
tempered its reach. After the initial level of centralization was set in 1962-4, it was tested 
once in 1970-1 before both sides widely accepted the status quo. Minor attempts to 
further centralize in the 1990s and 2013 failed, reinforcing the necessity of partial 
centralization to all parties. The period from 1962-4 receives the most detailed treatment 
here for its role in establishing the partial centralization that persists, at least on paper, 
today. 
Following independence, Nyerere was elected to the presidency of Tanzania with 
over 99% of the vote. Equipped with a strong mandate, Nyerere identified economic 
development and the propagation of a national identity that would eliminate any tendency 
toward inter-tribal conflict as his two central priorities. In his inaugural address, he 
outlined his goals for the first ten years of Tanganyika’s independence, putting the 
greatest emphasis on the fight against hunger, poverty, and disease.357 Ideologically, 
Nyerere was committed to socialism, but rather than try to translate the ideas of Marx, 
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1952-65, London, Oxford University Press (1967), 183. 
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Trotsky, and other theorists of collectivism, Nyerere developed a new, context-specific 
form of socialism that, as Hyden explains, “explicitly stressed the use of local ideas and 
resources.”358  In 1967, Nyerere gave a speech to an assembly of TANU representatives 
that for the first time, fully articulated the political and economic philosophy that he had 
begun to put into practice in 1962. He labeled his philosophy “ujamaa”, a Kiswahili word 
meaning “extended family,” which he coined in a 1961 paper titled “Ujamaa—The Basis 
of African Socialism.” 359 Over time, it became known as a uniquely Tanzanian form of 
socialism. 
The first elements of ujamaa were put into effect in 1962. To achieve needed 
economic development, Nyerere drew on proposals that the World Bank had drafted 
during a visit to Tanganyika in 1960, during the transition to independence. The World 
Bank report suggested “planned and supervised settlement of areas which are at present 
uninhabited or thinly inhabited” to improve agricultural output.360 Most of these 
proposals involved reforms in rural areas where the capacity of rural elites was relatively 
high. Nyerere acknowledged that the government’s lack of resources would prevent it 
from being able to subsidize individual family farms. He therefore announced that, 
following the World Bank’s plans, “for the next few years, Government will be doing all 
it can to enable the farmers of Tanganyika to come together in village communities,” 
which he saw as the only way of providing equal access to tractors, schools, hospitals, 
clean drinking water, and other goods.361 The resulting plan, fully articulated in 1967, 
began as a voluntary effort to urge farmers to relocate to under populated areas of the 
                                                
358 Hyden 1980, 96. 
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country and, in more densely populated areas, to persuade families to live more closely 
together to share agricultural implements and one another’s labor. To fulfill some of the 
promises TANU made its supporters before independence and to eliminate potential 
obstacles to the new development agenda, Nyerere adopted two controversial policies 
within his first year and a half in office: he nationalized all land in Tanganyika, and 
eliminated the chieftaincy. 
In 1962, shortly after assuming the presidency, the Tanganyikan government 
adopted a socialist land policy in Tanganyika and made the “state the ultimate trustee of 
all land and rule[d] out individual freeholding.”362 Nyerere had publicly argued for state 
control of land during the campaign for independence. In 1958, in a pamphlet written on 
property rights, he explains that because “we are mere tenants over land that does not 
actually, belong to us” it is impermissible to “distribute this land to other persons….”363 
Land that had been held in the trust of the community would now transfer to national 
ownership. Referring to the pre-colonial era, he argues, “In the past, when our population 
was divided into different tribal groups, the land belonged to the particular tribe living on 
it. In future, however, our population will be united as one nation, and the land will 
belong to the nation.”364 Nyerere understood that ujamaa could not proceed under a 
system of private ownership. Farmers would not voluntarily move away from land that 
they owned, which would hinder resettlement schemes, and there was insufficient public 
land for the creation of communal villages. Although the reforms quickly generated 
opposition, especially among farmers who lost valuable plots to redistribution or 
villagization schemes, Nyerere saw nationalization as the first step in the larger process 
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of achieving economic development. His preliminary pamphlet on the topic generated 
widespread support in rural areas, so Nyerere had good reason to believe that the policy 
would succeed despite opposition from some landholders and rural elites.365 
Although they were optimistic that many of their reforms would be popular, 
Nyerere and his ruling party colleagues had observed that most resistance to colonial 
policies came from tribal chiefs. Even when chiefs capitulated, dissidents could organize 
themselves around a rival chief. During the years of transition toward self-rule, most 
villagers refused to join TANU until their chief had already done so.366 In light of their 
strong capacity to organize resistance and their perceived ambivalence about the new 
ruling party, Nyerere decided to remove the possible threat. In 1962, TANU officials 
began to request that chiefs voluntarily resign, and those who failed to resign were told 
that they must do so by the end of the year.367 In 1963, the African Chiefs Ordinance 
(Repeal) Act abolished the institution of the chieftaincy entirely, and later in the same 
year, the Chiefs (Abolition of Office: Consequential Provisions) Act made it illegal for 
former chiefs to seek judicial redress for loss of office.368  
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To replace the structure of tribal authority, Nyerere and his advisors instituted an 
elaborate system of overlapping local committees, all of which were connected to the 
single party then governing Tanzania. At the very most local level, the ten-house cell 
system organized every village into groupings of ten houses that elected a leader to 
represent the cell to the local TANU office, manage security, and perform basic judicial 
functions for its households.369 These leaders were accountable to two types of local 
administration: village and ward committees, which were part of Tanzania’s local 
government structure, and local TANU party offices and the TANU Youth League, 
which were under party control.370 Some cell leaders were also elected to membership in 
local government offices.371 The shift from rule by chiefs to rule by political party bound 
citizens directly to the state through the ten-house cell system and created a two-way 
conduit of information: cell leaders reported local affairs to district party and government 
officers, and transmitted ideological statements and reform prerogatives to their local 
constituents.  
Another of Nyerere’s reform platforms, national unification, envisioned a wide 
range of projects to forge a national identity and sense of cooperation. Nyerere’s speeches 
from the period demonstrate his awareness of the devastating consequences of tribal 
conflict in neighboring countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo. As early 
as 1955, he explained to the United Nations that one of TANU’s main concerns was “to 
build up a national consciousness among the African peoples in Tanganyika,” and that to 
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do so, it was necessary “to break up this tribal consciousness among the people and to 
build up a national consciousness.”372 The judicial centralization project described above 
formed part of this same effort to combat tribalism. Nyerere believed that creating a 
single judiciary and, more importantly, unifying customary law would weaken tribal 
loyalty while still infusing the judicial system with a distinctly African, customary 
character, which was necessary for the government’s bona fides as protector of African 
family structure and traditional identity (see below for more on this). Tanganyika was the 
first African country to attempt to codify and unify customary law.373 It was the instigator 
of the international conference on customary law and the state that had progressed the 
furthest in its thinking on customary law because the President stressed that “a unified 
code was important for the building of a nation.”374  
In his inaugural address in 1962, Nyerere announced the creation of a Ministry of 
National Culture and Youth, whose first task would be to compile the traditions and 
customs of Tanganyika’s tribes to form a national culture.375 As part of the project of 
national transformation, school curriculums across the country were standardized and 
Kiswahili was introduced as the universal language of instruction, in the hope that it 
would soon become the lingua franca.376 Nyerere also prioritized Africanization, the 
replacement of colonial British personnel with Tanganyikan staff, and by 1966 the 
process had been completed in two thirds of the lower rungs of the bureaucracy.377 
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Africanization and the creation of a national school system succeeded within the first 
decade of independence. Although it took longer, Kiswahili did become the national 
language following its classroom use by generations of Tanzanian schoolchildren. 
Taken together, ujamaa and its concurrent centralization and bureaucratization 
measures constituted an enormously ambitious project to remake Tanzania. Old 
hierarchical tribal structures and forms of loyalty were dismantled by eliminating the 
chieftaincy and physically resettling Tanzania’s new citizens into sub-units that could be 
monitored by the one party system and organized by units of local government. Disputes 
that would have been taken to the village headman or local chief to resolve were now 
directed to the 10-house cell leader or the village chairman. Local youth, instead of 
entering the ceremonial warrior class after attaining majority, joined the TANU youth 
league. Scott argues that villagization can best be interpreted as a “high modernist” 
attempt to “reconfigure the rural population into a form that would allow the state to 
impose its development agenda and, in the process, to control the work and production of 
the cultivators.”378 Nyerere’s speeches point to the nation-building character that he 
attempted to infuse into much of the reform process including the goals of equality 
between Tanzanian citizens, preventing class and tribal warfare, and furthering the 
principles of dignity and self-reliance. But ujamaa, first and foremost, was a program of 
economic development.379 
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Other post-independence African states used chiefs in their development plans in 
much the same way that colonial officials had. Mamdani argues that in the many African 
states that failed to do away with chiefly power (and in some of those that did), the same 
traditional authorities who came to power through indirect rule continued to govern after 
independence, perpetuating the colonial structure of rule with African elites replacing 
colonial administrators.380 In Malawi, for example, President Banda used chiefs to corral 
votes, oversee development projects, and preside as judges in special, executive-branch 
controlled courts that were sometimes used to persecute political opponents. Without 
chiefs to oversee villagization, agricultural reforms, and other components of ujamaa, 
Nyerere and TANU required a sufficiently strong coalition to make sure that their 
reforms not only became law in Parliament, but also were carried out on the ground. This 
coalition necessarily had to involve rural elites, who had the most influence in the 
countryside, where most of the reforms would take place. In this particular domain, elite 
capacity was relatively high compared to that of the state, so the state needed to build a 
rural-national coalition to implement its reforms. 
If the political coalition hypothesis is correct, it should be possible to find several 
indicators of its presence, even if no direct statements from Nyerere or TANU attest to 
the tradeoff between customary law and other goals. These indicators include the 
presence of opposition signals by TANU of willingness to attenuate or alter some sets of 
policies when confronted with opposition; and, to establish the place of judicial 
centralization in the larger process of bargaining, evidence that halting judicial 
centralization was timed to coincide with quelling opposition. Additionally, it should be 
possible to find evidence that Nyerere and other TANU politicians prioritized other 
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policy goals higher than that of judicial centralization, and that they were less willing to 
compromise concerning these reforms.  The evidence is in fact consistent with these 
expectations.  
Within a year of Nyerere’s election, pockets of opposition to TANU had begun to 
develop in rural areas, including places such as Sukumaland, which had served as 
TANU’s strongest recruiting ground only years before. TANU’s success at gaining a 
strong following in the late 1950s was largely predicated on its ability to present an 
effective critique of the colonial regime’s policies.  The most widely hated colonial 
policies involved changes to traditional methods of agriculture and tax collection. The 
post-independence policies went even further to transform rural agriculture, and quickly 
generated dissent. Hyden argues that Nyerere’s commitment to multiracialism and his 
decision to nationalize all land generated the most dissent, which created widespread 
opposition movements in 1962 through 1964.381 Although popular support for Nyerere 
remained strong, TANU became so unpopular in some regions of Tanganyika that during 
the District Council of 1963, just a year after Nyerere and TANU’s decisive victory, 
some of TANU activists who had played a role in the struggle for independence failed to 
be reelected to office. 
The two primary centers for opposition to TANU were two rival political parties: 
the Tanganyika African National Congress (ANC) and the People’s Democratic Party 
(PDP). The ANC was founded by Zuberi Mtemvu in 1958 after a disagreement over 
TANU’s willingness to participate in the pre-independence elections of 1958.382 Its 
platform was, according to Hyden, traditionalist. Although it promoted some arguably 
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leftist ideas such as a refusal to cooperate with multiracialism (in post-independence 
Tanganyika, multiracialism referred to protections for European and Asian land rights in 
Tanganyika), it drew most of its support from chiefs and other local elites who opposed 
the abolition of the chieftaincy.383 In Sukumaland, the local ANC leader explained that 
the difference between ANC and TANU was that ANC favored freedom for Africans 
only, “whereas TANU was a multi-racial [read: European-favoring] party,” and that the 
ANC “wished chiefs to retain their positions” after independence.384 Many ANC leaders 
were chiefs or sub-chiefs who had lost their position under British rule, and hoped to 
regain it after independence.385 ANC also opposed chiefs who favored TANU or who lent 
their voice to liberal projects such as inter-tribal social integration or land 
nationalization.386 
The People’s Democratic Party was founded in 1962 by a former TANU 
parliamentarian, C. K. Tumbo, who believed that TANU had not been radical enough in 
its approach.387 The PDP gained a strong following among the Sukuma, particularly after 
David Kidaha Makwaia, a prominent former chief, joined its ranks and began to recruit 
followers.388 Maguire argues “That the government was gravely concerned about the 
prospects for the organization and articulation of opposition sentiments in 
Sukumaland…could not have been made more clear than by the stern steps of deportation 
taken against them.”389 In other regions of Tanganyika, PDP failed to gain a local 
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following, but other, non party-affiliated opposition movements proliferated after 
independence. In Buhaya, a consortium of teachers, many of them already elected to the 
District Council on the TANU platform, decided to run as independents during the 1963 
District Council elections.390 They won half of the local seats, but were ousted when the 
Minister of the Interior dissolved the Council and appointed local TANU supporters in 
place of the independence candidates. During the same 1963 District Council Elections, 
independents also won a quarter of the seats in Chaggaland until they were similarly 
dismissed.391 Hyden argues that the success of independent candidates in 1963 
demonstrates that “some of the locally important groups had not been fully assimilated 
into the ranks of the party.”392 
In order for controversial reforms to move forward, TANU needed local elites—
usually, former chiefs and traditional authorities—to lend them their support because, in 
most areas of Tanganyika, chiefly power retained salience even after the abolition of the 
chieftaincy. Surveys at the time show that few people openly opposed abolition, but few 
people supported it either.393 Well over 80% of survey respondents among the Haya tribe 
agreed that one-party rule was necessary for good governance, and over 90% agree that 
eliminating the patronage system surrounding the chieftaincy was a good thing.394 At the 
same time, fewer than 5% listed the abolition of traditional authorities as having had a 
positive influence in their life.395 In 1965, surveys among the Nyamwezi determined that 
chiefs still played an important role in rural life.396 80% of local leaders (defined as 
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members of local government and TANU) still believed that “a man should always obey 
his traditional chief,” and 98.5% of non-leaders believed the same.397 Hyden finds that in 
the Buhaya tribal region, former chiefs “remained influential among those who still 
believed in the validity of the traditional Haya myth.”398 Support for ten-house cell 
leaders was high, but support for TANU and local government officials was mixed; of 
those who supported either, few knew the function of various village officers.399 When 
villagers supported TANU officials, it was often for reasons other than political ideology, 
such as a personal or family connection within the village. Also, many former chiefs and 
sub chiefs became party officials. Maguire finds that in Sukumaland, half to two thirds of 
Divisional and Assistant Divisional Executive Officers were drawn from former 
traditional authorities.400 According to Miller, of 108 chiefs and village headmen in 
power when the chieftaincy was eliminated, 93 later obtained a position in the local 
government or TANU regional office.401 In other regions where chiefs were less 
successful, 25-35% were still able to find influential government jobs.402 Most villagers 
continued to feel more connected to fellow villagers and traditional institutions than to 
the new party structure, which made it difficult for TANU to achieve compliance with 
some of its new laws, particularly those involving agricultural reform and villagization, 
which aimed to physically resettle large numbers of Tanzanians.  
Nyerere’s speeches from before independence and during the first few years of his 
presidency reflect a keen understanding of the need for popular support of his reforms. 
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He argued, “the peace resulting from imposed law is short-lived. The moment a man feels 
himself strong enough he tries to throw off this law and substitute another more to his 
liking. Or he may even break out in sheer destructive desperation if the law appears to 
him to be threatening his life or that of his family…".403 An early presidential 
commission established to determine the long-term viability of one party rule noted that 
its recommendations must be tempered with consideration to the President’s strong 
feeling that “Democratic government cannot be practised [sic] nor individual rights 
protected in a society torn by internal disorder. For a young nation, public order is 
precious but it is also fragile.”404 In 1963, Nyerere noted, with respect to his economic 
reforms, “All schemes must be drawn up in relation to the people who are most directly 
concerned in them, and the amount of cultural change required should not be greater than 
they can accommodate.”405  
The later failure of TANU’s villagization project illustrates that the government 
was not always capable of legislating within the bounds of what ordinary Tanzanians 
might accept, but certainly to begin with, there is evidence that TANU was aware of 
growing opposition and worked to find ways to make their platform more palatable.  
Nyerere’s primary means of lobbying for his reforms, both before and after 
independence, was to couch his ideas in traditionalist terms that presented them as a 
familiar and authentically African form of power relations that predated the despised 
colonial laws. Tradition lent legitimacy because it evoked a now long-distant but 
seemingly better time before the introduction of taxes, cattle dipping, etc.  
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In 1958, in a pamphlet on property relations, he wrote “By his traditions, the 
African knows that the land belongs to his tribe and that he has traditional rights over that 
land.”406 The pamphlet, and others like it, extend this idea to make the case for promoting 
the nationalization of land. In a paper published in 1961, Nyerere makes the case for 
socialism by analogizing nation and tribe; just as individuals were rich or poor 
“according to whether the whole tribe was rich or poor,” the material well being of 
individual citizens depends on the nation’s prosperity.407 In 1963, in a pamphlet prepared 
to defend the idea of one-party rule, Nyerere contends that Africa was democratic before 
the advent of colonialism because elders gathered under a tree to discuss village affairs 
and decide matters together, and that TANU fulfills the same role at a larger scale via 
representatives.408 Crucially, the basis of ujamaa was the traditional African family. In 
these disparate policy areas, as well as with agricultural reform, education, villagization, 
and other matters, Nyerere reaches for tribe, patriarchal family organization, and the 
authority of village elders to explain and justify his reforms. In places, he even cites 
customary law.409 
Mamdani identifies the post-independence reference to tradition as a continent-
wide strategy adopted by new rulers to preserve or reinforce colonial barriers between the 
educated, urban ruling elite and the uneducated rural peasant class to circumscribe 
privilege. The seeming contradiction between frequent reference to the virtues of 
traditional African values and anti-tradition policies such as eliminating the chieftaincy 
and moving to restrict customary law arguably lend support to Mamdani’s contention. It 
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misses, however, both the difficulty and necessity of building a coalition of local elites 
who might support TANU’s post-independence program, particularly since its 
continuation of taxes and agricultural reforms was bound to, and did, generate dissent. 
Having eliminated the chieftaincy and put into place a plan to centralize customary law, 
Nyerere was, as demonstrated, at risk of losing support from rural elites who had 
succeeded in retaining influence at the local level through TANU party and local 
government positions. As argued above, these elites, having helped to craft customary 
law, and relying on it for much of their power, would not support policies that weakened 
it. His framing of reform issues in traditional terms could not be credible if his new laws 
enfeebled or eradicated the institutions on which he claimed to base ujamaa.  
Having disbanded the chieftaincy, both as a means of launching the nation-
building project that must begin with the erosion of tribal identity and eliminating 
possible rallying points of opposition, Nyerere’s proposals to substitute local customary 
law with a unified code threatened the main sources of revenue and influence that 
empowered former chiefs, sub chiefs, and village heads even without their former titles. 
Because ordinary Tanzanians continued to express allegiance to former chiefs, the 
support of those chiefs was crucial to effecting reform. In fact, when political 
participation declined after independence, the party asked village elders to enlist new 
members because “it was hoped that these elders would be more acceptable to the 
ordinary citizen than the…Youth League contingents,” who were restricted to activities 
overseen by the elders.410 Their outsize political influence gave their preferences greater 
weight at the national level. 
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Lineage heads and village elders traditionally held the right to the fruits of labor 
from their daughter-in-laws’ children and the power to allocate land within the family 
and to negotiate marriages. They accordingly resisted those elements of the new 
economic and social order that diminished their influence. Compulsory schooling took 
away from time that children spent laboring for village elders.411 Resettlement 
jeopardized their ability to allocate land and proposed reforms to family law threatened 
one of their most valuable resources: the wealth of cattle paid to them at their daughters’ 
marriage. Lineage heads and elders consequently found elaborate ways of bringing social 
pressure and shame to bear on their children to ensure compliance with the old order 
despite government reforms.412 Any woman who complained to the courts was usually 
expelled from her home and kept away from her children, and she would be considered 
socially dangerous.413 Lwoga notes that in the village of Bigwa, when peasants were 
ordered to relocate as part of the villagization scheme, village elders refused to go and 
initiated a long-running dispute with higher authorities in Dar es Salaam, which they 
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won.414 Rwezaura documents village elites orchestrating thefts from ujamaa villages to 
protest their existence.415 
 Although nation-building and other reforms were important to Nyerere, there is 
no question that economic development came first and foremost, and that he was willing 
to forego success elsewhere to achieve development. In August of 1964, Nyerere 
contended “As circumstances change—and are changed by us—so the emphasis we can  
give to the social, economic, and political freedoms will also change. At present, 
however, we have to face the fact that in general terms the freedom for all to live 
a decent life must take priority. Development must be considered first, and other 
matters examined in relation to it. Our question with regard to every matter—even 
the issue of individual freedom—must be “How does this affect the progress of 
our Development Plan?416 
In 1965, he emphasized that economic development relied, above all, on agriculture, in 
the following terms:  “Agricultural progress is indeed the basis of Tanzanian 
development—and thus of a better standard of living for the people of Tanzania.”417 If 
former chiefs and village heads actively opposed agricultural development policies, they 
could (and as demonstrated, sometimes did) have a deleterious effect on creating the 
needed agricultural surpluses. As Hyden argues “TANU was anxious not to take 
unpopular measures…Government policies slipped as a result of peasant indifference to 
their demands.”418 Nyerere’s stated priorities and his willingness to compromise are 
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strong indicators that his reversal on judicial centralization was due to a need to win rural 
support for his reforms. 
 Furthermore, there was a financial cost to arresting the course of judicial 
centralization, which implies that it would only have been seriously considered if there 
were benefits to outweigh the cost. The creation of a unified customary law code was 
completed in 1963 for Tanzania’s patriarchal tribes, which included the vast majority of 
the country, and codification of matrilineal law was not anticipated in the short term. The 
capital required to interview locals about local customary law had already been spent. 
Also, allowing districts to submit modifications to the code, or to opt out entirely, added 
administrative expenses. Additionally, magistrates had already been posted to most rural 
courts, and more were in training. Adding assessors to primary courts for the purpose of 
advising on local customary law increased the judicial budget and tripled the number of 
individuals required in any given court session. The gains that accrued from halting 
judicial centralization must have outweighed the added capital outlay, particularly given 
Nyerere’s stated preference for the adoption of a uniform customary code. Given that 
there were no economic or ideological motivations for arresting the course of 
centralization, political tradeoffs are the most likely reason for it.   
No records exist to document negotiations between rural elites and TANU 
officials, nor are there transcripts of parliamentary sessions or other documentary 
evidence detailing TANU’s decision to abandon judicial centralization to ward off 
opposition. However, TANU’s demonstrated need for the support of village elders in 
implementing policy, especially given the abolition of the chieftaincy; Nyerere’s 
demonstrated ability to prioritize goals and to decelerate or halt unpopular measures; the 
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strong preference of rural elites for locally distinct customary law; and the lack of 
alternate reasons for abandoning the carefully planned process of centralization create the 
strong inference that partial centralization was the result of political compromise. The 
timing of the reforms points to this conclusion as well. The abandonment of a unified 
customary law did not entirely forestall opposition in Tanzania, but it coincided with the 
end of opposition based on the idea of restoring the positions of former chiefs and the 
participation of chiefs in opposition parties. Maguire argues that the inability of rival 
parties to rally the support of greater numbers of rural supporters presaged their demise 
and the nearly universal support for the transformation to a one party state.419 The 
transition fundamentally changed the nature of opposition—challenges would now come 
to particular policies, such as villagization, rather than to Nyerere’s or TANU’s rule.420 
 Widespread opposition to TANU policies did unfold in the second half of the 60s, 
particularly after Nyerere announced widespread villagization in the 1967 Arusha 
Declaration, in which he launched the comprehensive development plan that he called 
ujamaa, drawing on a term he had used earlier to describe African socialism.421 
Encouraging farmers to live in close-knit settlements where they could share goods and 
labor had been party policy since independence, but villagization took the idea of 
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communal living much further. Villagization schemes moved farmers from their 
farmland into villages, where they were governed by the 10-house cell system. 
Villagization also collectivized labor; the new villagers were expected to farm 
surrounding land collectively, sharing profits equally between households.422 Nyerere 
hoped that the creation of cooperative villages would facilitate the introduction of new 
agricultural methods and projects, which were planned by agricultural experts in the 
central government.423  
The resulting movement of people was, according to Hyden, “the largest 
resettlement effort in the history of Africa.”424 For communities that resettled voluntarily, 
Nyerere promised wells, piped water, schools, and other development projects.425 The 
policy was made compulsory in 1973, but even then, compliance was not universal. 
Coulson demonstrates the many ways in which farmers resisted state sponsored 
agriculture programs from 1946 through 1976 by sabotaging crop production, machinery, 
and refusing to move.426 Once the new villages had been established, Walsh observes, 
“the village government was only as effective as local interests would allow.”427 Farmers 
often fled their new village. In Seeing Like a State, Scott argues that even Nyerere was 
surprised by the brutality that was required to forcibly move farmers off their land.428 
Nyerere chose to make villagization optional to begin with because, as Maguire argues, 
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he had learned that “if compulsion and resistance were not to feed on each other,” 
changes were necessary that would reduce government coercion.429 
Accordingly, Nyerere went to great lengths to persuade his citizens that 
villagization brought tangible benefits. To convince the people of the Dodoma Region to 
move into ujamaa villages in 1970, Nyerere spent a “long time” living in an early ujamaa 
village, Chamwino, to demonstrate its benefits, and afterward toured other villages to 
urge farmers to relocate.430 As with his efforts to eliminate opposition to agricultural 
reforms in the early 1960s, Nyerere again moved to further restrict the lingering influence 
of traditional authority, to further enmesh former chiefs into the party structure, and to 
maintain a balance between standardizing legal rules and giving local customs legal 
stature, this time with the regulation of marriage and divorce. With the African Chiefs 
Act of 1969, the Tanzanian Government eliminated the last official remnants of chiefly 
power by barring former chiefs from exercising any function under customary law or any 
other form of authority. The Act was designed to eliminate the vestiges of chiefs’ 
authority gleaned from citizens’ unofficial recourse to former chiefs as a source of 
dispute resolution.431 At the same time, the government’s passage of Government Acts 
219 and 219A of 1969, which established Ward Tribunals, paved the way for chiefs to 
continue to exercise power, but on behalf of the Tanzanian government and TANU. 
Miller finds that local TANU officials often approached former chiefs to ask their help in 
mobilizing local support, particularly in increasing agricultural production and other 
“issues which required mobilization for an unpopular cause, or one requiring a great deal 
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of individual labor without visible rewards.”432 In this particular area, the state’s capacity 
was lower than that of local elites. Finally, the Law of Marriage Act, described above, 
which was originally intended to standardize marriage and divorce law, was written in 
such a way as to allow local variations to persist.433  
The same sequence of events involving controversial government policies 
coupled with the elimination of rival sources of power or their cooptation to serve 
government purposes, further combined with careful avoidance of curtailing the powers 
accorded rural elites through customary law, played out in both 1962-64 and 1969-71. Its 
duplication suggests that judicial centralization was a bargaining piece in the 
government’s attempt to win loyalty from rural elites. The fierce opposition to attempts to 
further centralize law in the 1990s and 2013 suggests that the accommodations granted 
concerning locally distinct customary law are still strongly protected by select 
communities. An effort in the 1990s to create a uniform law of inheritance along the lines 
of the Law of Marriage Act (1971) was so controversial that the Law Reform 
Commission’s report on the law was immediately made confidential, and it remains 
impossible to obtain a copy.434 Debate over removing the binding vote of assessors in 
magistrate courts brought Tanzania’s parliament to a near shutdown during the spring of 
2013, and the government was forced to withdraw its proposal in the face of massive 
resistance, particularly from parliamentarians from rural and strongly Muslim districts.435 
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absence of efforts to do so. 
434 Author interview with an anonymous official at the Law Reform Commission, Dar es Salaam, April 8 
2012. Author interview with Professor Sufian Bukurura, Law Reform Commission, Dar es Salaam, March 
1, 2013.  
435 Author interview with official in the Ethics Commission, Dar es Salaam, March 27, 2013. Author 
interview with Attorney General Francis Werema, Dar es Salaam, March 25, 2013. 
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Because rural elites, whose support was necessary for effecting reform, prioritized the 
retention of locally distinct customary law, Nyerere slowed the process of judicial 
centralization to prevent their opposition to his policies. The resulting partial 
centralization has become strongly institutionalized. As will be seen in the next section, 
however, change is beginning to favor further centralization. 
 
Fifty Years Later: The Slow Erosion of Customary Law 
 
In 2013, fifty years after the Parliament session that gave rise to the Magistrates 
Courts Act and Government Notices 279 and 436, concerning the unification of 
customary law, much of Nyerere’s vision of judicial centralization had come to pass. 
These laws are still in effect, but the sections that allow for local variation in customary 
law are rarely invoked, and it is common for magistrates to ignore customary law 
entirely, except through the advice of the court assessors. Today, Tanzania’s judicial 
system is mostly centralized, and although some legal matters are resolved in venues 
other than state courts, no secondary system, recognized or not, vies for litigants or settles 
large disputes in a routinized manner. For the most part, the adjudication that takes place 
elsewhere than in primary courts happens within local government structures such as the 
ten-cell system.  
Centralization was achieved not through changes of policy in the permissibility of 
using local customary law, but through the lengthy process of nation building that 
Nyerere put into place.436 Three elements of his program, in particular, caused important 
changes. The first is the adoption of Swahili as a national language. Although local 
                                                
436 For excellent analysis on the effects of nation building in Tanzania versus Kenya, see Miguel 2004. 
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languages still thrive, all Tanzanians speak Swahili and can thus travel from one region to 
another without encountering language barriers, which has had a strong unifying effect. 
The language used in courts is Swahili, so there is no longer concern that people might 
not understand an esoteric court language, as is still the case in some states that have 
preserved English in the judiciary (such as Malawi). Second, the introduction of 
mandatory education exposed Tanzanians to a curriculum that teaches national history at 
the expense of local tribal history.437 As a result, many young Tanzanians know the 
names of important independence-era politicians, but few are able to say for sure who 
used to be a chief in the tribe, or which of their schoolmates might once have been chief 
or sub chief.438  
Perhaps most vitally, Nyerere brought about the vast movement of people across 
territory, both through villagization, but also through smaller, but more lasting, 
mechanism of rotating government officials through posts and sending children to 
different districts for different phases of their schooling. Although this last practice is 
beginning to weaken, official policy for most of the 1970s-90s was for students who 
qualified for anything beyond primary education to pursue their studies far from home, 
housed in government dormitories, and for secondary and tertiary education, they would 
move again. Many people met spouses or found employment far away from where they 
grew up, with the result of a large-scale intermixing of languages and cultures.439 This 
process is credited with increasing diversity across Tanzania and weakening tribal 
                                                
437 The 1974 Musoma Declaration succeeded in centralizing education and expanding it to include the vast 
majority of Tanzanian children. See Musoma Declaration of 1974; Chonjo, 36. 
438 Interview with Bahati, Tour Guide, Friends of the Usambaras, February 24, 2013, Lushoto. 
439 Ibid. 
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loyalty.440 Urbanization has also speeded this process. Magistrates were also rotated 
through posts fairly frequently, with the result that they never gained proficiency in the 
local form of customary law, and came to rely more on the unified version published in 
the Government Notices. As the cases that came to courts more commonly involved a 
mixture of tribal backgrounds and magistrates knew less of local custom, the use of 
locally distinct customary law declined. 
Although magistrates-in-training do study customary law, they spend the bulk of 
their time on Tanzania’s civil and criminal law codes. Even at the primary court level, 
where customary law most often makes an appearance, magistrates are unable to say 
what the codified customary law rule is for a particular question, whereas they are more 
likely to know the relevant portion of the civil law code without needing to look it up. All 
of this means that custom is used less frequently in the courts as time progresses, and 
when “custom” is used, it takes the form more of common sense than of codified law. For 
example, in Iringa Mjini primary court, the magistrate issued a judgment in a case 
involving a local woman and the driver of one of the private shared vans that provides 
most transport in the area. The woman had paid a single fare for herself and her toddler, 
who she held in her lap, but when she grew tired she placed the child on the seat next to 
her. The driver demanded extra payment for the child, the woman refused, and so the 
man removed the child from the van and then locked the woman and the other passengers 
inside the van until she paid. She began to hit him, and a fight resulted in which the driver 
was slightly injured. The driver was the complainant in the case, wanting compensation 
                                                
440 Ruth Wedgwood, “Post-Basic Education and Poverty in Tanzania,” Country paper for the DFID funded 
research on Post Basic Education and Training and Poverty Reduction. Post-Basic Education and 
Training Working Paper Series 1 (2005), 35; Author interview with F. Werema, Attorney General, 
Tanzania, March 25, 2013, Dar es Salaam. 
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for the assault. The magistrate acknowledged that assault had taken place but, with the 
consent of the assessors, advised the complainant that separating a toddler from his 
mother was unpardonable, and that the result of doing so was foreseeable. He accordingly 
dismissed the case on the grounds of lack of evidence, which he describes as a common 
means of dismissing cases where achieving any real justice would either be impossible 
based on the original suit, or so time-consuming as to not be worth it.441   
Locally distinct custom, that linked originally to the tribe, mostly survives 
through the position of court assessor. Assessors base their recommendations mostly on 
local customary law or, sometimes, on the practicalities of the case or their knowledge of 
the litigants. They are given a minimal stipend, and many of them are quite old, so there 
have been problems with absenteeism from court. Because the court cannot hear a case in 
the absence of either assessor, the result can be massive delays and backlogs of cases.442 
Many magistrates, frustrated with the assessors’ lack of legal education, fail to consult 
the assessors entirely, or neglect to inform them that their vote is binding.443 Accordingly, 
the Attorney General’s office has introduced a bill to eliminate the position of court 
assessor entirely, which most magistrates support.444 However, several MPs from 
predominately Muslim and rural areas have blocked a second reading of the bill, 
                                                
441 Interview with Iringa Mjini Magistrate, March 14, 2013. 
442 In Kinondoni Court, on the morning of February 28, 2013, 17 cases were postponed due to the absence 
of an assessor. Several of these cases were postponed for the second or third time. (Court observation 
session, Kinondoni Court, Dar es Salaam, February 28, 2013). 
443 Author interview with Helen, assessor, Mtae, Lushoto District, February 23, 2013; Author interview 
with Ilvin Mugeta, Resident Magistrate, Kisutu Court, Dar es Salaam, February 7, 2013. 
 444Interview with Magistrate, Mazombe Primary Court, March 20, 2013, Mazombe; Interview with 
Resident Magistrate in Charge, Iringa RM Court, March 10, 2013, Iringa; Interview with primary court 
magistrate, Kimande Primary Court, March 15, 2013, Rift Valley. In Mjini Court in Iringa, during a 
roundtable session with several magistrates, assessors, and magistrates-in-training, two of the magistrates 
argued that assessors are useful for generating popular trust in the court system, while a magistrate-in-
training claimed that in his last internship position, the magistrate had threatened to fire the assessors if 
they ventured an opinion (Roundtable Interview, Iringa Mjini Court, March 14, 2013, 
Iringa. 
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threatening to shut Parliament down if the bill progresses to a second reading. For now, 
the official level of centralization continues to be protected by the same coalition as when 
it was originally established. 
Outside of the court system, customary law continues to thrive, but in a modified 
sense. The Ward Tribunals are now mostly used as the first step for adjudicating land 
disputes, with appeals possible at the High Court level, and the Ward Tribunals do use 
custom. Likewise, the ten-cell system continues to thrive, and most disputes that 
eventually wind up in primary courts start at the ten-cell level, where elders use custom to 
decide the questions brought to them. In both Ward Tribunals and ten-cell adjudication 
sessions, custom has changed, and now mostly refers to a participant-driven process that 
uses few set rules and relies much more heavily on the values and interests of the parties 
involved. Compensation is regularly used, and everyone is given a turn to speak without 
formal rules of evidence or procedure. In many ways, customary law as practiced today 
more closely resembles the descriptions of customary law found in books on pre-colonial 
law, as opposed to the codified and hierarchical systems established by the British. For 
example, in Lushoto district, the practice of formal bride wealth payments has nearly 
disappeared, and it is now more common for the groom’s family to give gifts such as 
blankets, cookware, money, or chickens to the parents and uncle of the bride, who would 
once have been the recipients of bride wealth payments.445 The one major exception to 
this is in land disputes and inheritance, where it is quite common for elder male relatives 
to use local custom to dispossess widows, particularly in patriarchal areas.446 Although 
                                                
445 Interview with Bahati, Tour Guide, Friends of the Usambaras, February 24, 2013, Lushoto. 
446 Maira 2008 25-27; interview with Resident Magistrate in Charge, Iringa RM Court, March 10, 2013 
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disputes are sometimes settled outside of the formal court system and the party system, 
most cases of a more than trivial nature are soon brought to one or the other.447 
A focus group meeting conducted in a court in Iringa, a small city in the south of 
Tanzania, illustrates the general attitudes toward the provision of justice. The magistrate 
had just issued a judgment in the case concerning a local woman and driver described 
above, and the magistrates, assessors, and magistrates-in-training gathered to discuss the 
case, the ruling, and other interesting cases of the day. Several times, the question of the 
place of customary law in primary courts came up. At one point, Andrew, the magistrate 
who had issued the ruling, asked if it would be better to simply eliminate customary law 
entirely. The resulting conversation ensued: 
 
Male assessor 1: It is better for people to stick to customs because every place in Tanzania is 
different. It is good for them to follow their customs, because to adopt other customs makes 
people live not according to their specified place in life. 
Magistrate (Mbeya): Due to developments and technology, it is better to eliminate customary law 
because some of it is discriminatory, and it is bad for people.  
Magistrate (Mjini): I prefer that customary law continue to exist but in a form that is in accordance 
with the state law because if you have a custom that is contrary to the law, it must, by definition, 
be bad or discriminatory, for example female mutilation. Customs should continue through law 
because it makes people get along with one another better in the village and makes them continue 
to have good relations with the government. 
Female assessor: Customs prevail to prevent ethics from being destroyed. 
                                                
447 Interview with Village Chairman of Ilembula, March 12, 2013, Mazombe. According to the Ethics 
Commissioner for the Tanzanian Government, “Slowly, people came to realize that if they wanted a 
decision enforced it was better to come to the government courts than the ward tribunal, so there was a 
slow shift of cases away from the local ward tribunals towards the state courts” (Interview with Salome 
Kaganda, Ethics Commissioner, Vice President’s Offices, March 27, 2013, Dar es Salaam). 
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Male magistrate-in-training 1: It is better to leave custom in place because it helps kids learn good 
behavior, but you have to adhere only to that customs that lead to a better society 
Magistrate (Mbeya): But what is really the difference between customs and norms and laws? 
Magistrate (Mjini): Where does law come from? It must come from norms, and there is a fine line 
between customs and norms 
Magistrate (Mbeya): But doesn’t all law in Tanzania come from Europe? 
Magistrate (Mjini): Some of it does, but norms are what creates laws, and how life is lived from 
day to day creates norms, so law comes from daily life. At least, it should. In law school we were 
taught that customary law is made up of norms that are so generally applicable that they can be 
enforced because they are expected.  
Male assessor 1: I remember a case from my village where the elders of the village ruled that a 
man should be punished by caning. The circumstances were that the man had refused to attend 
local funerals when his neighbors died.448 Later, someone in his family died, and all of the other 
villagers attended the funeral to condole with him. At the same time, they asked him if he had 
been sick at the other funerals, and, when he said no, the elders voted to punish him by caning him 
in front of the village for breaking the law. 
Magistrate (Mbeya): These elders were not in a position to punish this man. This is horrible, the 
man was not accused and he was not brought to court. They cannot just act like a court, they 
should go to jail for assault! 
Magistrate (Mjini): Yes, but it is all very complicated, because for the villagers, they were 
enforcing the law. What would they have said in court? 
This conversation reflects a wider debate across Tanzania about the place of custom in 
law. In general, there is widespread support for the preservation of custom as a valued 
piece of African and Tanzanian identity, and as a necessary means of instilling values in 
young people and ensuring harmony within communities. However, there is an increasing 
                                                
448 Funerals are an important social occasion when the village gathers to condole and offer food and money 
to the family of the deceased. In patrilineal areas, the family of the deceased usually butchers a cow to feed 
funeral attendees.  
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discomfort with custom as a judicial matter, particularly as women’s rights groups and 
international organizations bring to light the systematic use of customary law to 
impoverish rural women and children.449 
The role of custom in Tanzania is further complicated by the growth of the 
Muslim community on the mainland. Tanzanian law does not recognize Islamic religious 
law (sharia) other than as part of local customary law, with the major exception of the 
island of Zanzibar, which joined then-Tanganyika to form Tanzania using a federal-style 
arrangement that permitted Zanzibar to leave Islamic law as its primary legal system. 
Because there is no codified version of sharia, at least not in the Tanzanian judicial 
system, magistrates have no way of applying customary law when cases of Muslim 
family law are brought to them.450 Accordingly, many magistrates report that Muslims in 
their communities tend to go to religious officials for questions of family law.451 There is 
growing pressure, particularly among the Muslim community of Dar es Salaam, for the 
state to create an official means of litigating sharia cases in primary courts, although 
there is also resistance to this idea, particularly among those who hope to weaken the role 
of customary law overall.452 
There is a great deal of reform underway in the Tanzanian judiciary aimed to 
remedy problems with the existing system. Currently, only a limited number of Law 
                                                
449 Interview with Victoria Mandari, Lawyer, January 24, 2013, Mikocheni, Dar es Salaam; Interview with 
Jovin Sanga, Publicity Director, Tanzania Women Lawyers Association (TAWLA), January 29, 2013, 
Ilala, Dar es Salaam. TAWLA and the Directorate of Local Courts both issue radio broadcasts to inform 
Tanzanians of their rights and to warn them of possible abuses that are preventable by bringing legal 
matters to primary courts rather than settling them at home. 
450 For more on Islamic law in mainland Tanzania, see Majamba 2007. 
451 Interview with retired teacher, Sungea village, February 22, 2013, Western Usambara Mountains; 
Interview with magistrate, Kimande Primary Court, March 15, 2013, Rift Valley. 
452 Author interview with Attorney General Francis Werema, Dar es Salaam, March 25, 2013. Interview 
with Professor Hamudi Majamba, University of Dar es Salaam School of Law, January 31, 2013, Dar es 
Salaam. 
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Reports are printed, so most lower courts are left without a record of High Court and 
Court of Appeals cases whose precedent should inform their interpretation of the law.453 
The Directorate of Local Courts is trying to find a better system, perhaps electronic, to 
provide better access to the Reports.454 The project of codifying matrilineal customary 
law, on hold since the 1960s, has now been restarted, and there is hope that it will reach 
completion in the next calendar year.455 This time, the Tanzania Women Lawyers 
Association and other rights groups are advising the process to make sure that 
discriminatory processes such as unequal inheritance practices are removed. This will 
have the effect of altering local law, but participants in the project are unconcerned. The 
Tanzanian constitution is also being examined for the purpose of reform. The 
Constitutional Reform Commission, whose members include former high court judges, 
law professors and deans, and other government officials, is tasked with updating 
Tanzania’s outdated constitution—or, if the task of reconciling old and new becomes too 
cumbersome, writing whole sections of it anew. Perhaps necessarily, given the 
composition of the Commission, the judiciary is under intense scrutiny, particularly with 
regard to the appointment process for judges and the necessity of making sure that all 
laws currently on the books conform to human rights standards.456 
                                                
453 Lawrence Magere and Ibrahim Mkamba, “Doctrine of Stare Decisis: Problem of Law Reporting in 
Tanzania Mainland.” LLB Dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam Faculty of Law,1991. The same 
problem exists today. 
454 Interview with Warsha Sylvester Ng’humbu, Assistant Director of Primary Courts, April 9, 2013, Court 
of Appeals, Dar es Salaam. 
455 Interview with the Secretary General Law of the Tanzania Law Reform Commission,  
April 8, 2013, Dar es Salaam. 
456 Interview with Augostini Ramadhani, Former Chief Justice of Tanzania, Vice-Chairman, Commission 
on Constitutional Reform, March 26, 2013, Dar es Salaam; Interview with Sendongo Mvungi, former Dean 
of the University of Dar es Salaam, Commissioner, Commission on Constitutional Reform, February 6, 
2013, Dar es Salaam.  
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Further centralization, the majority of commissioners agree, is inevitable. Not, 
however, because Tanzania is too judicially decentralized. On the contrary, there is a 
consensus that Tanzania’s judiciary is more centralized than the laws reflect, and it is 
now necessary to bring the written laws into line with actual practice.457 The Ethics 
Commissioner of Tanzania and the Attorney General both argue that it will be necessary 
to slowly curb some of the remaining customary practices that violate human rights, but 
both agree that the best way to do so is to improve education about women’s rights and 
human rights, and increase the efficiency of the state courts so that they continue to 
become more appealing than other, less easy to regulate venues of arbitration.458 They do 
not intend to promulgate legislation proscribing the problematic practices. In this regard, 
judicial centralization (and court reform, in general) continues very much along the lines 
initially established by Nyerere. After all, the Ethics Commissioner pointed out, in an 
echo of Nyerere, “Laws follow custom. You can’t impose strange laws, law only works if 
they are approximately congruent with what people actually practice.” What began as a 
necessary policy to secure elite rural support for other reforms has seemingly become an 
ethic of reform in and of itself. 
 
Conclusion 
 Tanzania’s trajectory of judicial decentralization is long and complicated, but 
ultimately it is one of the most interesting case studies. Before the colonial era, each of 
Tanzania’s tribes practiced a different form of customary law, although there were some 
regional similarities in customs. During the German and British colonial periods, colonial 
                                                
457 Interview with Salome Kaganda, Ethics Commissioner, Vice President’s Offices, March 27, 2013, Dar 
es Salaam; Interview with Augostini Ramadhani. 
458 Interview with Salome Kaganda; Interview with Francis Werema. 
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administrators entirely remade the tribal system and, with it, customary law. The British 
also used tribal group elites as their deputies, which, during the independence era, caused 
nationalists and non-elites to call for the abolition of the chieftaincy, since it was so 
closely linked with colonial rule. The post independence government succeeded in 
eliminating the chieftaincy, and this attack on tribal elite power brought former chiefs 
together, increasing their capacity to demand recognition for locally distinct customary 
law, which was one of their few remaining sources of power. Because Nyerere chose to 
pursue a policy of agricultural and local village reforms, he needed the support of these 
former chiefs to enact them, since they took place in rural areas far from the state leaders’ 
center of power. Despite losing their tribal status, former chiefs were able to become 
local government officials, and thus still had political saliency. The bargaining between 
these group elites and the state, with group elites favoring judicial decentralization to 
bolster their fading power, and the state agreeing in return for their support for ujamaa, 
resulted in Tanzania adopting a partially decentralized judiciary whose form persists to 
the present day. 
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Chapter Four: The Incorporation of Personal Status Law in Egypt 
 
“The study of law as a system of social control reveals what a society claims to honor and 
tries to protect. The study of judicial administration discloses whether society in fact 
protects what it honors, and how.” 
--Galal H. El-Nahal, The Judicial Administration of Ottoman Egypt in the 
Seventeenth Century.459 
 
Introduction 
 
The idea of one set of laws for all citizens, endorsed by Hayek and Dicey, among 
other legal theorists, is only fully possible in a state that is built on John Locke’s premise, 
articulated in “A Letter Concerning Toleration,” that “each of them [state and church] 
contain itself within its own bounds, the one attending to the worldly welfare of the 
commonwealth, the other to the salvation of soul.” In practice, this requires both that a 
state’s citizens put aside their commitment to either public, state-authorized religious or 
ethnic rituals and practices, and that the state make available a neutral public sphere in 
which the institutions of no particular group are privileged over others, and in which 
there is a minimum of interference in the commitments citizens hold in their private lives. 
In most places and times, at least one of these conditions has been impossible to achieve, 
making legal monism a convenient fiction, rather than an accurate descriptor of a 
country’s judicial system. In Egypt, citizens remain strongly committed to religious 
                                                
459 Galal H El-Nahal, The Judicial Administration of Ottoman Egypt in the Seventeenth Century, 
Bibliotheca Islamica (1979), 1. 
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identity in both the public and private sphere, and the state privileges the law of one 
religion, Sunni Islam, over those of its Christian and other religious minority groups. 
Egypt’s history involves, in many ways, a classic trajectory of legal centralization 
from the nearly complete decentralization of the Ottoman period to its current state of 
partially incorporating minority group law into state courts. Nasser’s state-building 
project included eliminating sectarian courts and bringing family law almost entirely 
under the state’s control. However, this project never fully succeeded.  Egypt left 
personal status law matters in the hands of religious authorities, resulting in a somewhat 
ambiguous legal state with multiple, overlapping jurisdictions in which it is possible that 
a person who has received a court-sanctioned divorce is nonetheless prohibited from 
remarrying when the religious officials who govern his religious community refuse to 
recognize the divorce.460 This chapter thus considers Egypt’s transition from several 
centuries of widespread and institutionalized legal pluralism to a somewhat unstable form 
of legal monism. It explains how variations in the relative capacities of the groups and the 
state, along with changes in levels of elite coordination, resulted in the judicial 
decentralization of the partial incorporation type. 
 
Summary of Legal Pluralism in Egypt 
 
                                                
460 See Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron’s excellent coverage of two recent cases in Egypt where Egyptian state 
courts issued and then upheld a divorce ruling for a Copt which the Coptic church refused to recognize, 
both of which prompted a lawsuit against Pope Shenouda for recognition of the divorce, without which the 
persons in question could not remarry, in Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron, “Divorce and Remarriage of 
Orthodox Copts in Egypt: The 2008 State Council Ruling and the Amendment of the 1938 Personal Status 
Regulations.” Islamic Law and Society, 18(3), 356–386.  
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Before proceeding with the argument, it is worth briefly clarifying the somewhat 
confusing nature of legal pluralism in contemporary Egypt. Under Ottoman rule, there 
were separate personal status (family law) courts for the various non-Muslim 
communities in Egypt, including the Copts, Jews, Greek Orthodox, etc. This system 
continued through Mohamed Ali’s dynasty (1805-1848) and, although the subsequent 
British occupation (from, effectively, 1882 to 1954) changed the court structure, it did not 
eliminate separate jurisdictions for different classes of citizens. As such, during this 
period Egypt can be classified as a case of full decentralization. As Egypt transitioned 
toward full self-rule in the 1940s, various measures of judicial centralization were 
adopted, but it wasn’t until after the 1952 revolution that Nasser, as part of his state-
building measures, brought all courts and judicial bodies under state control by 
eliminating religious courts.  
In September 1955, the Egyptian government enacted the Sharia Courts and 
Community Tribunals Abolition Act, also known as Law No. 462, which eliminated 
personal status courts operated by religious communities and instead gave jurisdiction 
over family law matters to Egypt’s national courts.461 This act ended the most 
unconstrained period of legal pluralism in Egyptian history. But it did not completely end 
legal pluralism, as the new law required the national, civil law courts to use codified 
confessional law to arrive at rulings in personal law cases. In cases involving the majority 
                                                
461 J. D. Pennington, “The Copts in modern Egypt,” Middle Eastern Studies, 18(2), 158–179, 165; David 
Zeidan, “The Copts — Equal , Protected or Persecuted? The Impact of Islamization on Muslim ‐ Christian 
Relations in Modern Egypt,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 10(1), 58; Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron 
and Baudoin Dupret, Egypt and Its Laws, 1st ed. Springer (2002), chapter two. 
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population of Muslims, courts applied Hanafi sharia law, whereas cases involving only 
Copts or Jews, for example, were decided under the law of their respective community.462  
 
Summary of Causal Argument 
 
How and why did the government come to pass Law No. 462, and why were the 
communities that lost judicial control over intra-community disputes unable to prevent its 
enactment? Phrased differently, what were the circumstances that led to the abolition of 
institutional legal pluralism in Egypt and to its replacement with government-
administered, centralized normative pluralism, achieved through the use of multiple 
codes of law in a single court system? This chapter argues that Egypt transitioned from 
being a case of full judicial decentralization to one of partial incorporation (see below) as 
the relative capacities of the group and the state shifted in the period following 
independence. Specifically, levels of elite coordination (a key capacity for group elites) 
among Orthodox Copts declined to levels at which the state had an advantage during 
bargaining over judicial decentralization. This same process that led to declines in elite 
coordination (the fragmentation of the Coptic Orthodox elite, discussed below) also 
weakened the group elites’ other capacities. The decline in group elites’ capacities 
resulted in the shift from full centralization to partial incorporation.  
 
 
 
                                                
462 Pennington, 165; Yuksel Sezgin “God v Adam & Eve,” Unpublished dissertation manuscript, University 
of Washington, as edited 2011, 75. 
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Table 5 
Trajectory of Judicial (De)centralization in Egypt 
 
 
Centralization took place in two separate historical periods, both of which will be 
discussed in this chapter. The first was the moment of state-building and state 
consolidation in Egypt following independence, from 1952-57. The second was a 
moment of political crisis following Egypt’s defeat in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. During 
the first period, from 1952-57, the relative capacities of the state were higher than that of 
the religious groups that opposed centralization, and the level of the group elites’ 
coordination was low as well. During the second, from 1975-85, the Coptic Orthodox 
community (which forms the main unit of analysis here, see below) underwent internal 
restructuring which resulted in a higher level of elite coordination, and the political 
context gave the group higher capacities than it normally enjoyed. These increased 
capacities allowed it to prevent the state from further centralizing personal status law, 
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which had been a state goal at that time. Consistent with the theory advanced in Chapter 
1, Egypt was thus able to partially centralize its judicial system during the first period, 
but was not able to further centralize after that.   
Two interrelated historical processes facilitated the drive for legal centralization 
that accompanied Nasser’s early state building. The first is the growth of internecine 
Coptic conflict during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which divided 
secular and religious elites on the question of who would govern the community, and in 
particular, who would administer Coptic personal status law. This hindered elite 
coordination during the crucial moment of legal centralization. The second process is the 
weakening of the Coptic papacy, which resulted both from the divide between the church 
and the lay community, and the political context of Egypt’s independence. This had the 
effect of reducing the capacity of the Coptic community to resist state reforms. The long 
struggle between the two factions of elites left Copts without a leader or credible 
spokesperson to bargain with the Egyptian government on its behalf, denying the 
community both agreement between elites on the issue of judicial autonomy and the 
ability to signal its preference to the state. The relatively low capacities of the Coptic 
Orthodox community did not significantly change until the 1980s, so changes in the level 
of judicial decentralization before then are likely associated with shifts in elite 
coordination. These two factors allowed the Egyptian government to complete the 
judicial portion of a process of centralization and bureaucratization that it pursued 
following Nasser’s 1952 revolution.  
 Even so, not all aspects of Egypt’s long-standing legal pluralism were eliminated, 
especially in regard to family law.  Beginning in the mid-1970s, Anwar Sadat’s 
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administration sought to carry legal centralization to completion.  This later effort came, 
however, at a time when the leading minority religious group, the Orthodox Copts, was in 
a better position to resist.  The result was that centralizing efforts came at higher political 
costs, and the efforts did not achieve success. As a consequence of this series of 
developments, today certain powers often reserved for the state, such as legalizing 
marriages, remain shared with minority religious groups.  The result is a somewhat 
paradoxical legal reality in which there are no judicial forums in which the entirety of a 
divorce or remarriage case can be adjudicated. This point will be discussed further at the 
end of the chapter. 
In attempting to answer questions of this nature, the problem of complexity can 
become daunting and overwhelm the researcher’s best efforts to untangle causal 
processes. Law No. 462 eliminated all religious and confessional tribunals, not just those 
of the largest or most prominent groups. Must a full answer thus incorporate analysis of 
each group’s response to the reforms, which in Egypt’s case, includes seventeen different 
groups? Jacob Levy, in his analysis of state incorporation of indigenous law, recommends 
a more narrow focus. As he rightly points out “most states use elements of more than one 
mode of incorporation [essentially, state policy on non-state law]; but there are 
differences of emphasis. The self-government mode of incorporation is most important in 
the United States, and is also significant in Canada. Customary incorporation plays at 
least some part in most states that accord any status to indigenous law, but is relied on 
almost exclusively in South Africa. Australia places greater emphasis than other states on 
common law incorporation.”463 While Australia uses common law incorporation to 
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recognize some provisions of aboriginal tribal law, it generally does not do so with 
religious law. In this case, as Levy acknowledges, too much granularity erodes the 
researcher’s ability to detect overarching patterns and create larger categorizations.  
Following Levy, I suggest that the best strategy for understanding Egyptian legal 
reform is to focus on the experience of the country’s largest minority group, the Orthodox 
Copts. Orthodox Copts have comprised seven to nine percent of Egypt’s population since 
record keeping first began in 1897.464 This is partially true because their experience is 
representative of many other communities (including other Christian communities, which 
comprise ten of the seventeen recognized religious groups in Egypt) but also because 
Egyptian policy was formulated in response to the dominant Sunni majority and the 
Copts to a greater extent than other groups. Also, smaller groups have been unsuccessful 
in blocking or altering government actions, whereas the majority Muslim population and 
the Copts have often been able to influence policy. As such, focusing on the legal 
experience of the Copts provides a useful lens for understanding Egyptian legal reform as 
a whole. 
 
The Egyptian Legal System Before 1955 
 
It is difficult to follow the trajectory of judicial decentralization in Egypt without 
an understanding of the judicial landscape both before and following Egyptian 
independence. The following section will highlight the forms of the judiciary during the 
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Ottoman and British colonial periods, as well as its effects on sectarian politics in Egypt. 
This background will help the reader better understand the process tracing narrative that 
is built below to explain shifts in the capacities of interest that led to changes in levels of 
judicial decentralization. It also provides a portrait of the legal pluralism that was the 
status quo in Egypt before the advent of the post-independence centralizing reforms. 
The Ottoman Empire conquered Egypt in 1517 and quickly began to transform it 
into an Ottoman province modeled on its other holdings. Most private Egyptian land was 
confiscated on the grounds of improper record keeping and given directly to the Sultan.465 
By 1525, Ottoman administrators had created three branches of government: military, 
financial, and judicial with an accompanying legal structure to govern their function.466 
The judiciary was led by an Ottoman qadi askar (functionally, chief justice) who 
presided over Egypt’s courts of all types.467 He was a Turkish-speaking Ottoman official 
from the capital appointed by the empire’s grand mufti for a period of one, but sometimes 
up to three years.468 The civil court system was divided into six levels, but only for the 
purpose of promoting judges through the ranks of the Ottoman Empire’s civil service, as 
the courts were non-hierarchical and could not hear appeals from lower levels.469  
The official Ottoman courts applied two forms of law: qanun, a secular body of 
Ottoman law composed of executive decrees and custom, and sharia, Islamic law.470 In 
general, sharia law in Egypt was derived from the Hanafi school of jurisprudence, but the 
Ottoman judiciary made judges from the Hanbali, Shafi’i, and Maliki schools of fiqh 
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available as well.471 These judgments were usually rendered from the mosque, although 
they were often verified by the district judge.472 There were two types of judges who 
heard day to day civil and criminal law disputes: qadis, who headed the judiciary for each 
of the thirty-seven Egyptian judicial districts and na’ibs, their deputies who heard most 
non-criminal first instance cases. The system was rigidly structured with rules governing 
which type of court could hear certain types of dispute, when higher-level judicial 
officials must be consulted, and guidelines to preserve the independence of the judiciary. 
Every judicial official was appointed by external Ottoman officials.473 This system 
governed the vast majority of Egyptians and Ottoman administrators. 
 There were, however, communities in Egypt who were exempt from this elaborate 
Ottoman judicial apparatus. Non-Muslims, known as dhimmis, were not subject to 
Ottoman law.474 Instead, religious leaders within each community judged disputes, unless 
the dispute occurred across sects, such as between a Muslim and a non-Muslim or a non-
Muslim and the government, in which case it was decided under sharia law.475 The local 
qadi adjudicated disputes between non-Muslims of different religions.476  
The practice of granting intra-community judicial autonomy to dhimmis stems 
from several Quranic passages urging limited interaction between Muslims and non-
Muslims and from Caliph Umar’s interpretation of these passages, as well as customary 
rules governing inter-communal relations during the beginning of his reign.477 According 
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to Hoyle, in his analysis of Egyptian legal history “Following the Islamic principle that 
Sharia was for believers and not for non-Muslims, the varying jurisdictions of religious 
and personal status courts were accepted by the Arab rulers as normal, and foreigners and 
Christians encountered no trouble over their legal systems.”478 These rules were 
preserved with only slight alteration through the Ummayad and Abbasid Caliphates, and 
they were adopted by the Ottoman Empire as a means of administering a highly diverse 
empire. Although Egypt’s rulers were inconsistent about certain practices such as the 
jizyah (a special tax on dhimmis) and requiring distinctive garb for non-Muslims, they 
never attempted to diminish communal judicial autonomy.  
 The three-year French incursion into Egypt beginning in 1798 changed the 
composition of the judiciary but did not fundamentally alter its structure. According to 
Stanford Shaw, the French created a General Council composed of local notables, 
religious officials, merchants, peasants, farmers, and Bedouin chiefs whose job it was to 
formulate policies to govern Egypt.479 The Council “stated its opinion that the Muslim 
system of justice and the laws of inheritance should be maintained as they existed under 
Ottomans.”480 The only substantive changes were in the composition of the state 
judiciary. The French victory over Ottoman troops forced the Ottoman Governor and 
bureaucrats into exile, leaving the administrative apparatus virtually empty.481 
Accordingly, French administrators appointed Egyptians to these posts, replacing all but 
five Ottoman judges with Egyptian religious officials, including the first Egyptian Qadi 
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Askar.482 Business in the courts, which had often been conducted in Turkish, reverted to 
Arabic, a practice that would continue through the end of the French occupation and the 
beginning of Muhammad Ali’s dynasty. 
 The Copts received considerably better treatment after 1805 under Muhammad 
Ali’s dynasty, which succeeded the French occupation, than they had under previous 
rulers. They were given the freedom to dress as they pleased, to go on pilgrimages, to be 
hired by Muslims (previous laws had forbidden Muslims to employ Copts), and perhaps 
most importantly, to build as many churches as the community needed.483 Muhammad 
Ali’s successors introduced further reforms including the elimination of the jizyah (a tax 
on non-Muslims) in 1855, the inclusion of Copts in the national military draft, and the 
funding of the first state-sponsored Coptic Orthodox schools.484 Khedive Ismail, 
Muhammad Ali’s grandson, welcomed Copts into the civil service at both low and high 
levels, appointing them to judgeships in civil courts and permitting them to run as 
candidates in the elections for his new Consultative Council.485 In 1892, British forces 
invaded Egypt during the Anglo-Egyptian war, resulting in a de facto protectorate that 
lasted until 1914, when it became official following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire 
following WWI. Egypt remained under full protectorate status until 1922, at which point 
it declared unilateral independence, which Britain ultimately recognized in 1936. British 
troops, and a strong British presence remained in Egypt until 1956.  
The country’s first constitution was drafted after Egypt’s independence from 
Britain in 1922 under the direction of Fuad I, the ninth ruler in Muhammad Ali’s dynasty. 
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Published in 1923, the constitution stipulated legal equality between Muslims and non-
Muslims and guaranteed freedom of religion.486 The advances in general rights and 
freedoms, however, did not signal any alternations in Coptic judicial administration. The 
community continued to govern intra-communal legal matters without reference to the 
outside courts, except in cases where a Muslim was involved.  
 During this period, another type of court was introduced to Egypt’s already plural 
legal system. In 1841, Britain, Austria, Prussia, France, and Russia entered into 
negotiations with the Ottoman Empire concerning Egypt’s status. The result was a decree 
that gave Egypt greater freedom within the Empire, and particularly judicial freedom, in 
return for military assistance.487 During and after the French occupation of Egypt, 
European trade with Egypt began to expand, bringing resident foreigners to Egypt in 
large numbers. These nationals of England, France, Greece, Austria, and elsewhere were 
exempt from the jurisdiction of the Ottoman court system because of a series of 
capitulations signed during the early 1800s. As a result, judicial matters involving 
foreigners were heard by consular courts, which used the law of their home country. This 
arrangement tended to mean that suits brought against foreigners by Egyptians almost 
always failed, and disputes between residents of different nationalities brought similar 
problems.488  
 In 1875, Egypt inaugurated a new system of courts called the “Mixed Courts,” 
created in response to Egypt’s increasing independence from the Ottoman Empire during 
a moment of economic opening and growing trade.489  The Mixed Courts had jurisdiction 
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across the entirety of Egypt, although only in particular types of disputes. They formed 
one of four types of courts then in existence including administrative courts for 
administrative law and infringements of Ottoman general regulations; family law courts 
including personal status courts for religious minority groups and consular courts for the 
family law cases of foreigners; Sharia courts for all disputes involving Muslim Egyptians; 
and mixed courts for disputes concerning persons of multiple jurisdictions including 
disputes between Egyptians and foreigners, the Egyptian government and foreigners, and 
between foreigners of different nationalities.490 The mixed courts did not, in and of 
themselves, constitute legal pluralism. As Hoyle points out in his study of the mixed 
courts, “all laws, courts, and codes [in the Mixed courts] were Egyptian, the only mixed 
elements were the parties.”491 Legal pluralism instead resided in the multiple different 
courts that the Egyptian government administered with jurisdiction dependent on identity 
instead of territoriality, which effectively meant that an identical case of divorce, for 
example, would wind up in a different court depending on the religion and nationality of 
the claimants.  
The mixed courts existed for seventy-four years until they were closed in 1949, 
and they were effective in centralizing and simplifying the complex jurisdictional 
landscape of pre-1875 Egypt. They became the country’s “foremost judicial authority” 
and convinced the Egyptian authorities that a comprehensive legal code was superior to 
Sharia-based rulings issued by religious officials. Within ten years of their creation, 
Egypt created a parallel system of “native courts” that applied similar codes to disputes 
between Egyptians, thereby partially supplanting the previously exclusive jurisdiction of 
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Muslim courts in this domain.492 By 1937, Farouk I’s administration suggested a move 
away from a separate system of mixed and native courts, which applied many of the same 
codes, and the creation of a unified national court system. Later that year, at a meeting of 
the capitulatory powers, they and Egypt signed the Montreux Convention, which created 
a twelve-year plan to end the mixed courts.493  
On October 15, 1949 the new Egyptian National Courts took over all cases 
pending in the now-closed mixed and native courts.494 Although personal status cases 
involving foreigners were still heard by the consular courts, all other non-family law 
disputes went to the new National Courts, which centralized all but personal status law 
under a single system.495 Thus, the history of the Mixed Courts emphasizes the drive for 
centralization that, unimportant under Ottoman rule, became a central concern as 
European powers gained influence in Egypt. The Mixed Courts brought the multiple 
jurisdictions of the consular courts under a single court reserved for disputes involving 
foreigners, and once the efficiency of this model became apparent, they served as a model 
for the new Native Courts, which replaced the Ottoman system of local, mosque-run 
courts. The abolition of these and their replacement with the Egyptian national court 
system nearly completed the process of centralization as it brought all but the personal 
status courts under the jurisdiction of a single court system. However, this was not an 
instance of an independent state formulating its own policy on legal pluralism. This 
episode of legal centralization is provided as background for the reader rather than as a 
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case study subjected to causal analysis because it was brought about by the capitulatory 
powers and overseen by the British. The case study of centralization under consideration 
here is that of Egypt as a newly independent state, able to formulate its own policy 
without foreign veto. 
 One of the most important results of the many invasions of Egypt is a 
contemporary legal system that is built on more than one source of law. Sharia law, 
Ottoman secular law, French civil law, and even a degree of English common law coexist 
in the country’s national courts alongside the family law codes of Egypt’s religious 
communities. The mixed courts normalized the concept that a central court system could 
adjudicate cases even when litigants came from different jurisdictions. Given the 
heterogeneous nature of the Egyptian legal system, it is important to remember that legal 
pluralism is defined as a plurality of types of law available in the same situation, not a 
plurality of sources of law. In other words, a mixed system of Ottoman law, French civil 
law, and Islamic law, if applied equally and in the same manner to all litigants, is not an 
instance of legal pluralism. Legal pluralism exists only when different laws apply to 
people in the same legal situations. Ottoman Egypt was characterized by a system of full 
decentralization in which non-Muslim communities adjudicated all disputes within their 
communities, including civil, criminal, and family law. In present-day Egypt, legal 
pluralism is restricted to the domain of family law, and exists by virtue of the different 
legal codes that are applied to identical situations such as divorce and inheritance 
according to the litigants’ religion, which particularly when compared to the cases of 
Tanzania and Malawi, is a weak form of legal pluralism.  
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Period 1: Legal Centralization during Egyptian State-Building 
 
 With a preliminary understanding of Egyptian legal history preceding 1955, it is 
possible to turn to the question of why, despite strong opposition from powerful groups in 
Egyptian society, Egypt ended up in the category of partial incorporation, which involves 
a lesser transfer of judicial power to non-state groups than many of the other types. This 
chapter argues that it is a decline in the relative capacities of the Coptic Orthodox elite 
that account for this outcome, so the following sections will examine changes in the 
capacities of the state leaders (in this case, Nasser and his deputies) and group elites 
(Coptic Orthodox elites). It will also examine the interests of both parties—the state 
leaders, in centralizing the judiciary, and the Coptic Orthodox elites, in preserving 
judicial decentralization. 
 
 Interests and Capacities of Egyptian State Leaders 
 
Following his instatement as Egypt’s second president, Nasser adopted a policy of 
full judicial centralization. The history of the mixed courts demonstrates that Egypt had 
already experienced a certain amount of judicial centralization before the 1952 
revolution. It would be wrong, however, to read Nasser’s reforms as an extension of this 
earlier tendency. Before the withdrawal of British troops in 1954, Egypt’s policies were 
either written by or under the heavy influence of the British, and cannot be counted as 
instances of a sovereign state formulating judicial policy. The British occupation 
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generated significant opposition, and after the July revolution of 1952 Egyptian 
politicians made a point of breaking with colonial policies.  
 Two interrelated programmatic agendas drove the campaign for judicial 
centralization during the Egyptian Republic’s early years. The first was a desire to 
bureaucratize and rationalize the Egyptian state, and the second was a movement toward 
a secular, Egyptian nationalist identity that would orient Egypt’s citizens towards the 
state, rather than the sects, as the appropriate locus of political loyalty. In general, the 
reforms were a central component of the period of modernization and bureaucratization 
that Nasser and the first president of Egypt, Mohamed Naguib, launched together with 
the avowed purpose of making Egypt more administratively efficient and democratic.496 
According to Sezgin, Nasser’s “revolutionary government was mainly motivated by such 
mechanical concerns as to increase the efficiency of its central administration and 
reinstate the sovereignty of the Egyptian state over its territory.”497 The reforms formed 
part of the effort to strengthen the state apparatus.  These are, of course, typical motives 
driving judicial centralization in many standard accounts of state building. 
 Having dismantled many of the existing political parties and removed officials 
from their government positions, the regime hired a whole new cadre of regime loyalists, 
expanding the bureaucracy and government payroll rapidly.498 Sezgin characterizes 
Nasser’s regime as bureaucratic-authoritarian for its program of top-down bureaucratic 
rationalization and its faith “in the value of specialized knowledge, professionalization, 
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and uniformity in public administration.”499 A senior official in the central Coptic 
patriarchate and a Coptic journalist both agree that Nasser’s centralization efforts were 
the driving force behind sectarian law reform.500 Science and progress were the regime’s 
watchwords, and anything that appeared to be irrational, unscientific or inefficient was on 
the agenda for reform. The regime at least nominally committed itself to the idea that its 
citizens should be equal under the law and governed by the same set of rules. Permitting 
religious officials, particularly officials from different religions, to adjudicate the disputes 
of Egyptian citizens violates these principles. One suspects, too, that perhaps even more, 
the regime strengthening character of a centralized judiciary, identified by Shapiro and 
Becker, appealed to Nasser during the early days of state formation. 
Additionally, unlike his successor, Nasser was an Egyptian nationalist and pan-
Arabist in political outlook. Although he was not against religious groups for the most 
part, he was suspicious of anything that might undermine ties between the citizen and 
state. He frequently worked with the Coptic Pope (explained further below) to aid 
church-building projects in return for the Pope’s, and by extension the Coptic 
community’s, political support. Prominent Copts had joined Egypt’s Wafd party, the 
political force that won independence from Great Britain in 1952. Pennington, Wakin, 
and other historians emphasize the extent to which Copts and Muslims worked together 
to achieve independence, and they highlight the fierce nationalism of the Copts, which 
led them to protest when the British attempted to reserve the right, after independence, to 
intervene in Egyptian affairs in matters concerning discrimination against the Coptic 
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community.501 In return, Nasser declared himself a friend to Egypt’s Copts, claiming his 
childhood upbringing in a Copt-heavy village gave him a good opinion of Egypt’s 
Christians.502  
 Nasser was not in his own view anti-Islam; he had publicly called for a “form of 
Islamicized modernity,” but one in which the mosque would be limited, in the tradition of 
John Locke, to the private sphere, leaving the state free to govern the public realm.503 He 
rarely, if ever used religious vocabulary in public, and he worked hard to diminish the 
strength of sectarian feeling, which he saw as an impediment to pan-Arabism. This 
stance, especially coming from a Muslim political leader, was unpalatable to Egypt’s 
Islamists, who worked to undermine Nasser’s agenda even before he became the head of 
state. The Brotherhood had vowed to block the withdrawal of British troops because they 
disliked the secular program of the Free Officers. Although their attempt failed, they 
collaborated with the British in 1955 to contact exiled King Farouk in Italy, who they 
planned to reinstate as ruler of Egypt with Jordanian and Saudi help.504  
In addition, Brotherhood members preached against Nasser during Friday 
sermons and built resistance to his rule in the countryside. As a result, Nasser began a 
series of targeted maneuvers against the Muslim Brotherhood, eliminated Muslim 
Brothers from Al Azhar (Egypt’s preeminent Muslim university) and replaced them with 
regime loyalists, and ordered secular sciences to be taught at Al Azhar.505 In 1954, a 
member of the Brotherhood tried to assassinate Nasser during a speech in Alexandria to 
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celebrate the evacuation agreement with England.506 In the following crackdown, seven 
hundred members of the Brotherhood were arrested and six condemned to death.507 
In his biography of Nasser, Aburish argues, “Nasser’s pragmatism and refusal to 
allow religion a direct say in governance showed very early. This time he scored against 
the country’s conservative institutionalized Islamic tendencies. He secularized the 
religious courts, which used the Koran for legal analogy and guidance, making them part 
of the civil courts.”508 Of course, Nasser’s reforms did not secularize Egyptian law. 
Family law disputes in the Muslim community, although adjudicated in secular civil law 
courts, were decided using a codified version of sharia law. Nevertheless, his reform 
shifted judicial authority from priests and imams to state judges, denying the former a 
powerful source of intra-community authority and bringing citizens to the state for 
adjudication.  
Both this episode of judicial centralization and the next, under Sadat, involved the 
mobilization of a particular identity repertoire, but they were nevertheless extremely 
different. Nasser, although Muslim, advocated a pan-Arabist and Egyptian nationalist 
identity, which was equally foreign to all of Egypt’s religious groups. The elimination of 
sectarian courts was a byproduct of the more important agenda of centralizing the 
Egyptian state and consolidating its authority. It was perhaps inevitable that in this 
climate Nasser, who valued bureaucratized structures and rational systems so highly, 
would attempt to bring the final area, family law, under the jurisdiction of its courts as 
well. Eliminating sectarian courts was thus not part of a strategy to mobilize a particular 
identity repertoire to build loyalty with one group at the expense of another, as would 
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later prove the case with Sadat. Nevertheless, although their motives were different, as 
Nasser upheld an Egyptian nationalism that was equally leery of all sectarian ties, 
whereas Sadat embraced Islamism at the expense of non-Muslim rights in Egypt, the 
outcome was in one vital respect the same: the elimination of minority group judicial 
power. 
Under Nasser, legal centralization cannot be considered a punitive measure 
directed specifically at the Coptic community, but rather a part of Egypt’s post-colonial 
state building. Despite this motive, the Coptic community did not welcome the proposed 
abolition of their personal status courts, which allowed them to live under Christian 
family law. In other matters, the Coptic community had some success in persuading the 
government to abandon reform efforts, and through the 1940s it had been successful in 
delaying the abolition of Coptic church courts. Why, in 1955, did its attempt fail? 
 
The Decline of the Coptic Orthodox Elites’ Capacities 
 
 Through most of the period outlined above, the Coptic Church had been rigidly 
hierarchical. The Patriarch, also called the Pope, was the supreme head of the Coptic 
Orthodox Church and he presided over several layers of religious officials including 
bishops, priests, and monks. This structure created a small group of elites who were 
easily able to coordinate with one another, and gave them the automatic support of the 
Coptic laity, which gave the Pope de facto power over 8% of Egypt’s population. The 
changes to this structure of authority weakened the capacities of the Coptic Orthodox 
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elites in the period leading up to independence, such that they were unable to preserve 
full judicial decentralization in the period after 1952. 
During the 1700s, the Patriarch and his deputies governed the community without 
any competition from secular or lay Coptic organizations. The first substantive changes 
in community structure came during Muhammad Ali’s dynasty, when opportunities for 
Copts to participate in Egyptian government and upper-level society appeared.509 Peter 
VII, Patriarch from 1810-1852, supported a Coptic seminary that the Church Missionary 
Society founded in 1833 to provide better training for Coptic clergy.510  
Some of these better-educated clergy went on to become reform leaders during 
the next Patriarch’s reign. Cyril IV, called “The Father of Reformation,” introduced 
further changes into the Coptic community including four secular schools, two for boys 
and two for girls, and an Arabic printing press to print Coptic publications.511 This was 
done partly to educate members of the clergy, who were “ignorant, and negligent of their 
religious duties,” and partly to offer the laity an opportunity to gain some learning.512 He 
also pursued structural changes in the administration of the clergy. He ordered fixed 
salaries for priests to eliminate the private fundraising many carried out as a side business 
to supplement their poor wages, including selling church property and requiring fees for 
religious services.513 He also created a registry of the awqaf (religious endowments), 
properties whose rents comprised a large share of church income, to prevent their 
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misuse.514 The effect of these reforms was a better-educated clergy and the beginnings of 
an educated laity.  
This period coincided with two external reforms that were important for Coptic 
communal life. The first was the emergence of a Coptic upper class, which resulted from 
the opening of government jobs and the beginnings of large land ownership. Although 
Copts had acted as accountants and tax gatherers since the French occupation of Egypt, 
securing them a position in Egypt’s middle classes, they had been banned from high 
government office. But as this changed, Copts began to fill these posts, including the first 
Coptic foreign minister, Boutros Ghali, in 1893.515 Furthermore, both Abbas II and 
Khedive Ismail transferred large tracts of land to the Coptic Church, further enriching it 
and its clergy.516 The second reform was a decree issued by the Ottoman Empire in 1856. 
The Khatt al Hamayoni (Hatt-i Humayun in Turkish, Jubilant Decree in English) 
provided guarantees for “spiritual privileges and tolerance” for the Empire’s Christian 
communities.517 It furthermore required that each Christian community elect a special 
council to decide on reforms necessary for the community and to share in the 
administration of “private suits such as those relating to inheritance.”518 This decree, had 
it been implemented as intended at the time, would have removed personal status law 
from the sole purview of the Coptic clergy and given elected councils, comprised of both 
clergy and laymen, the ability to adjudicate these disputes as well. 
 In fact, these lay councils were not created in Egypt until 1874 when the Coptic 
Papacy was vacant for four years. During this period, Bishop Mark (Marqus), who was 
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appointed interim leader, chose select members of the Coptic upper class to help him 
govern the community, including two former students of Cyril IV’s schools.519 In 1874, 
he petitioned Khedive Ismail to make the position of these advisors permanent with the 
creation of an advisory board--in other words to establish a council, called the Majlis 
Milli (Community Council), to be composed of clergy and laity. The decree officially 
establishing the Council was quickly granted.520 The Council was composed of twelve 
lay members and twelve church deputies elected in five-year cycles and it was charged 
with overseeing the awqaf (religious endowments) and personal status law.521 This was 
the first time that lay members of the community had an opportunity to participate in its 
governance. Effectively, the decree ordering lay participation in adjudication and 
administration came only shortly after an educated upper class had emerged to fulfill it.  
A few months later, the community overcame the disagreements that had 
prevented the appointment of a new Patriarch, and Cyril V (born al-Barmus) was 
appointed to the position. Almost immediately, a power struggle ensued between the 
Patriarch and the Majlis Milli, which resulted in many iterations of the successful 
elimination of the Majlis by the Patriarch, followed by its reinstatement by either Egypt’s 
ruler or the Coptic community. From this point forward, Copts were divided in opinion as 
to the correct source of authority concerning personal status law and the degree of 
allegiance due to the Patriarch and (or) the increasingly secular Majlis Milli. As Sana 
Hasan summarizes, they “vacillated between two competing modalities of solidarity: the 
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religious one offered by the clergy, with the church as the communal meeting place, and 
the secular one offered by the Coptic upper class.”522 
By 1875, the first Majlis had been dissolved because the Patriarch refused to carry 
out its suggestions, and in the face of its increasing irrelevance, the council stopped 
meeting.523 In 1883, a group of reformers successfully lobbied Khedive Ismail to 
reestablish the Majlis, and it once again began to meet regularly to consider matters of 
personal status law and to administrate waqf (endowment) properties. But the Patriarch, 
still convinced that the council was a challenge to his authority, refused to attend 
meetings. Without his presence, the Majlis was unable to achieve any of its desired 
reforms, and it again stopped meeting in 1884.524 A group of upper class laymen 
successfully petitioned the government to bring the Majlis Milli back into existence in 
1891.525 This time it lasted for two years, until the Patriarch and Bishop of Alexandria, in 
a gesture of defiance, excommunicated the Khedive’s choice of President for the new 
Majlis. In response, the Khedive sent Cyril V and the John, Bishop of Alexandria, into 
exile.526 Although the Majlis was pleased to have won definitive government support, the 
exile of the Patriarch left a vacuum in spiritual leadership which, according to Bestavros, 
resulted in turmoil for the community: “Churches turned into empty sanctuaries, baptisms 
were not celebrated, marriages were not contracted, even the final religious rites for the 
dying and the dead were not available.”527 In response, large delegations of Copts 
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petitioned the Khedive for the Patriarch’s pardon, and in 1893 the Patriarch returned to 
Cairo, where he promptly disbanded the Majlis Milli.528  
The Majlis met again from 1906-1909, but was dissolved in 1909 after a bitter 
fight over who should have the authority to control church finances, and particularly the 
awqaf lands. This Majlis was composed entirely of lawyers who had been elected for 
their competence in managing community matters, particularly compared to the illiterate 
and often uneducated clergy.529 However, supporters of the Patriarch pointed out that the 
clergy were the “defenders of Christianity” and as such had the highest claim to 
important administrative duties.530 Bestavros acknowledges the claims of both sides—the 
laity were often better administrators and managed complex judicial and financial 
arrangements more ably than the clergy, but the clergy had the support of the majority of 
the Coptic community and the Patriarch, who was used to governing in a “traditional, 
autocratic manner”, was successful at mobilizing the community against the Majlis.531 
The 1908-1909 clashes between the Majlis and the Patriarch played out during sermons, 
in debates published in Misr, a leading Coptic newspaper, and in private pamphlets 
printed by both sides lambasting the other.532 By 1912, the Patriarch had managed to pass 
two laws, one that limited the Majlis to twelve members, and the other stipulating that in 
the event of his absence, the Council could only meet under the leadership of his 
appointed deputy.533 During this period the number of educated Copts continued to rise, 
which fueled support for the Majlis.534 The net effect was a community divided between 
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supporters of the Majlis and supporters of the Patriarch, and an extremely weak 
administrative structure. 
In 1927, the Majlis Milli was revived yet again according to its 1883 mandate, and 
this time managed to reach a compromise with the Patriarch over financial control of the 
awqaf.535 A sub-committee headed by the Patriarch and composed of four members of the 
Majlis and two Bishops administrated the awqaf for the next decade, until the Majlis 
again seized full control in 1937.536 By this point, the debate over waqf control was so 
salient that it became an issue in the election of the next two Patriarchs, Macarius III and 
Joseph II. In his single year as Patriarch, Macarius failed to negotiate a settlement over 
waqf control, and Joseph II was in 1946 elected on a platform of supporting laical control 
over the awqaf.537 However, Joseph II’s reign brought new conflict to the community. 
Having promised the awqaf to the laity, he reneged on the deal and supported the clergy’s 
bid to attain control over them. More seriously, by the early 1950s he faced charges of 
corruption for selling Bishoprics. Pennington describes him as “a feeble old man 
allegedly dominated by a manservant who did a roaring trade in the sale of ecclesiastical 
appointments.”538 During his reign and just following the Egyptian revolution, Ibrahim 
Fahmi Hilal, a young lawyer, established a reform movement, “The Coptic Nation,” to 
promote Coptic identity.539 Angered by the Patriarch’s corruption and the community’s 
inaction, Hilal and members of the Coptic Nation (which the regime had officially 
disbanded three months before) kidnapped Joseph II in July 1954 and forced him to sign 
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papers authorizing his abdication.540 Although the government arrested the kidnappers 
and reinstated the Patriarch, he was never effectively community leader again, as a 
committee of Bishops was appointed to supervise him.541 In 1955, Joseph II made one 
last attempt to gain control by exiling a Bishop, which resulted in the Synod of Bishops 
and Majlis Milli together petitioning the government for his removal, which was effected 
(he retired to a monastery) in 1955.542 Thus, during the crucial period of late 1954-1956, 
the Coptic community was effectively leaderless. 
The result of the internecine struggle between the Patriarch and the Majlis Milli 
was the deinstitutionalization of intra-communal adjudication mechanisms that dated 
back to before the Arab invasion of Egypt. A fractured community was left without a 
leader or spokesperson during the judicial reforms of 1955. By the time the responsibility 
for adjudicating family law disputes had been passed back and forth between the clergy 
and the Majlis Milli several times, there was some confusion in the community as to who 
had, or ought to have, the authority to adjudicate these disputes. The laity seemed not to 
highly prioritize this issue, as adjudication became less about dispute resolution and more 
about the power struggle between the clergy and Majlis Milli. Thus, by the time the 
British were in negotiations to leave Egypt, Coptic activists and reformers were the only 
members of their community who attempted to forestall government reforms that would 
have ended Coptic control over family law disputes. Family law was no longer the 
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exclusive domain of the Coptic Orthodox Church; its dispute resolution mechanisms had 
become deinstitutionalized. As a result, it was no longer a salient issue that could 
mobilize community action. 
Perhaps more importantly, the events leading up to 1955 had robbed the Coptic 
community of an authoritative leader or group that could advocate on its behalf during 
negotiations with the government. Previously, strong community leadership had been 
able to forestall government reforms. Law No. 462 was not the first effort by the 
Egyptian government to bring confessional courts under the control of the state. In 1927, 
the Minister of Justice was asked to come up with a comprehensive plan to unify the 
confessional family law courts, but when the Ministry of Justice asked for input from 
Egypt’s non-Muslim communities, he received overwhelming opposition from the Coptic 
community, leading him to conclude that only community clergy could change the law.543 
In 1931, the government again attempted to discern whether it would be possible to 
create a single personal status code for non-Muslims, but Misr and other Coptic 
newspapers spread opposition to the plan, and it was never moved out of the Ministry of 
Justice.544 In 1936, the Ministry of Finance tried to move the Ministry of Justice plans to 
a Cabinet vote, and succeeded in galvanizing some support, only to have the Cabinet, 
composed mainly of Wafd party members (who were at the time allied closely with the 
Copts) declare the reforms beyond their jurisdiction.545 In 1944, the government 
attempted to pass a bill that would require all Egyptians, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, 
to use Muslim inheritance laws, but Coptic representatives in the Chamber of Deputies 
protested and the Patriarch withdrew into seclusion to protest the reforms, and they were 
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never passed.546 In 1945, another attempt failed. In 1955, however, without a strong 
Pope, the only group to protest the reforms was a delegation of three bishops.547 Their 
objections were not successful because it was unclear to Nasser whether they truly 
represented the Coptic community or could mobilize the community on behalf of the 
regime. 
Later, in the years after his 1959 election as Pope, Patriarch Cyril VI and 
President Nasser became good friends and political allies. As a consequence, the Coptic 
community was granted permission to build a number of new churches and rebuild 
churches that had fallen into disrepair.548 The personal friendship and political alliance 
between Cyril VI and Nasser proved to be of immense benefit to the Copts.549 This 
further illustrates the disastrous consequences of not having a spokesperson during the 
1955 reform period. If one engages in counterfactual thinking, it is likely that had Cyril 
VI been Patriarch during the 1950s, the reforms might have been circumvented. In fact, 
Cyril VI and Nasser forged an understanding that both solved the waqf crisis in the 
Coptic community and secured Nasser’s support for the community. At the Patriarch’s 
request, in 1962 the Majlis Milli was disbanded, leaving control of the Coptic community 
to the Patriarch and his selected clergy.550 In return, Cyril VI pledged the support of the 
Coptic community to Nasser and publicly gave his blessing to many of Nasser’s projects. 
In particular, when Nasser attempted to resign his presidency followed the 1967 debacle 
with Israel, the Patriarch visited him at home to declare “the Copts’ insistence on his 
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leadership.”551 During this period, Nasser granted the Coptic community sufficient funds 
to build a cathedral in Cairo and to construct a new monastery.552 Nasser even attended 
the ceremony where the cornerstone of the new cathedral was laid.553 In essence, what 
Tadros describes as the first “entente” between the Egyptian state and the Coptic 
community, an alliance that gave Nasser the unconditional political support of the Coptic 
community in return for advancing the Pope’s agenda, was materially profitable for both 
sides.554 But it came too late to stand in the way of the administrative reforms that 
removed Coptic law from communal adjudication and made it a part of the Egyptian 
court system. 
 
Summary of the Argument 
 
By the end of this period, then, Coptic Orthodox elite capacities had declined 
dramatically. The issue of preserving judicial decentralization no longer mobilized 
popular support for Coptic church leaders, so they had lost a large proportion of popular 
support. The community disagreed over whether the church or secular elites should 
govern, which caused a strong decline in elite coordination, since one half of the elites 
was bitterly opposed to the agenda against the other half. Finally, this dysfunction caused 
a vacuum in key leadership positions during the period of bargaining over the new level 
of judicial decentralization that post independence Egypt would adopt. By contrast, 
                                                
551 Tadros, 272. 
552 Ibid., 271, Pennington 166. 
553 Al Dustur, July 23, 1997 “Nasser and the Rich Copts.” 
554 Tadros, 272. Author interviews with Rania Nagar and Sherine Lamy on February 29, 2012, said that 
“everyone” in the Coptic community knew that Nasser was very good to the Copts because he and Nasser 
were personal friends. Although Michael, in an author interview on February 26, expressed the belief that 
the friendship was one-sided and Nasser benefited more than Cyril, he agreed that there was also close 
cooperation. 
 208 
Nasser came to power with a strong mandate to reform the governmental structure of the 
newly independent country. In sum, the fragmentation of the Coptic community that 
made it unable to bargain effectively with the Egyptian state in the 1950s proved key to 
Nasser’s largely successful effort at judicial centralization, driven by the kinds of 
concerns that have fostered judicial centralization in many settings. 
 
Period 2: Further Attempts at Judicial Centralization under Sadat 
 
 The elimination of sectarian courts marks the end of formal judicial 
decentralization in Egypt. Constitutional reforms in the late 1970s and early 1980s further 
centralized Egypt’s legal code, but did so via a contentious process that produced less 
sweeping changes in practice than the state desired. This second period of reform 
demonstrates the importance of the relative contextual capacities of the state leaders and 
Coptic Orthodox elites, particularly the increase in elite coordination on judicial 
autonomy in minority communities, theorized here as necessary to constrain state 
centralization initiatives. 
In 1970, Anwar Sadat succeeded Nasser as president of Egypt, and in 1971 he 
amended the constitution to list sharia law as “a” major source of legislation, thereby 
acknowledging the primacy of Islam in Egypt’s political life, but without mandating its 
use in drafting any particular legislation. In 1977, following bread riots and criticism of 
the ongoing peace efforts with Israel, Sadat proposed to amend the constitution to make 
sharia “the” primary source of law, which would make any civil laws on the books that 
clashed with sharia law candidates for nullification, and would preclude the introduction 
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of sharia-incompatible laws. This law represented a disaster for Egypt’s non-Muslim 
citizens.555 Although the move can be read as a populist measure to appease Egypt’s 
Islamists, who had become steadily more powerful through the 1970s, it was also timed 
to draw attention away from the peace process with Israel and economic problems. 
However, the Coptic church was able to delay the reforms until a complete breakdown in 
relations between the President and Pope led to the exile of the latter.556  
Pope Shenouda succeeded Cyril VI in 1971, the year after Anwar Sadat assumed 
the presidency of Egypt following Nasser’s death. Cyril VI maintained friendly relations 
with Nasser’s successor for the year that they overlapped, but Shenouda’s relationship 
with Sadat was strained from the beginning, and became outright hostile with time.557 
Although Pope Shenouda was not the government’s least favored choice in the 
nomination process for Pope, Sadat preferred Anba Samuel, who was considered more 
“cautious and politically reliable.”558 Shenouda was viewed as too political for assuming 
the role of Bishop responsible for educational affairs and for the weekly question and 
answer sessions that he delivered at St. Mark’s Cathedral in Cairo, which routinely gave 
him an audience of thousands.559 Whereas Cyril VI quietly centralized church power 
through his friendship with Nasser by eliminating the Majlis Milli, he never challenged 
the 1938 marriage law promulgated by the Majlis Milli that served as the government’s 
legal code for Coptic family law cases in government courts. Pope Shenouda’s first act as 
Pope was to challenge the 1938 code by issuing a decree banning divorcees from 
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remarrying in cases where the divorce had been issued on any grounds other than 
adultery.560  
As this only affected a small number of Copts, the government did not 
immediately react, and during the first months after Shenouda’s consecration, both he and 
Sadat took a series of public steps to maintain an at least outwardly friendly relationship. 
Sadat sent high-level representatives to the consecration including Prime Minister Fawzy 
and Salah al Shahad, the Chief Presidential Chamberlain.561 Front-page pictures in 
newspapers the next day showed a smiling delegate from Al Azhar, the country’s 
preeminent Islamic religious institution, shaking hands with Shenouda.562 A few days 
later, Shenouda visited Vice Prime Minister Shafei on the occasion of Ramadan Bairam, 
a Muslim holiday, and the next day he called on Hafez Badawy, Speaker for the People’s 
Assembly, and Dr. Abdel Kader Hatem, the Deputy Prime Minister, to thank them for 
their role in his consecration.563 The Grand Sheikh of Al Azhar and Pope Shenouda were 
both invited to attend the Cairo National Congress at the end of November, and a few 
days later Pope Shenouda issued a statement supporting Sadat’s position on Israeli 
settlement in Palestine and called for national unity under Sadat’s leadership.564 At least 
to begin with, both leaders attempted to preserve the state-church relationship that gave 
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the President the political support of the Coptic community in exchange for various 
public concessions. 
By the mid-1970s, however, their relationship was becoming strained. Sadat had 
loosened restrictions on the Muslim Brotherhood, and Islamists had become increasingly 
powerful in major campus and professional organizations across Egypt.565 Sadat began to 
publicly demonstrate his piety, attempting to signal solidarity with the rising Islamist 
trend.566 According to Hasan “When Sadat  
began positioning himself as the as-Rais al-Mu’min (the devout president), 
seated cross-legged on the prayer rug for photographers, he was not introducing 
anything new: he was merely riding the crest of a wave of popular enthusiasm 
for Islam that had been latent during the last years of Nasser’s life. Once 
Nasser’s massive reassuring presence, which had managed in the aftermath of 
the defeat to hold together the conflicting elements within Egyptian society and 
to make them keep to the old beaten track of Arab socialism, was removed 
political Islam burst forth and filled [sic] the vacuum. In an attempt to 
consolidate his rule, Sadat began to lend state support to the Islamic groups both 
within and without the universities…”  
 
Sadat, faced with rising opposition to his rule, sought a way to boost his popularity, and 
given that the most powerful members of Egyptian society were increasingly members of 
the Islamist opposition, appropriating the language and symbolism of Islam helped make 
his political agenda more palatable to the majority of Egyptians. Pan-Arabism was in 
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decline and secularism unpopular, so Sadat mobilized his Islamic identity for political 
purposes, having himself photographed at prayer, meeting with the Sheikh of al-Azhar, 
and referring to himself as the Muslim president of a Muslim country.  
As Sadat became less interested in representing Christian interests in Egypt, 
Shenouda became an increasingly political leader who mobilized his constituency to 
attain greater bargaining leverage with the Egyptian state. His greatest success was in 
centralizing the Coptic religious establishment and binding the Coptic community to it in 
such a way that the Coptic church became a corporate political entity, rather than a set of 
individuals bound together by a common faith. Centralization had begun under Cyril VI, 
who in 1960 changed the requirements for attaining priesthood to include graduation 
from the Coptic Clerical College, so that all priests would share a certain basic education 
directed by the central Patriarchate.567 Shenouda continued this trend, and one of his first 
moves was to ensure that the Majlis Milli, which still performed an administrative role 
even after losing its judicial role, was strictly loyal to him. During elections, he took to 
publishing his list of favored candidates in the Papal newspaper, and these candidates 
always won.568 He also brought the powerful institution of the bishopric under his control 
by subdividing existing dioceses and appointing young reformers who agreed with his 
campaign of reforms, in total quadrupling the number of bishops.569 Additionally, he 
recruited thousands of extra church servants to create another bond between the church 
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and its lay congregation and strengthened local church councils, which implemented his 
reforms at the local level.570  
These measures expanded the church’s reach, and Shenouda, along with some of 
his senior Bishops, used the extra manpower to extend the church’s influence in the daily 
lives of its congregation. Essentially, having eliminated opposition from within the 
community, Shenouda and his followers sought to reinstitutionalize the church as the 
central political authority for Copts, surpassing even the Egyptian state. To do so, they 
created new volunteer and social work programs for ordinary Copts and appointed a 
Bishop of Youth, tasked with involving young Copts in the life of the church.571 The new 
Bishop, Moses, used tactics such as engaging in topics like “drugs, sex, emigration, and 
job anxiety” that would appeal to youth and printing out “schedules of church meetings 
on the back of pictures of saints, so that the recipient of these schedules would be reticent 
to toss them into the wastepaper basket.”572 According to church workers at the Hanging 
Church, Cairo’s most famous Coptic place of worship, youth attendance at services 
increased from the 1980s onwards.573 
Shenouda revived the study of Coptic language and liturgy, and sponsored the 
recording of Coptic sacred music.574 In addition, innovations such as collective prayers, a 
weekly live address from the Pope during mass, excursions to monasteries, and 
community activities helped general church attendance to climb dramatically through the 
1970s and 80s and to turn the church into “a rallying place for Copts, where they can 
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reaffirm their collective identity.”575 Shenouda’s motives for these wide ranging reforms 
appears to have been a desire to increase the power of the Coptic church and to increase 
the ties of personal loyalty between his congregation and himself. He succeeded at both 
objectives; most Orthodox Copts today, even among the more educated youth who are 
often critical of the political turn that the church has taken, are hesitant to criticize 
Shenouda openly. Josephine, a young professional, spoke of “discontent among Coptic 
youth and quiet talk of a revolution within the church” but was scandalized that a group 
of Copts had dared to file a lawsuit against the Pope.576 Michael, a business executive, 
said that young Copts “resent the Church’s rigidity on certain issues like divorce and how 
hierarchical and authoritarian it all is,” but he supports Shenouda’s political leadership of 
the community.577 The vast majority of Copts are unwilling to express any disapproval of 
the Church or its leadership to outsiders, and the administrators of the central Patriarchate 
offices in Cairo display tremendous personal loyalty to Shenouda. The Coptic community 
thus entered the next period of attempted judicial centralization with a greater degree of 
elite coordination than it had during the first. 
According to Hasan, “the unintended consequence [of the reforms] was to 
increase the weight of the church vis-à-vis the state. The head of the state no longer had 
to deal merely with one of Egypt’s spiritual dignitaries, but with the institutional 
representative of a large, well-organized and unified religious community.”578 As long as 
Shenouda was unequivocal in his support of the state, Sadat mostly left the Coptic 
community to its own devices, particularly as Shenouda could order the Coptic 
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community to vote for Sadat’s preferred slate of candidates during national elections. 
Occasionally, though conflicts did flare up.  
Not content with banning remarriage in the case of biblically unsanctioned 
divorces, Shenouda wanted to change the 1938 Coptic law used by the state courts to 
reflect the new divorce rules. He also lobbied to give Copts the right to use Coptic 
inheritance law to govern the transfer of property in inheritance cases, rather than the 
sharia-based inheritance law that is standard for all Egyptians.579 The Pope’s multiple 
requests to change the law, however, resulted in refusals--the President requested that 
Parliament not take the matter up, as it could not be allowed to pass.580 Additionally, the 
level of violence between Muslims and Christians rose steadily through the 1970s, 
beginning in 1972 with the November 6 and 7 burning of a church and subsequent 
sectarian riots in Al-Khanka, Egypt.581 This incident gave Pope Shenouda his first 
opportunity for open confrontation with the government on the matter of protecting Copts 
from armed attacks, a matter on which he intended to be more aggressive than his 
predecessor. He accordingly sent one hundred priests from Cairo to Al Khanka to march 
through the streets in protest.582 To defuse the incident, Sadat promised Pope Shenouda 
that he would authorize the building of fifty churches. Sadat also commissioned a 
parliamentary committee of inquiry led by the Deputy Speaker Gamal al-Otaifi. The 
commission issued two recommendations: that the government loosen its restrictions on 
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the building of churches and that the Coptic church reinstate the Majlis Milli, canceled by 
Nasser.583 Although the law on church building was never reformed, the Pope did accept 
elections for a new Majlis Milli, albeit one that he tightly controlled.584 
The next few years were relatively peaceful, featuring visits and addresses 
between the Pope and Sheikh of Al Azhar, and between government members and the 
Pope that marked their at least ceremonial cordiality to one another.585 As a consequence 
of this improved relationship and, perhaps more fundamentally, his strengthened position 
as leader of a more united Coptic community, Pope Shenouda regained some of the 
bargaining power he initially lost due to his early conflicts with Sadat.  He was able to 
forestall Sadat’s proposal that the Constitution be amended to change Islamic sharia from 
being “a” source of legislation to being “the” source of legislation.586 The proposed 
change would have meant that in places where the Egyptian state had not yet made law, 
new legislation would have to originate from or at least be compatible with sharia law. 
At least in theory, it also meant that judges could “dismiss civil law deemed incompatible 
with the Sharia.”587  
In protest, Pope Shenouda called a meeting of the Holy Synod, which concluded 
that sharia could only ever apply to Muslims, and when that failed to persuade the 
legislature, he ordered the Coptic community to fast for five days at the end of the 
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summer.588 This was Shenouda’s first use of a collective fast to serve a political cause, 
and it was tremendously successful in mobilizing the Coptic community against the 
law.589 In response, Prime Minister Salem visited the Pope to notify him that the 
proposed legislation had been tabled, and a few days later the Pope met with President 
Sadat and the Grand Sheikh of Al Azhar to pray together to reaffirm their good 
relations.590 In this instance, the Pope’s protest was successful in averting legislation that 
would have brought the Coptic community under the jurisdiction of sharia law. 
This victory turned out to be temporary, however, as in 1979, coinciding with the 
deeply unpopular peace treaty with Israel, Sadat again proposed a national referendum to 
approve an amendment to Article II of the Constitution to make sharia “the” source of 
national legislation, and by 1980 a full draft was sent to the Cabinet.591 By this time, 
relations between Pope and President Shenouda were significantly worse than they had 
been. In 1978, 1979, and 1980 there had been sectarian conflicts in Assiut and Minya, 
two towns in Upper Egypt with the highest concentrations of Copts in Egypt, and in 
Alexandria and Cairo as well. In 1979, an ancient Coptic church in Cairo was burned, and 
in Alexandria in the spring of 1980, as Parliament debated the proposed amendment, 
large-scale clashes broke out between Muslim and Christian students at the University of 
Alexandria.592 As Hasan points out, the Sadat’s politicization of Islamic identity involved 
portraying Copts as the “other” within Egypt.  In response, Shenouda too emphasized the 
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separateness of Coptic identity, which led both sides to overstate the threat that each 
posed to the other, heightening sectarian conflict during this period.593  
Faced with both attacks on Copts and the advancement of the sharia legislation, 
the Pope canceled Easter and went into retreat in protest.594 These actions had a much 
larger effect than the previous order to fast because Pope Shenouda refused to receive the 
usual Easter greetings from the President and, in canceling Easter, he drew the attention 
of the expatriate Coptic community, who could not watch the usual broadcast of the 
Pope’s Easter sermon. As a result, a large group of Copts protested in the United States 
during Sadat’s visit to discuss with President Carter the terms of Egypt’s peace treaty 
with Israel.595 
These events represented the first irrevocable breakdown in bargaining between 
Sadat and Shenouda who, if not happy with one another’s political activities most of the 
time, were at least able to exchange key goods such as permits to build churches, political 
appointments, and a certain degree of influence over the legislative agenda for political 
support and votes. Up to this point, their dependence on one another’s support meant that 
they were able to recover from setbacks in their political relationship. In addition to the 
rising sectarian violence, there are two particular incidents in the preceding three years 
that made it impossible for their political relationship to continue. The first was related to 
Sadat’s peace process with Israel. As part of the normalization of relations between the 
two states, Sadat asked Shenouda to send a delegation of priests and Bishops to 
Jerusalem on a symbolic pilgrimage. Shenouda refused, allegedly to prevent Egypt’s 
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Muslim population, the majority of whom were opposed to peace with Israel, from 
perpetrating further violence on the Coptic community, which would be seen as 
collaborating with Israel.596 This angered Sadat, who was particularly sensitive to 
anything that might get in the way of the peace process.597 In this particular context, 
because the state needed a particular good from the Coptic community, the latter’s 
relative capacity to bargain successfully increased beyond levels obtainable in most 
spheres of domestic politics.  
The second episode was the Pope’s demand that Copts boycott the referendum to 
approve the Constitutional amendment that would alter the status of sharia law. This was 
the first time that the Pope asked his followers not to vote for one of Sadat’s policies, and 
it demonstrated danger of a potential Coptic opposition to the regime. This time, instead 
of withdrawing the legislation, President Sadat gave a national address in which he 
criticized Pope Shenouda for canceling Easter, spreading sedition, inflaming American 
Copts against him, and for failing to live up to the high standard set by his predecessor’s 
cooperation with President Nasser.598 Coptic demonstrations made American Christians 
question Carter about his support for Sadat, potentially imperiling the peace negotiations. 
Also, signs held during Pope Shenouda’s first post-Easter speech saying “Shenouda is 
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our President” seem to have angered Sadat for their challenge to his authority. On 
September 5, 1981, having passed the constitutional amendment, Sadat responded to the 
next widespread sectarian violence by revoking the decree that confirmed Shenouda as 
Pope and exiled him to Wadi Natroun, a monastery outside Cairo.599 
 
Summary of the Argument 
 
 While the judicial reforms of the 1950s were more wide reaching in their extent in 
terms of abolishing sectarian judicial institutions, the amendment of Article II of the 
Egyptian constitution served to further marginalize non-Muslim, minority law in Egypt. 
Whereas a law reforming Coptic Orthodox family law to permit adoption and non sharia-
based inheritance might have been possible before 1980, the amendment of Article II 
made this kind of reform, and any law not in accord with sharia law, impossible. Whole 
segments of Christian sectarian family law are, at least for now, precluded under 
Egyptian civil law. Nonetheless, the state still recognizes or indeed requires sectarian 
authorizations in some areas of family law, particularly marriages.  Complete abolition of 
legal pluralism has yet to occur, in significant measure due to coordinated Coptic 
opposition under Shenouda.  Still, minority power is only minority power.  Although the 
deinstitutionalization of Coptic legal tribunals and the breakdown of elite coordination 
created space for state judicial centralization during the 1950s, the 1970s and 80s initially 
offered the Coptic church an opportunity to reassert itself and prevent further 
centralization. However, when Pope Shenouda demanded too much from Sadat, 
extending his demands beyond those realizable even with the relatively expanded 
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capacity that the Coptic church enjoyed during the peace process with Israel, bargaining 
broke down and some significant further centralization took place.  
 
Recent Developments 
 
The result of increased legal centralization in Egypt through these two eras of 
reforms is a somewhat confusing tangle of jurisdictions and competencies that overlap in 
some areas but not in others. For example, as noted, today jurisdiction over marriage 
remains shared between the state and Egypt’s various religious sects. An Egyptian 
wishing to marry must obtain a certificate of marriage from the relevant religious 
authority, and then, after the religious ceremony, register the marriage with the state. The 
state will not register marriages that are not accompanied by a religious certificate of 
marriage, and marriages are not considered valid until they are registered with the state. 
Centralization thus has now stopped at an awkward partway point, leaving religious sects 
with an almost token control over marriage but without power over divorce or forums in 
which to adjudicate marital disputes.  
The case of legal centralization in France forms an interesting counterpoint to the 
case study of Egypt. Modern day France, like Egypt, was made up of multiple different 
territories and identity groups who were brought under a central authority via strategic 
alliances and conquest. 600Egypt’s Ottoman period left it with a legacy of legal 
accommodation for different religious norms which contrasts starkly with France, where 
Catholic-Protestant conflicts in the second half of the sixteenth century left millions dead 
and a long-term suspicion of religious identity. Even today, French politicians, asked why 
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they choose not to accommodate aspects of Catholic, Muslim, or Jewish cultural practice 
or law (such as wearing a cross or headscarf, wedding via religious ceremony, etc.) bring 
up the siege of La Rochelle, where Catholics besieged and killed thousands of Huguenots 
in 1572-3.601 They argue, in an interestingly uniform narrative, that La Rochelle formed a 
turning point for religious identity in France, and that having once seen the violence 
unleashed by religious hatred, French officials would never again allow policies that 
support the mobilization of religious identity in French politics.602 While England ignores 
the presence of non-state mediation bodies such as the Sharia councils, and Egypt 
centralizes by bringing group law under extensive state control, France defines group law 
out of existence by eliminating the category of religion entirely from public life.  
Egypt, in contrast, retains significant legal pluralism, even though centralization 
efforts have not disappeared after the two main initiatives discussed here.  In 2000, Egypt 
further reformed its judiciary to introduce specific family law courts, effectively 
removing family law jurisdiction from the more general first instance courts. This change 
was entirely structural; the underlying laws remained the same. In practice, this had very 
little effect on minority law in Egypt, but it did offer the hope that the judges might 
possess some degree of specialization in the area of family law, including the family law 
of different religious denominations, as opposed to the generalist Muslim judges who had 
heard these disputes previously.  
In Egypt today, all matrimonial law is governed under sharia law unless two co-
members of a particular religion marry one another. If two Orthodox Copts wed, for 
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example, their union is governed by Coptic Orthodox law, although the marriage must be 
legalized by the state through filing the appropriate, church-generated paperwork. This is 
true as well for Catholics, Protestants, and the various other Orthodox sects such as Greek 
and Syrian Orthodox Egyptians. When a Catholic marries a Protestant, or an Orthodox 
Copt marries a Muslim, these unions are solemnized under sharia law, which governs all 
“mixed” marriages as well as marriages between Muslims. In effect, Egyptians are 
governed according to religious identity, with Islam and its associated sharia law 
operating as a sort of trump card that operates when it is unclear whose law should 
prevail. 
 Divorce, on the other hand, is governed entirely by the state. Civil divorce is 
permitted as long as it is authorized by the legal code of at least one spouse, so that a 
Muslim may divorce a Catholic whose legal code would otherwise ban divorce. Because 
the courts rely on the relatively liberal 1938 Coptic Orthodox family law written by the 
secular Majlis Milli, divorce is legal for Orthodox Copts on nine separate grounds, which 
gives litigants a sufficiently wide range of options that most divorces go through. The 
Patriarchate, however, refuses to recognize the 1938 law because it was written by a 
secular body, and instead claims to follow the laws of the Bible, as codified by the 
Church in 1955.  These codes allow divorce only in the case of adultery.603 This means 
that an Orthodox Copt can only divorce by proving adultery (and the guilty spouse loses 
custody of the children), or by converting to a different religion.  Conversion is easier for 
men than women because they are less subject to sanction by the community, but it 
means that the couple’s children are automatically converted to that religion as well, 
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which is not the case if the woman converts.604 The disparity in divorce law between the 
Egyptian civil courts and Patriarchate has led to the filing of several lawsuits against the 
Pope on behalf of litigants who possess a civil divorce but are unable to remarry because 
the Patriarchate, which issues marriage licenses, refuses to recognize their divorce.605 
The lawsuits pit two different views of Egyptian law against one another. The 
Pope’s lawyers argue that Egyptian civil courts, including the Supreme Administrative 
Court, which heard some of the cases on appeal, lack jurisdiction over religious law and 
thus cannot hear the case. They contend further that even if the civil courts had 
jurisdiction, the 1938 Coptic family laws that the court used in its decision are no longer 
valid, because the Coptic community now follows the law as written in the Bible.606  
The Supreme Administrative Court’s decision argues, in contrast, that it does 
have jurisdiction, because it views the Coptic Orthodox Patriarchate as a “public law 
corporate person” and that the 1938 laws have customary law status, and thus hold 
force.607 Furthermore, it notes that the Egyptian Constitution includes the right to form a 
family, and that Coptic religious officials only have the right to exercise jurisdiction over 
marital law to the extent that they do so within the bounds of Egyptian civil law, 
including the Constitution, and subject to judicial oversight.608 This decision, issued in 
2008, comes closer than any other recent judgment to clarifying the relationship between 
sectarian law and Egyptian civil law. It makes clear that sectarian law holds a subordinate 
position to both the Egyptian Constitution and subsequent statute-based laws, and it 
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effectively rules that sectarian groups may not unilaterally change the content of their 
personal status laws.  
In response, Shenouda ordered the Majlis Milli to pass a formal amendment to the 
1938 Coptic Orthodox Personal Law Code to eliminate articles 52 through 58, leaving in 
place only articles 50 and 51, which authorize divorce in the case of proven adultery or 
conversion to another religion, respectively.609 This seems to have had little effect, 
however, because in 2010, the Supreme Administrative Court again ordered Pope 
Shenouda to allow a member of his congregation to remarry within the Coptic church 
after his former wife, the actress Hala Sidqi, converted to Syrian Orthodox Christianity to 
nullify their marriage.610 Shenouda refused to recognize the divorce because Sidqi had 
converted to another denomination of Orthodox Christianity, which meant that her 
divorce should still fall under Orthodox jurisdiction. The Supreme Administrative Court 
ordered the divorce to go through because denominational difference is sufficient for the 
Egyptian state to apply sharia law, which allows divorce, and because the Egyptian 
Constitution guarantees the “right to marry and form a family.”611   
In this case, as with the previous cases, Shenouda refused to acknowledge the 
court’s order and did not issue a remarriage license. His decision sparked days of 
widespread Coptic demonstrations in his support, and in favor of the Pope’s suggestion 
that the Egyptian state reestablish sectarian family courts to resolve this type of 
jurisdictional dispute. In response, then-President Hosni Mubarak ordered the Ministry of 
Justice to look into authorizing a unified personal status law for the various Christian 
sects of Egypt, something these sects had advocated since the 1950s. This initiative 
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would have allowed Christian rather than Muslim personal law to apply in cases of 
denominational difference. That Mubarak seriously considered allowing the domain of 
sharia law to shrink in favor of Christian law is astonishing. Before he could decide 
whether to follow through or not, he was forced out of the presidency in January, 2011. It 
remains to be seen how Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s government will address the ongoing 
demand of the Orthodox Copts to adjudicate their own family law disputes once again, or 
at least to place Egypt’s Christians beyond the jurisdiction of Islamic family law. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The case study of Egypt reveals two causal pathways to legal centralization. In the 
first, a bureaucratizing state sought to rationalize its administrative structure and thus 
attempted to eliminate non-state courts, succeeding in doing so only when the push for 
centralization coincided with a weakening in group capacity. It was only once the group 
in question, the Copts, became so internally disorganized and without leadership as to 
have relatively low capacity in comparison to that of the state, as well as low elite 
coordination within the group, that centralization largely succeeded. In the second, a 
regime in crisis looked to further legal centralization as a tool to strengthen its position 
against its Muslim opposition. Despite initial resistance from Coptic elites, abetted by 
greater unification within the Orthodox Coptic community, the regime eventually 
succeeded in centralizing to a significant extent when the regime replaced the recalcitrant 
minority group leader with more accommodating community representatives. The state 
thereby reduced Coptic elite coordination by depriving the community of a leader who 
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could successfully mobilize opposition to the reforms and bargain on its behalf.  Since 
2012, the Coptic community has been led by Shenouda’s successor, Pope Tawadros II, 
while Egypt has been led since 2014 by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.   The issues of whether the 
community will attain a unified Christian personal status law or regain the ability to 
adjudicate intra-community family law disputes remains unsettled.  Their fate is likely to 
depend on how far Egypt’s current and future leaders rely on their Islamic identity to 
retain power and the political strength, as well as the savvy of the Orthodox Coptic 
Popes.  
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
 
 
Summary of the Overall Argument 
 
 
One of the most pressing and under-researched issues in comparative politics is 
the delegation of the state’s coercive function to non-state groups such as military 
contractors, private jails, surveillance firms, and religious or ethnic courts. Many 
developed, democratic states hire private firms to enact force against international 
opponents and domestic law-breakers, but few are willing to permit the existence of 
separate, group-based courts and legal systems. Whereas contractors carry out the state’s 
mandate, courts make, revise, and implement laws, and, as such, are bound up with the 
governing authority of the state, as well as its coercive apparatus and its tax-generating 
property rights regime. Nevertheless, more than half of the world’s states do decentralize 
judicial power.  
This project theorizes the phenomenon of legal pluralism resulting from judicial 
decentralization. It argues that while many different pathways lead to various levels of 
judicial decentralization, they involve some sort of bargaining process between the state 
and societal groups, usually tribal or religious, which are bound together by norms not 
shared by the state. In this bargaining process, the relative capacities of minority group 
elites and the state, and of these, levels of elite coordination within these identity groups 
determine the level of decentralization that result. Observations from the case studies of 
Egypt, Lebanon, and Tanzania lend support to this contention and further demonstrate the 
mechanisms of bargaining. In all three cases, elite members of groups whose support the 
state needed to enact a particular agenda were able to use their power to preserve varying 
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amounts of autonomy from the state vis-à-vis inheritance law, marriage and divorce law, 
and other areas of the law. The Tanzanian state’s need for support from former chiefs for 
post-independence state building projects, the Egyptian state’s need for support from 
Coptic authorities during state building and subsequent international conflicts, and the 
Lebanese state’s need for support from religious leaders in holding together a fragile pact 
that allowed the Lebanese state to cohere, all gave these minority group elites sufficient 
leverage to press for partial judicial autonomy. 
Having examined judicial decentralization in three full case studies and three 
shadow cases, it becomes clear that while contestation whose outcome is determined by 
the above bargaining matrix is causally important, it is not the only important causal 
factor. In tracing state leaders’ and group elites’ capacities, I necessarily invoke the 
colonial period before independence and state building as a vital moment during which 
capacities took shape. As such, I begin to suspect that colonial legacies may be more 
decisively constitutive of subsequent bargaining positions and paths of development than 
my theory initially recognized. Comparativists have for similar reasons utilized colonial 
legacies to great effect in explaining outcomes in fields such as trade and finance 
(Mahoney 2001, Beck et al. 2003, La Porta et al. 2007), human rights (Cross 1999, Carey 
et al 2002, Mitchell et al. 2013), ethnic conflict (Blanton et al. 2001) and the rule of law 
(Joireman 2001, Helmke and Rosenbluth 2009). Judicial decentralization, as a process 
rooted in the state’s post independence trajectory, could also benefit from a greater 
emphasis on the constitutive role of colonial legacies. 
In the context of this study, I imagine that several separate components of colonial 
legacies would be immensely helpful in further understanding relative capacities. For 
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example, what form did colonial governance take? States with systems of indirect rule 
would be more likely to have strong group elites, whereas those that were centrally 
governed might have a stronger state at the moment of independence. It would also be 
interesting to consider whether the colonial power had attempted to centralize or reform 
the judiciary before independence. This analysis could help explain the first period of 
contestation following independence, in particular, when the state and groups negotiate 
for the level of judicial decentralization for the first time.  
However, colonial legacies alone cannot explain the full variation of types of 
judicial decentralization, and states’ trajectories in moving from one type to another. 
Because colonial legacies do not change after the end of the colonial period, they cannot 
explain later changes in levels of judicial decentralization. In Egypt, for example, Sadat 
accomplished further centralization in the 1980s. In Malawi, the state has reversed course 
on judicial decentralization policy three separate times. Colonial legacies also cannot 
explain judicial decentralization in states that were not former colonies. Nevertheless, 
emphasizing and exploring more fully the constitutive roles of colonial legacies is an 
important next step for this project, particularly since the first period of bargaining in all 
states that I have examined takes place either under colonial rule or in its immediate 
aftermath. 
 
Possible Directions for Further Research 
 
 Given that the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor deliberately 
set up a legally pluralistic framework for the new government, under which separate 
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identity groups would be governed by separate laws, and similar arrangements have been 
proposed for Iraq and Afghanistan, legal pluralism is becoming of more than theoretical 
interest. Aside from its origins and structure, there are many aspects of legal pluralism 
that warrant further scholarly attention. Do particular types of litigants fare better in state 
or non-state courts? More concretely, in which venue do women fare better? Does the 
state’s commitment to its lower level courts in rural areas suffer when there are also non-
state courts in these areas? How does long term reliance on or exposure to one type of 
venue or another alter citizens’ perception of the state or their participation in civic life? 
When states devolve judicial power to win support for their judicial projects, do they 
favor group rights at the expense of individual rights? These questions are yet to be 
answered, but I hope that a preliminary analysis of the types of legal pluralism and their 
origins will help to provide a foundation for these, and other similar inquiries.  By 
understanding the political forces that give rise to differing levels of judicial 
decentralization and legal pluralism, we can not only recognize that legal pluralism 
represents a range of highly consequential political phenomena that are not likely to 
disappear any time soon, as accounts stressing the reasons for centralization and legal 
uniformity may seem to suggest.  We can also begin to consider who benefits and who 
suffers, as well as which public goals are better advanced and which are not, by different 
forms of legal pluralism; and so we may be able to discern the prospects for constructing 
legal systems in many places that are more broadly beneficial for all they govern.  
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Appendix A 
 
Anecdotes and Sample Court Cases from Each Country 
 
 The preceding analysis of the conditions that beget various iterations of legal 
pluralism primarily focuses on macro social forces, and by necessity abstracts elements 
of the available data to draw more general causal conclusions. It does not, however, give 
a good sense of what it is actually like to witness proceedings in the courts and judicial 
tribunals that result from legal pluralism. This project drew on primary observations of 
these court sessions, so I will describe them here to give the reader a better sense of the 
lived experience underpinning the above analysis. Because I devoted less space to them 
above, I will begin with the three shadow cases. 
  
England 
 
England’s Sharia councils have gained a degree of notoriety over the last decade. 
Newspaper and magazine articles have discussed, with varying degrees of hysteria and 
accuracy, the fact that some British Muslims choose to avail themselves of non-state, 
religious arbitration. I visited and witnessed proceedings in four different councils, and 
spoke with arbitrators from another two. What struck me, again and again, was the extent 
to which litigants in these councils needed their services. On the day I visited, the Islamic 
Sharia Council heard two divorce proceedings from women whose husbands had either 
abandoned or abused them, and so met the Islamic legal requirements for divorce. 
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Neither woman had had a civil marriage, and one of the women was confused that the 
lawyer she had spoken with had advised her that she did not need a divorce since she was 
never married. In both cases, the litigants needed a religious divorce so that they could 
remarry. That such a thing wasn’t required by civil law meant nothing to them—the 
religious laws that governed their behavior required a divorce before remarriage, and they 
had come to the only authority that they knew could provide them with one. Both women 
were successful in their suit, although a third was denied a divorce for failing to attempt 
to reconcile with her spouse before asking that their marriage end. The Islamic Sharia 
Council appears to attract litigants who are either recent immigrants to Britain, or are less 
aware of British civil law. In cases where a civil divorce was required, the arbitrator 
usually granted an Islamic divorce but advised the litigant(s) to seek a civil divorce as 
well.612 
 The Birmingham Sharia Council, by contrast, worked closely with local civil 
courts. In all of the divorce proceedings I witnessed, the Council refused to issue an 
Islamic divorce until the couple had obtained a civil divorce first. They did so both 
because they wanted to make sure that their litigants truly obtained the full outcome they 
desired, but also because they recognized that rulings in British courts were fully binding 
when it came to things like filing tax returns, establishing guardianship of children, and 
other matters. Although they saw their role as important in advising the proper outcome 
or giving religious support to the court’s decision, they did not see themselves as 
substitutes for British law. They were particularly exasperated with a male litigant who 
had two separate religious marriages to two women, and knew that he was married in a 
civil marriage to one of them, but couldn’t remember which since he had been filing 
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single tax returns. Both women wanted to leave their marriage to the litigant, so the court 
interviewed both women, discovered which one had been involved in a civil marriage, 
granted the other a religious divorce, and sent the civilly married couple to the British 
courts for a divorce that they could then bring back to the Council for a religious one. The 
court advised the man not to seek guardianship of the children, even though they were of 
an age to be under his care according to Islamic law. When I asked them about this 
seeming contravention of the religious law that they purportedly used to arbitrate, they 
argued persuasively that they saw their role as helping members of their community to 
live according to their shared religious dictates to the best of their ability, but that they 
recognized that British laws and values were now an important part of that community.  
They also were sure that the children in this case would be better off with their mother.613  
 In cases that I witnessed at all four Councils, some litigants attempted to use the 
religious authority of the forum to help them get what they wanted in a civil divorce. In 
one case, a woman forced her husband to testify in front of her relatives that he had been 
unfaithful to her. By doing this, she gained their support in pressuring her husband to 
willingly participate in a civil divorce.614 In another case, a man had attempted to 
unilaterally divorce his wife while drunk. The woman used the resulting divorce hearing 
to reveal that her husband drank alcohol, and to ask for the Council’s intervention in 
helping him stop drinking, and to invalidate the divorce.615 The Council agreed to 
invalidate the divorce and referred the husband to a support group for alcohol addiction, 
but asked the couple to return in six months to establish whether the husband still wanted 
a divorce. I also witnessed cases where these Councils (and, in particular, the London 
                                                
613 Author interview and observation, Birmingham Sharia Council, May 9, 2012.  
614 Author observation, London Fatwa Council, May 11, 2012. 
615 Author observation, Birmingham Sharia Council, May 9, 2012. 
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Sharia Council) directly contravened British law, for example by allocating all property 
of a divorced couple to the husband, or granting custody of the couple’s children to the 
husband’s mother, rather than the children’s mother. I would have loved to have been 
able to find out whether these rulings ultimately proved binding, or whether the woman 
in either case sought redress in civil court. 
 
France 
 
 Coming from England, where Sharia Councils were widespread and easy for a 
researcher to access, it was somewhat jarring to find how closed the more observant 
sectors of French Muslim society were to outsiders. In interviews and conversations with 
French Muslims in the courtyards of mosques, bakeries, Arabic book shops, and cafes, it 
was easy to discern that French Muslims did not seem to approach their commitment to 
religious law with any greater or lesser degree of seriousness than their British 
counterparts. However, French law outright bans religious involvement in public life, so 
French Sharia Councils were an impossibility. Instead, I found that French imams quietly 
offered marriage and divorce services inside mosques on an as-needed basis. Support 
staff at the Union of Islamic Organizations in France spoke of visiting a mosque after 
their civil union to have a brief religious ceremony.616 This practice in no way 
contravenes French law, but it appears to be kept out of the public eye. More 
controversially, an imam at the Paris Central Mosque advised a woman who had just 
procured a divorce to ignore the French court’s allocation of the couple’s assets, and to 
                                                
616 Author interview, UOIF, May 29, 2012. 
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return as a couple for a proper allocation that evening.617 The woman expressed concern 
that she would lose her ex-husband’s financial support, but the imam argued that it was 
now her responsibility, and the responsibility of her parents, to support her. Interestingly, 
a large sign on the wall behind the imam’s desk announced that no religious marriage or 
divorce proceedings could occur unless the couple in question brought proof of civil 
marriage or divorce with them. That said, proof of the involvement of French law did not 
prohibit its contravention by at least one religious authority. As he told me, the law was 
the law, but what people chose to do in their own homes was up to them, since God could 
see everywhere, but the French authorities could not.618 
 
Malawi 
 
 In Malawi, courts governed according to local customary law and using chiefs, in 
Malawi termed Traditional Authorities, as judges were outlawed as part of the transition 
to multiparty democracy in 1994. However, many Malawians continued to use these 
courts, which were often never actually disbanded, and a law passed in 2011 reinstated 
these courts, although the Minister for Justice has never officially followed the law to 
recognize these courts.619  Whether cases end up in the courts of Traditional Authorities 
(henceforth referred to as TA courts) or state magistrates seems mostly to depend on 
questions of geography, family ties and social networks. In urban areas, where there is a 
greater concentration of magistrate courts and greater access to public transit, there is less 
reliance on TA courts. In more rural areas, a greater number of cases are decided in TA 
                                                
617 Author interview with Head of Religious Affairs, Paris Central Mosque, June 2, 2012. 
618 Ibid. 
619 Author interview with J. Ubink, July 2, 2013. 
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courts, although the magistrate courts still have a heavy caseload. In the most rural 
districts, however, magistrates presiding over courts do not always have copies of the 
laws they are meant to uphold, and have not received dispatches outlining changes to the 
law in several years. For this reason, they appear to rely on a patchwork of whichever law 
books they possess, notes from their training, and local custom. In one court near the 
border of Zambia, a magistrate had a copy of the United States Constitution but not that 
of Malawi. 
 Because there is less ability to forum shop in rural areas, litigants are often left 
with no recourse when TA courts reach decisions they disagree with, even when they 
violate Malawian law. In a court in a rural district in the South of Malawi, I witnessed the 
fourth and final section of a longstanding case involving a land dispute between two 
neighbors. At issue was a parcel of land that both had planted on, and each claimed 
belonged to their now-deceased parents. The Traditional Authority had asked the litigants 
to return on three occasions to answer more questions and to allow her to pursue her own 
research into the question. In this final session, she ruled that neither person could legally 
plant on the land because it formed part of a national forest preserve. Both litigants were 
furious—they suspected (and one of the Traditional Authority’s aides later verified) that 
the TA in question had a history of requiring disputants to make multiple appearances so 
that she could justify charging a higher fee.620 The nearest magistrate court they could 
approach was in the city of Zomba, which was too far away to allow the multiple visits 
that would be required to settle the dispute. In other disputes, however, TA courts had 
been able to peacefully adjudicate disputes over chieftaincy succession, land rights, sales 
contracts, and petty crime.  
                                                
620 Author interviews and court observation, TA Court, Zomba rural district, June 13, 2013. 
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 In most districts, I found an unofficial but strong collaboration between magistrate 
and TA courts. They often referred cases back and forth—TA courts sent complicated 
cases, or those whose outcomes could jeopardize their legitimacy, to the local 
magistrates, and magistrates sent petty cases or those whose backgrounds they were 
having difficulty discovering to TA courts, which often had better access to family 
testimony.621 The confusion governing national level recognition of TA courts was in no 
way reflected at the local level. There, officials in different venues proved capable of 
collaborating effectively, and using components of the different laws and norms when 
they best suited the case at hand. Perhaps the best example of this was an attempted 
murder case from a court near Lake Malawi. A woman had accused her neighbor of 
attempting to poison her children, but the magistrate suspected it wasn’t really an 
attempted murder. However, he wanted the case to be followed up, so he passed it along 
to the local TA court. The TA determined that the man had put poisoned fish outside his 
house in an attempt to poison some neighboring dogs that had been stealing some of the 
fish that he left outside in the sun to preserve with salt, and he had not imagined that 
neighboring children might attempt to eat the poisoned fish. Fortunately, no one was hurt, 
but the TA fined the man and asked him not to repeat the practice.622  
 
Tanzania 
 
                                                
621 Author interview with the District Commissioner of Nkhata Bay, June 25, 2013; author interview with 
the District Commissioner of Rumphi, June 27, 2013; author interview with Village Head, Rumphi Urban 
Council, June 27, 2013; author interview with Traditional Authority Malanda, Nkhata Bay District, June 
27, 2013; author interview with Traditional Authority , Zomba district, July 6, 2013. 
622 Author observation, Mangochi rural district court director, July 12, 2013. 
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 Like Malawi, Tanzania’s court system is under resourced and has a long backlog 
of cases. In urban areas, this results in sometimes years-long waits for simple cases. A 
week of observing one of Dar es Salaam’s magistrate courts showed me that a large part 
of the problem was the assessors, whose presence in the courts leaves the possibility for 
the introduction of customary law into civil law courts. The post of assessor, it turns out, 
is not lucrative, and most of the people who have both sufficient knowledge of local 
custom and the time to spend in a less high earning position are too old to take other jobs. 
As a result, there is a high rate of absenteeism among assessors. During the week I 
attempted to observe court sessions, two full days had to be entirely canceled (a court 
cannot operate without the presence of two assessors) and one day’s session began three 
hours late. The assessors often fell asleep and had to be awakened to waive their right to 
question witnesses. The cases at the court that I witnesses were mostly petty criminal 
cases involving theft, bar fights, and non-payment of previous court fines. The issues 
were mostly handled through the imposition of fines or brief, 24-48 hour long stints in 
jail. 
 At a magistrate court in Iringa, a city in the south of Tanzania, the magistrate 
seemed to work much better with the assessors. He asked their opinion on all of the cases, 
and listened when they weighed in on histories of local property disputes and 
longstanding family feuds. In one case, an elderly man and woman were in court because 
the man’s chickens kept going into the woman’s garden and eating seeds. The session 
turned surprisingly acrimonious until one of the assessors got involved, at which point 
everyone began to laugh, including the litigants. The assessor, a friend of both parties, 
had called them both old chickens (apparently a hilarious insult) and asked them to 
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propose their own solution. They agreed that the two would share the cost of an improved 
chicken pen. Although Tanzanian law would have called for fines or damages, the 
magistrate went along with the assessor’s collaborative solution.623  
 In Mtae, a small village in Lushoto district that is cut off from main roads during 
the rainy season, local elders held informal adjudication sessions in Mr. Pochi’s 
restaurant, the town’s main gathering place. Mr. Pochi, the main adjudicator, had served 
as an assessor, but found he preferred to run his business full time. Knowledge of his 
experience as an assessor brought locals to him for dispute resolution, which he did in 
return for a small fee. In one of the two cases I observed, he spoke with the families of 
two young men who had been in a fight. One of the families threatened to take the case to 
the magistrate’s court in Lushoto, but Mr. Pochi talked them out of it. Instead, he helped 
the families negotiate a solution. The aggressor’s family agreed to pay the medical costs 
of the injured party, and both families agreed to keep the boys out of one another’s way 
until their tempers had cooled.624 Normatively speaking, it was difficult to determine 
whether the litigants were intentionally avoiding state court in favor of a venue where 
they thought the result would favor reconciliation over restitution, or whether it was 
simply more convenient or less costly to do things this way. At the end of the day, both 
families were pleased—one had avoided the risk of having their son imprisoned, which 
would have deprived them of his labor, and the other had a small monetary settlement. 
 
Egypt 
 
                                                
623 Author interview and observation, Iringa Mjini Court, March 14, 2013. 
624 Author interview with E. Pochi, Mtae, February 23, 2013. 
 
 241 
 Arriving in post-revolution Egypt during the period when Mohamed Tantawi and 
a coalition of military authorities governed the country, before the election of Mohamed 
Morsi, and only a week after 79 people were killed in a revolution-related incident in Port 
Said, it became clear that it was going to be difficult to sit in on sessions in state courts. 
This proved to be the case, since not all courts were in session, and those that were 
operated under instructions to be wary of journalists. However, I was able to obtain 
firsthand accounts of proceedings in these courts from former litigants. By far the most 
common scenario I heard was that of a divorced Coptic couple attempting to remarry. 
The marriage law put into place by secular Copts in 1938 permits divorce, while the 
Coptic Orthodox church does not, so while Copts can receive a divorce under Coptic law 
in Egyptian state court, they cannot remarry, since marriages are still conducted by the 
church itself. One woman I spoke with was in a relationship with a man she intended to 
marry, but she was deciding whether her best bet would be for the man to convert to 
Islam, in which case they could be married under Muslim law, giving them a legitimate 
marriage in the eyes of the state but not their community, or whether they should marry 
overseas.625 Another woman had gone to court to ask for a divorce, but had changed her 
mind when she realized that her court-issued divorce would not be recognized by her 
family.626 
 There was a lot of discussion among young, reform-minded Copts, particularly 
men, about pushing the church to recognize divorce as part of the newly forming alliance 
between the Coptic church and the transitional government.627 These hopes seemed to be 
on the verge of being realized after the death of Coptic Orthodox Pope Shenouda III, who 
                                                
625 Author interview with J. B., February 10, 2012. Maadi, Cairo. 
626 Author interview with S. L., wife of Coptic Priest D. L., February 29, 2012. 
627 Author interview with M. S., February 14, 2012; author interview with G. M., February 22, 2012. 
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had been one of the church’s staunchest opponents of divorce, and his replacement with 
Pope Tawadros II, who was seen as being more pro reform, and the election of Egypt’s 
first post-revolution president, Mohamed Morsi. However, Tawadros II’s participation in 
the coup replacing Morsi with General el-Sisi seemingly reestablished the traditional 
dynamic of the regime granting the Coptic Orthodox Church wide latitude in regulating 
its internal affairs without state interference in exchange for Church support for the ruling 
regime.  
 
Lebanon 
 
 In Lebanon, I witnessed religious courts legally determine matters of post-divorce 
property allocation and guardianship, among many other matters. Having seen these 
types of decisions rendered before, but either unofficially, outside the domain of state 
law, or according to codes of law that didn’t necessarily reflect the community’s current 
understanding, it was somewhat jarring to realize that litigants in these venues did not 
have a backup option of appealing to civil law if they disagreed with the outcome. In a 
court near the border of Syria, a Sunni judge gave sole custody of a couple’s children to 
the husband, with only visitation rights for the wife.628 In another case, the court granted 
a man a divorce from a man and his wife, who although present, was represented by her 
father and not allowed to say anything except that she opposed the divorce. After the 
judge issued the divorce, he required the husband to repay his former wife the dowry she 
had brought to the marriage, but the wife’s father took the money instead. The court 
                                                
628 Author interview and observation, Sunni Sharia Court, Chtoura, Bekaa valley, Lebanon 
November 17, 2012, with Judge Mohamed Nokkari. 
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reporter, a local, suspected that the father had forced the issue of the divorce.629 In 
another instance, the court issued a divorce to a woman whose husband had abused her, 
but in the following case, the judge denied a divorce in a similar situation until the couple 
had attempted to reconcile. 
 In a Maronite court, I witnessed an appeal from a couple that wanted to marry, but 
had been denied permission to do so. Although the couple was both Maronite Christians, 
the man had never been baptized, so the church did not recognize him as a suitable 
spouse.630 The church offered two choices—either the man could be baptized, or they 
could appeal to the Bishop for an exception. The couple chose the baptism option. In 
another case, a Maronite couple that had chosen to obtain a civil marriage in Cyprus 
requested a religious divorce so that the woman would be free to remarry. The judge 
explained that there was no concept of divorce in the Maronite church, and that their best 
recourse was to return to Cyprus to seek a divorce.631 Another case involved an interfaith 
couple where a Maronite man and Muslim woman were seeking to marry one another. 
They could not marry under Sunni Muslim law because Muslim women, according to 
some interpretations, are prohibited from marrying non-Muslims, so they were hoping 
that the Maronite court could help them. They, too, were referred to Cyprus.632 While 
many of the cases were resolved in a manner that appeared to be satisfactory to both 
parties, others did not. In these cases, the structure of appeal led up through the church 
hierarchy, ending with the Patriarch of the Maronite Church. Although the church did not 
                                                
629 Ibid. 
630 Interview and observation, Father Maroun Nasr, Judge on the Maronite Court of Appeals, President of 
the Catholic Court for the East, Saint Tekla Monastery, Wadi Chahrour, Lebanon, November 15, 2012. 
631 Ibid. 
632 Ibid. 
 244 
condone it, litigants in the waiting room quietly traded tips about which religions they 
could convert to that might have laws more favorable to their hoped for outcome. 
 These observations, far from making it clear whether non-state courts are 
normatively desirable or not, serve to show how complicated the law is when people find 
themselves bound by multiple, sometimes conflicting sets of law, or when state law fails 
to reach all of its citizens in its intended form. Neither is it clear whether some forms of 
legal pluralism result in better outcomes for ordinary citizens than others. Even in places 
where pluralism is hidden from the state, such as France, citizens who find themselves in 
need of religious law are clearly able to access it, albeit discreetly. In England, the open 
nature of the Sharia Councils lends them greater visibility. This seems to help in most 
cases, as Council judges work more fluidly with state law, but it has also created a large 
backlash against Sharia councils and greater stereotyping of Sharia law. Whether or not 
the state brings minority group law into state courts, as in Egypt and Tanzania, or 
recognizes its use in other types of tribunals, as in Lebanon and Malawi, it is clear that 
legal pluralism is an integral part of the legal landscape of many countries. 
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